Serbian News Network - SNN

Socialists and Democrats Will Rule Serbia

2008-07-02T23:00:00.001-04:00

Socialists and Democrats Will Rule Serbia
by Srdja Trifkovic

http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=664#comments

The political situation in Serbia is both unprecedented and unexpected. No analyst had predicted, three or four months ago, that the election on May 11 would result in such impressive gains by the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS)—which won over 38 percent of the vote—and in a relative defeat for the Radicals (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS), which polled 29 percent. The most surprising feature of Serbia's post-election scene in the formation of the new governing coalition, based on an alliance between the "pro-Western, reformist" Democrats and the Socialists (Socijalisticka partija Srbije, SPS), the party of the late President Slobodan Milosevic.
For the past almost eight years since the fall of Milosevic, the Democrats and their allies have been demonizing the Socialist Party as an ugly relic of the past, the party that provided the political backbone to Milosevic and his regime, the obedient mechanism for all of his misguided and possibly criminal policies in the 1990s. One of the members of the present DS-led coalition, a separatist from Vojvodina by the name of Nenad Canak, has even advocated a formal ban on the Socialist Party.
But the Democrats have made a complete U-turn since May 11, having realized that they need the Socialists—who together with their smaller allies have 20 deputies—in order to stay in power. Over the past six weeks some extensive horse-trading followed that realization. Legitimizing the Socialists, proclaiming them to be a modern, decent, pro-European center-left party, fit for membership in the Socialist International, is merely one part of the package offered by the DS. Overall, the coalition agreement is the fruit of a massive exercise in political corruption, the like of which has never been seen in Serbia's long and turbulent history.
TYCOONS AND DIPLOMATS—The ability of the Democratic Party to come on top is nevertheless difficult to explain unless we consider the impact of an important pressure group helping the DS. This group's influence was not unknown, but it had never before pulled the strings so blatantly. It is the oligarchy. Now at last we know the full extent to which Belgrade's leading tycoons—their fortunes often harking back to the days of Milosevic—control the political scene from the shadows. About a dozen men who hold all key levers of financial and economic power in the country are overwhelmingly supportive of Tadic's Democrats. They are well aware that under the Yellow-Red Coalition (DS-SPS) their lucrative practices will continue unhindered. On the other hand, they were scared stiff of the Radicals, because the SRS had made the struggle against corruption a key element of its election campaign. In addition, the Radicals have amassed a lot of compromising information about some key oligarchs and their political associates in the DS camp, and they were determined to pursue prosecutions if they came to power. Knowing this, the tycoons had an additional motive to contribute lavishly to a clandestine slush fund that the DS used to woo Ivica Dacic, the Socialists leader, and his junior partners. Tadic's emissaries have done their work on the Socialist Party Main Board so thoroughly, that even this bulwark of Milosevic's reliable cadres from the 1990s overwhelmingly voted to support the coalition of their party with the DS.
While the exact magnitude of illicit transactions is unknown for the time being, Belgrade is a relatively small place in which nothing political remains unknown for long. In Serbia's politics, where there's smoke, there's fire. It is also noteworthy that the oligarchs enjoy the support of some Western diplomats in Belgrade—specifically the U.S. and British Ambassadors—in their self-appropriated role of king-makers, which provides a vivid example of the EU-NATO support for democracy in the Balkans.

COMMIES OLD AND NEW—That so many old Milosevic loyalists, who presumably have good reasons to despise and dislike Tadic's people, have changed their minds so swiftly, is a sad testimony to the condition of a shattered nation. The SPS U-turn does not concern the legacy of Milosevic alone. Having profiled themselves for years as a patriotic force determined to defend Serbia's rights in Kosovo come what may, the Socialists are about to join forces with the party obviously reconciled to giving up on Serbia's southern province after some decent interval, while pretending all along not to be doing so.
The readiness to treat vital national interests as disposable commodities indicates that the DS-SPS tandem is less surprising than it looks. The differences between the new partners may not be so deep after all. The leading lights of both parties have their ideological roots in the old, long-defunct League of Communists of Yugoslavia. A cynic would say that we are witnessing the creation of a coalition between Serbia's "reformist" communists—such as Dragoljub Micunovic—who have morphed into Tadic's Europhile social-democrats, and some seriously hard-line doctrinaires—such as Milutin Mrkonjic—who still remain faithful to Milosevic's legacy. It has been noted that we are now witnessing the coalition of two opposite factions from the Eight Session of the Communist party of Serbia in September 1987, which propelled Milosevic to power. The reformist, social-democratic wing was defeated at that time, while Milosevic's wing was triumphant. Over the past eight years the roles have been reversed. After an estrangement lasting two decades, the two factions are coming back together again.
Some Serbian patriots console themselves with the view that this coalition cannot last for long. They are wrong: this coalition is likely to stay in power longer than its predecessors because its partners will have no motive to rock the boat. The Socialists have obtained the best deal they could hope for, and they have an incentive to maintain the new status quo as long as possible. Their leader Ivica Dacic probably realizes that the party will disappear from the political scene at the next election: SPS rank-and-file will never forgive him the deal with Tadic, and this is the one shot at power, money and influence that he will ever have.
The Democrats cannot afford to risk another election, because they have reached the zenith of their likely electoral success, with just under forty percent of the vote and over a hundred deputies. They are loath to risk their current dominant position, especially if the country's financial and economic situation starts to unravel. Serbia is effectively bankrupt. It owes over $20 billion to foreign creditors, but in spite of heavy borrowing the neoliberals who run the showt have not succeeded in quick-starting the economy. Public spending in particular is not supported by the economy. After the final round of privatization, public spending may have to be financed either by inflationary means, or else by a new round of borrowing.
OPPOSITION IN CRISIS—On the other hand, the opposition to the DS-led government has to devise a long-term strategy which it does not have at the moment. In the short term it will be hard for the leading opposition parties, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), to come up with a program of action that could undermine the emerging coalition. The DSS of the outgoing Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica is entering a period of decline. It is having difficulty in retaining loyalty of any significant segment of the electorate. Having failed on two important occasions (after the elections of December of 2004 and January of 2007) to put together stable coalitions, it is paying the price of joining forces with the DS last year. The ensuing tensions and almost schizoid bipolarity between Tadic's Europhiles and Kostunica's moderate patriots have harmed the latter disproportionately. The latter is now paying the price of not entering a coalition with the Radical Party when he could do so from the position of strength.
The Radicals also are entering a period of crisis. For many years they have been building up their support and developing their base, in the confident expectation that the ruling parties' failures over Kosovo will work to their advantage. This is not the case, however. The Democrats have succeeded in presenting Kosovo as fait accompli to the Serbian public, and they keep pointing at some elusive "European integrations" as a substitute. The Radicals, on the other hand, have failed to articulate a message that is both correct and inspiring. The Serbs are tired of economic deprivation, and many of them are willing to be duped with Euro-talk. They are still listening to the rosy stories of the open EU path, which with the defeat of the Lisbon Treaty at the Irish referendum is in fact closed. There will be no enlargement of the EU for a many years to come.
SERBIA AND THE E.U.—Serbia's Euro-fanatics, led by President Boris Tadic, will admit no such thing, however. In an interview on June 29, Tadic stated two priorities of the new government: to ratify the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU as soon as possible, and to "complete" cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. But Tadic's haste makes no sense. Even if the Serbian Assembly ratifies it, that gesture will be meaningless. The EU has already decided that the Agreement is suspended until General Mladic and Dr. Karadzic are arrested and delivered to the Hague Tribunal—and that will not happen. Had the Serbian government had the wherewithal to deliver them, it would have done so log time ago. Even if the Serbian Assembly ratifies the SAA, it will remain inoperative for as long as Brussels remains unconvinced that Serbia has fully complied with its imposed obligation to cooperate with The Hague Tribunal—and yet such compliance is impossible for as long as Karadzic and Mladic are at large; it's a classic Catch 22. In addition, even if the SAA were to become operative, it would not mean that Serbia is any closer to joining the EU. With the outcome of the Irish referendum the Lisbon Treaty is effectively dead. The Treaty, had it passed, would have provided the mechanism for further enlargement. Now the EU has to fall back on the Nice Treaty, signed in December 2000, that came into force in February 2003. It specifically limits the size of the EU to 28 members, which means that Croatia may be admitted next year, and that's the end: after that, for maybe 10 to 15 years the enlargement process will be over. It is interesting, however, that in Serbia nobody seems to be willing to spell this simple fact aloud. The enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn keeps saying that the door is still open to new members, but he is not telling the truth. He is paid to say so. In reality, in Brussels the EU bureaucrats are knowingly nodding to each other that it is over: neither Serbia, nor Macedonia, nor Bosnia-Herzegovina, let alone Turkey, will be members of the EU for at least two decades.
AS FOR KOSOVO…—Commenting on possible replacement of UNMIK by EULEX in Kosovo, Tadic repeated on June 29 that no transformation of UN's mission would be acceptable based on the initiative of the UN Secretary General alone, and that a Security Council decision would be needed. His statement was apparently calculated to prepare the ground for Serbia's gradual admission that Kosovo is a lost cause. Tadic pretends to resist such outcome, but in practice he is not taking any steps that would make the position of the secessionists more difficult. Belgrade's trade with Kosovo continues unabated, Kosovo Albanians' transit through the territory of Serbia is unhindered, Serbian electricity keeps Kosovo's derelict grid functioning.
Tadic seems to be implying that Serbia will accept the EU's EULEX mission, illegal as it is, provided it gets a fig leaf of legality from the UN Security Council. At the UN SC the only barrier is the opposition of Russia. Russia is not going to continue opposing Western policies, however, if Serbia herself is reconciled to the loss of the southern province. We are already witnessing gradual distancing of the Russian diplomacy from the Kosovo issue. It is only a matter of time till the new government in Belgrade signals to Moscow that Serbia is perfectly willing to see Russia removing its objections to the transformation of the UN mission into an EU mission. If and when that happens, it will mark de facto acceptance of Kosovo's independence by Belgrade.
The chief losers, in the short term, will be the remaining Serbs of Kosovo. Their lot is fatally dependent upon the posture of the government in Belgrade, politically, financially, and morally. Their ability to resist forced integration into an independent Kosovo is dependent on what happens in the Serbian capital. With the new coalition, they can no longer count on any serious support from Belgrade and most certainly they can no longer take it for granted. The previous coalition had an important ministry, the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, which was ably handled by the Democratic Party of Serbia and one of its leading lights, Prof. Slobodan Samardzic, as Minister. They were able to devise a whole series of projects that helped the Serbian community in Kosovo feel that it is not abandoned and that its members can count on support from Belgrade. With the new government this will no longer be the case.
It is tempting to conclude that Serbia will have an unpatriotic government for the next few years. This conclusion depends on one's definition of "patriotism," of course, and Tadic would claim that his striving to join "Europe" at any price—Kosovo implicitly included—is somehow "patriotic." Tadic's and his cohorts' understanding of Serbdom means turning Serbia into just another post-modern European nation that has given up on the legacy of its culture, tradition, and faith, just another nation that measures its successes solely in terms of dollars or euros per capita.

Kosovo Serbs vow to stay divided

2008-07-02T18:14:00.001-04:00

Kosovo Serbs vow to stay divided

Kosovo's Serbs have rejected the region's self-proclaimed independence from Serbia, and on Saturday set up their own rival institutions. The BBC's Helen Fawkes says this is likely to cement Kosovo's divisions.

Kosovo may have declared independence almost four months ago, but in the Serb areas there is little sign of this being Europe's newest country.

When you wander around North Mitrovica, you see lots of Serbian flags.

Some of the shop signs are written in Cyrillic. Go inside, and you will be asked to pay with Serbian money.

Now this Serb-dominated town has its own self-proclaimed "parliament".

However, the assembly does not actually have its own building.

Its opening session was held in a cramped and sweaty university lecture hall.

There was no special seating, so the representatives sat on rows of wooden benches, alongside the members of the public.

The 40-or-so representatives of the new assembly were given laminated white cards to hold up when they wanted to vote.

Symbolic

''These people will be feeling victorious. The assembly preserves the status quo and the position of Mitrovica,'' says Jelena Bjelic, editor-in-chief of the Serbian language newspaper in Kosovo, Gradjanski Glasnik.

The assembly is designed to strengthen the position of Serbs in Kosovo.

It will cause trouble for the authorities in Belgrade. It will also cause additional problems for Kosovo Serbs
Dusan Janjic
Political analyst

Its constitution declared that it would act as co-ordination body with Belgrade.

However, it will not be able to make any laws, and so it does not have any significant power.

In some ways this does not matter.

It seems like the main purpose of the assembly is to be symbolic.

Not all Serbs support it, though. Some see it as joke.

The moderate Kosovo Serb leader Oliver Ivanovic says that rather than helping ordinary people, it will be used as a ''political weapon".

Nationalist base

Some of those at the opening session of the assembly wore badges with the face of Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, who is currently on trial at the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.

The politicians that make up the assembly are hard-line nationalists, belonging to the parties which are destined to be in opposition in Belgrade.

A pro-Western coalition government is expected to be formed this week in Belgrade.

So the assembly in Kosovo gives the nationalists a power base.

''The assembly does not represent all the Serbian political parties. It will cause trouble for the authorities in Belgrade. It will also cause additional problems for Kosovo Serbs,'' says political analyst Dusan Janjic.

The assembly was set up partly in response to Kosovo's new constitution, which came into force a few weeks ago, following the declaration of independence.

It says that the majority ethnic-Albanian government now runs Kosovo, and that it assumes many of the powers of the United Nations, which has administered Kosovo for the last decade.

The ethnic-Albanian political leaders have condemned the Kosovo Serb assembly as illegal.

The UN will not recognise the assembly - a spokesman for the UN described it as a virtual reality.

Whether it is legal or not, the assembly will be able to help ensure that the Kosovan government is not able to operate in Serb areas.

It will only deepen the ethnic divisions in Kosovo and strengthen the parallel structures that already exist here.

There are also fears that the rhetoric that is likely to come from the assembly will have a destabilising effect on one of the tensest region in the Balkans.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7481299.stm

Russia praises formation of Kosovo Serbs' parliament

2008-07-01T14:56:00.001-04:00

Russia praises formation of Kosovo Serbs' parliament
20:57 | 01/ 07/ 2008

Print version

MOSCOW, July 1 (RIA Novosti) - The parliament set up by the Serbian community in Kosovo is a logical response to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.

Kosovo Serbs gathered last Saturday in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica for a session to inaugurate their own legislative body, calling it the Assembly of the Union of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, and draft its mandate.

The statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry said the establishment of the Assembly was "a logical reaction to illegal and unilateral declaration of independence of the region and is a reflection of prevailing sentiments among Serbs to resist their forceful integration into the illegal entity of the Kosovo Albanians."

The establishment of the assembly brought negative reactions from many of the countries that backed Kosovo's independence when it was declared five months ago.

"A number of countries have made a hasty assessment of this move [to establish the Assembly] branding it as illegal," the ministry said. "Thus, they have once again shown their biased approach to the situation in Kosovo."

Kosovo - which has been under UN administration since NATO bombings ended a conflict between Serbian troops and Albanian separatists in 1999 - has been recognized by 43 of 192 UN member states, including by the United States and most major European powers.

Moscow has supported its ally Serbia in refusing to recognize the world's 'newest state'.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20080701/112744964.html

Return of the Reds

2008-06-26T14:47:00.001-04:00

http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=13051

ANTIWAR (USA)

Moments of Transition
by Nebojsa Malic

June 26, 2008

Return of the Reds

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Very Old Boss

There is a proverb in the Balkans, probably as old as civilization: where
drills fail, money will do. It seems a fitting byline for the unraveling of
some six weeks of political drama, following the May 11 general elections.
At first, it seemed that President Tadic and the Democratic Party were
celebrating prematurely; their coalition, while scoring better than polls
had predicted, lacked enough votes to form a government. An alliance between
the National bloc of ex-PM Vojislav Kostunica, the Radical Party and the
resurgent Socialists (once led by Slobodan Milosevic) seemed a foregone
conclusion, and was even reported as a done deal.

What happened next seemed like a plot hatched by Chancellor Palpatine
himself. On June 24, the Socialists' steering committee voted overwhelmingly
for a deal with the Democrats - the very same party that has persecuted them
since the October 2000 coup, and blamed them for all the ills that have
befallen Serbia since 1989 (or even earlier), including the NATO bombing and
the occupation of Kosovo. Now the "Yellow and Red" coalition is being
reported as a done deal.

This is precisely the "Pro-European" government that Washington and Brussels
have lobbied for, and Tadic desired since winning a second term in February.
In return for supporting the people that overthrew them on behalf of NATO in
2000, the Socialists would become "respectable." Without the stubborn
insistence on international law by the now former PM Kostunica, the new
regime in Belgrade would not be free to "do everything it can" (to borrow
President Tadic's favorite phrase) to please its "friends" in Washington,
London and Brussels.

In Bad Faith

How did this happen? One theory is that the Socialists' leader Ivica Dacic
wanted to free himself of Milosevic's shadow, and the promises of Imperial
favor were too much to resist. It is well-known that Dacic and his junior
partners, Dragan "Palm Tree" Markovic and Jovan Krkobabic, were feted by
Serbian tycoons close to the Democratic Party and "advised" by U.S. and UK
ambassadors, Cameron Munter and Steven Wordsworth. Of course, Wordsworth and
Munter reject any insinuation that they were meddling in Serbia's internal
affairs by brokering coalition deals; it's perfectly normal for foreign
ambassadors to "advise" politicians of the host countries what to do, is it
not? And the tycoons surely had nothing to do with any of this, they were
just legitimate businessfolk relaxing over some cocktails and barbecue, and
figured they would invite their good friends over to share.

The Serbian media space is notoriously rotten; most media are owned by
foreign conglomerates or political interests. So, when the German-owned,
unabashedly pro-Democrat daily Blic spoke of an imminent coalition of
Democrats and Socialists three weeks or so ago, even as the Socialists were
closing a deal about running Belgrade with the Radicals and the National
bloc, that report sounded like deliberate misinformation and wishful
thinking. But could Blic have been right? Was it Dacic's plan to "go Yellow"
all along?

It certainly appears so. Another paper, Kurir, published a transcript of a
taped phone conversation between two Socialist officials, in which they
revealed that the Belgrade deal was a red herring, made to be broken within
months, leaving the Democrats in charge of the city.

The official excuse given by the Socialists is that they could not agree
with the legal analysis of Serbia's stillborn treaty with the EU offered by
Kostunica's legal team. However, given the Socialists' statements on record
concerning the SAA, this is obviously a smokescreen.

Absolute Power

For their part, Kostunica's National bloc and the Radicals seem to have
taken the Socialists' defection in stride. The Radicals are used to being in
opposition; they were only in power as Milosevic's very junior partners at
one point in the 1990s. Kostunica has survived a Democrat-orchestrated
ouster once before, only to return in triumph. That said, how come he
allowed himself to be blindsided again? "Fool me twice, shame on me" sounds
very appropriate here.

And what of Serbia? Buried in private and government debt - the poisonous
fruit of economic mismanagement by Democrats' allies G17 since 2000 - with
its military, diplomacy and security services gutted at the hands of
ministers always more at home in Brussels than in Belgrade, it is now in the
hands of people who haven't the slightest intent to oppose the illegal
separation of Kosovo. Nor is the new regime likely to oppose any further
dismantling of Serbia, should the Empire wish it.

Governments are essentially protection rackets. If a government is failing
to protect its subjects' lives and property from depredations of another
government, it is not doing its job.

Worse yet, the Democrats in Serbia now control the presidency, the cabinet,
the parliament, the media, and the economy. And as Lord Acton wrote,
"absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Back to the Future

Commentator Branko Radun made an interesting observation in the wake of the
"Yellow and Red" deal: "A growing number of people has the impression that
this was a reconciliation of the two factions from the Eighth Session."

What he is talking about is the 1987 meeting of the Serbian Communist Party
at which Slobodan Milosevic rose to power, ousting the old, hapless
apparatchiks who were passive in face of Albanian separatism. Milosevic's
most intractable enemies actually came from the ranks of the old Communist
Party, because they saw in him the bete noire of Yugoslav Communism, a "Serb
nationalist."

The irony here is that Milosevic could hardly be a "Serb nationalist" and a
Communist at the same time, since those are mutually exclusive concepts.
Communism in the Balkans has always had a Serbophobic flavor. Yugoslavia was
declared a "prison of nations" run by the "Greater Serbian bourgeois
imperialists," with only the Communists willing and able to "liberate" the
various groups. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia became an official goal of
the Communists in 1928; once they held power in the country in 1945, they
abandoned the concept - why destroy something you can rule? - but it still
lingered in the country's subdivision into "republics," which would cause
such bloodshed in the 1990s.

From that standpoint, what happened this week in Belgrade is far less
surprising than what it seemed at first glance. Today's Democrats are
dominated by the heirs of those Communists who lost out in 1987. By making a
deal with them, Dacic recanted for his predecessor's "heresy" and came back
into the fold.

Reunited after 20 years, the "transnational progressivists" are again in
absolute control of Serbia. And lo, how fortuitous, the EU and the American
Empire also see Serbian culture, faith and tradition as threats to their new
post-historical order.

It is looking like the beginning of a beautiful friendship. For all but the
Serbs, of course.
__,_._,___

”The Hunt: “Me and Military Criminals”

2008-06-22T19:25:00.001-04:00

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9418

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION (CANADA)

”The Hunt: “Me and Military Criminals”

A book on man-hunt by the Tribunal’ s prosecutor general

By Elena Guskova

Global Research, June 22, 2008
Strategic Cultural Foundation

[translated from the Russian original]

The presentation of memories of Carla del Ponte slated for April 3, 2008
just days after she had left her post of the Hague Prosecutor General for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The book published under the title”The
Hunt: “Me and Military Criminals” covers quite a long period of del Ponte’s
stint as the prosecutor from August 1999 to December 2007. A large part of
the book is given to exactly “the hunt” or the search and organisation of
legal prosecution of the guilty people, negotiations with the leadership of
a number of countries and international organisation with an eye to
extradition of the persons the Tribunal regards as military criminals, and
the obstacles put up by officials of different levels to prevent her from
completing her hard work. But the book became a sensation long before its
going out of print, when journalists laid their eyes on it. Its readers all
over the world and people with thinking were shaken by the facts Carla del
Ponte gave in her book that had always been concealed from public, about the
atrocities of Albanians committed against peaceful Serbs and Albanians
unwilling to become part of hostilities in Kosovo and Metohia, and the trade
in body organs extirpated from kidnapped Serbs. The leaders of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) were the culprits, its militants and currently the
respected politicians Hasim Taci, Agim Ceku and Ramus Haradinai.

Carla del Ponte writes that she got information from journalists way back in
1999 about 300 Serbs who were kidnapped in Kosovo and Metohia and then taken
to Albania. At first the prisoners were placed in the camps in Kukes and
Tropya in Albania’s north, and later surgeons hired by Albanians removed
their vitally important organs in field conditions. The Albanian village of
Burel was also mentioned, where in a “yellow house” the prisoners were
operated on after which their organs were delivered to Italy, and further
on, to major West European medical centres. According to del Ponte, “only
several months later investigators of the Tribunal and UNMIK arrived to
Albania to see the “yellow house”, which journalists described as the place
where prisoners were murdered for their bodily organs. A group of
journalists led the investigators and one Albanian prosecutor to that place.
The house is now painted white; and its host denies that it was repainted,
even though the investigators find traces of yellow along the basement. They
find pieces of sterile gauze. Lying nearby is a used syringe, two plastic
vials, one of which contained muscle relaxant that is usually used in
surgery. Application of special chemicals detects blood stains on the walls
and the floor in one of the rooms and at a cleaned floor sections measuring
1.8 by 0.6 metres." 1

Such revelations at the time when Kosovo declared its independence and when
the militants who took part in all these atrocities turned to politics
really turn the set notions the West has about developments in this unquiet
province upside down. In reality these facts are nothing new, it was just
that no one wanted to hear about them.

Carla del Ponte writes that the families of the Serbs who disappeared in
Kosovo asked her many “quite justified” questions. Why does the Tribunal not
give them any information about the disappeared relations? Why did the
Tribunal fail to find collective graves of Serbian victims? Why the POW
camps were not found? Why Albanians are not arrested after the Association
of the Families of Disappeared Kosovo Serbs tabled its list of suspects to
the Tribunal? Carla answered the questions evasively, saying the Tribunal
did not have documents about the KLA structure, being unable to come to
terms with KFOR2 and UNMIK3 about collaboration and is unable to investigate
all the crimes for reasons of difficulties in finding eyewitnesses of the
murder of Serbs, whereas those who could, are unwilling to speak4. These
answers convince no one. Even our Centre5 has documents about the KLA
structure, to say nothing of Belgrade. It has a vast repository of materials
about the atrocities committed against peaceful population in Kosovo, and
the Serbian authorities handed over to the Tribunal all the necessary
documents accusing the Albanians. Del Ponte writes that Neboisa Covic, then
the chairman of the the SRYu government’s Kosovo and Metohia Coordination
Centre gave to UNMIK information about 196 sites where atrocities against
Serbian population were committed. 6.

In 2001 the list of the kidnapped persons was handed over to del Ponte by
representatives of the Association of the Families of the Disappeared
persons. Simo Spasic, the chairman of this NGO argues that “all their
relations know the people who committed those crimes. They have evidence.
They eye witnessed many crimes. They watched horrible things – remains of
children burnt alive, the ripped stomachs of pregnant women and the embryos.
We have to live with this pang in our hearts but no one is willing to hear
us. We have photos; we know the places where the graves of the people who
were tortured and murdered are. None of the cases has been investigated. All
the facts are carefully concealed. The reason is this: had the crimes of the
Albanians been known about, no one would acknowledge Kosovo’s independence”
(underlined by me – E.G.) Besides, Spasic recalls, foreign TV companies
including the BBC, Deutsche Welle and Sky News showed footage of columns
guarded by KLA militants that moved in the direction of Albania. Those were
exactly the 300 people.”

The Belgrade media quote dozens of situations when a number of Serbian
organisations tired to make the Tribunal investigate Albanian crimes in
Kosovo, presenting to it detailed maps of burial places and concentration
camps in this province and in Albania’s north, evidence of cruel torture and
murder of peaceful residents. But it never started the trial of Albanian
leaders on charges of mass murder of people for obtaining their organs for
transplantation. Just the Association mentioned above has a list of more
than 2 000 people.

As for eyewitnesses, the Tribunal has at its disposal a wide range of ways
to protect them, and it needs to look for them not only among Albanians who
indeed are scared by the militants7 but among Serbs as well. But the word
“Serb” appears to be the term the Tribunal uses only when it means to punish
them. Carla del Ponte admits that she knew about the mass graves in three
provinces of north Albania. Human Rights Watch (HRW) also reported having
seen the documents the Tribunal collected, that included evidence of seven
KLA militants who claimed they were eyewitnesses of the delivery if
kidnapped Serbs to Albania. HRW experts decided to check this information in
Carla del Ponte’s book on their own, even though they initially doubted it.
They got the evidence and succeeded in getting new information about that8.

Thus, the Tribunal and its Prosecutor General had information about the
crimes committed against Serbs. But why did Carla del Ponte kept silent for
such a long time – close to 10 years? Her book gives part of the answer.

According to her the available evidence was not enough to verify the exact
dates of kidnapping, transfer of victims across the Albanian border and
identify the sites of crimes. Besides, Albanian prosecutors and detectives
did not want to collaborate, saying that if Albanians did murder Serbs, they
were right to do it. Carla del Ponte had enough courage the publish the
statement of Fabio Mini, Italian general who headed the KFOR (October, 2002)
who said that “to put Albanians under arrest was difficult because the
former UNMIK and KLA leaders were close relations.” Mini was sure that if
arrests would start “we would see many local leaders going on holidays
guarded by Americans.” 9. That is why, del Ponte concludes, the
investigation came to a halt. 10

The question is why the approaches a number of international organisations,
including UN, NATO and EU used against Serbia (cutting of credits, the
boycott of the talks on its NATO and EU entry, and so forth) were not used
against Albania?

The main thing as we see it is the prosecutor’s revelations boils down to
her making it known that “prosecution of military criminals in the
present-day world is an exclusively political affair. There was a silent
prohibition on accusations of Albanians. In this case the issue of Kosovo’s
independence would not be plausible. 11 Besides, her book makes it possible
to conclude that the peace-keepers and their masters were scary of
Albanians, and “were not ready to issue any sort of a warrant to arrest
Albanians” aware that Agim Ceku and Hasim Taci “were able to ignite a series
of riots in Macedonia and southern Serbia, and in other provinces, calling
the Albanian minorities there to violence.” 12 To continue this assumption,
it can be said that it was necessary to maintain the idea of the Serbian
guilt for everything that had taken place in the Balkans in the 1990s, that
had been worked out for quite a long time, to sustain the reasoning that
NATO activities in the Balkans with an eye at protecting Albanians in Kosovo
in 1999, and prevent world public opinion from concluding that the
international organisations in the post-Yugoslav space practiced double
standards.

The revelations of the Prosecutor were sensational only for those who did
not want to hear. Serbs started shouting about crimes against them in
Kosovo. 13 Danitsa Marinkovic, a courageous former judge of the district
court in Pristina investigated many facts, including earlier kidnappings,
the fake show of the killing of allegedly peaceful people in the village of
Racak, after which the bombing of Yugoslavia started and information about
the KLA death camps. She was also in the know of no other than Hasim Taci
organised kidnappings and established links with European medical centres,
and set into action the mechanism of deliveries of human organs to his
clientele, making fabulous money.

Carla del Ponte’s book provides serious arguments to investigators,
confirming information about subjectivity of activities of international
organisations operating in the former Yugoslavia and acting on its territory
at present. It is evident that the support of Albanians in Kosovo by the
international organisations was not accidental, and it was not accidental
that the facts of the involvement of the current leadership of the province
(Hasim Taci, Agim Ceku and Ramus Haradinai) in the crimes Carla del Ponte
writes about. There is much evidence of these military crimes.

Danitsa Marinkovic told that Fatmir Limai was in charge of the camp in
Klecka, where Serbian prisoners were held. As for the current Kosovo
premier, Hasim Taci was commandant of a similar camp in Lapusnik. “While I
was a judge in Pristina, I went to Klecka, -Danitsa said. “At the time there
were about 100 Serbian women, children and old people. They had been
murdered. We saw parts of their bodies scattered all over the place.” 14
Unlike Hasuim Taci, Fatmir Limai faced the court in the Hague in 2005. And
the verdict was “Not guilty”!

The Hague Tribunal acquitted two more Kosovo criminals, Ramus Haradinai and
Idriz Baliai, the former chief of the KLA squad “Black Eaglkes”. Both
committed atrocious crimes and no one doubted their guilt. One more field
commander, Lahi Brahimai was acknowledged guilty of torture, and sentenced
to six years of imprisonment.

The trial of Ramus Haradinai (then prime minister of Kosovo) and the
above-mentioned militants started in the Hague in April, 2007. Haradinai who
in 1998 was one of the KLA commanders, was charged on 37 articles, 17 of
which were crimes against humanity, and 20 - military crimes. Besides, all
of them were accused of harassment of Kosovo Serbs, Gypsies and Albanians
that were loyal to Serbs, involvement in murders, rape, illegal arrests and
destruction of property. But the judges did not find evidence of the guilt
of Ramus Haradinai and Idriz Baliai. It may be admitted that 7 million Euros
that were raised for their defence played its part. According to the German
“Berliner Zeitung”, the German intelligence regards Haradinai “the godfather
of a mafia clan engaged in speculation of cigarettes, drugs, arms and trade
in people.”

Haradinai has always been an “exclusive” defendant. Del Pobnte writes that
he was taken to the Hague on a German aeroplane, and once landed in Germany
where the leader of Albanian separatists accused of many crimes was greeted
by the guard of honour. Haradinai’s family maintains close ties with the UN
mission on Kosovo. Del Ponte writes about a visit by Larry Rosin (currently
the deputy head of the UN mission in Kosovo) to attend the matrimonial
ceremony of Haradinai’s close relation. No other but Rosin on behalf of the
UN mission in Kosovo gave his personal guarantees to the Hague tribunal that
Haradinai’s condict was proof of “his being able to defend himself in court
not being in custody.” On the other hand, Sorren Essen-Petersen, the former
head of the UN mission in Kosovo contacted the Hague tribunal asking to set
Haradinai free, because “his presence in Kosovo is a guarantee of peace and
stability.” Seeing Haradinai off to the Hague the head of the UN mission in
Kosovo said to Haradinai in public: “My friend! Let us see you returning
soon!” 15

And the triumphant return did happen. The prosecutors failed to present to
the Tribubnal even 10 eyewitnesses, who had been murdered one after another
before the trial. Kutim Berisa, whose ear Baliai personally cut off, was
killed in a car crash in February of 2008 in Montenegro a day after a
meeting with a representative of the Tribunal to discuss the coming court
session. Ilir Selmai was stabbed to death in a provoked fight. Bekim Mustafa
and Auni Elezai were shot dead. Kosovo police officers Sabaheta Tava and
Isuk Hakliai, who agreed to present evidence of Haradinai’s crimes, were
murdered, and the car with their bodies was burned. Three other
eyewitnesses – Jeidin Musta, Sadrik Murici and Vesel Murici were “the
protected eyewitnesses”, but they all were murdered by contract killers.
Tahir Zemai, one of the KLA leaders, who agreed to cooperate with the
tribunal, was shot dead together with his son. Ramir Murici survived a wound
but refused to provide evidence. About 40 potential eyewitnesses of KLA
atrocities in Kosovo and Metohia were murdered. 16 That is why former KLA
militants have no fear of court prosecution. They keep on going about their
criminal activities, confident of their protectors and the might of their
money and arms.

The Hague tribunal has long been known for its lack of objectivity and
prejudication. It has demonstrated its biased prejudgements, spending years
trying to prove the faults of Serbs. No other than Serbs make up two-thirds
of the convicts in Scheveningen. Only Serbian leaders have faced the court
or are on the “wanted” lists, the leaders of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
are at large. Activities of Serbs, Croats and Muslims get different
qualification at the tribunal: Serbs are accused of genocide for the lack of
human treatments of their prisoners, Croats are guilty of crimes against
humanity, and Muslims are blamed for serious violations of the Geneva
conventions. Only Serbs are accused of ethnic cleansings. That is exactly
the accusation they are faced with for the departure of Albanians from
Kosovo in 1998, whereas the activities of Croats in 1995 when the military
operations “The Shine “and “The Storm” that caused more than 250 000 Serbs
to leave their homes are not qualified this way. The crimes committed by
Serbs are regarded the result of systematic carefully planned policies. In
the case of Croats and Muslims, these are viewed as side effects of
hostilities created by a few undisciplined servicemen.” 17 By its selective
methods of trial the Tribunal violates the very idea of an international
criminal court. Carla del Ponte’s book is a graphic illustration of the
fact.

I happened to follow the Tribunal’s proceedings as an insider, when I acted
as a legal expert in the defence of Serbian general Stanislav Galic, accused
of blockading Saraevo, sharp-shooting and other crimes. It was exactly then
that I got proof of the fact that the official position of the Tribunal was
inherently subjective and sketchy. Principally, the Tribunal comes from the
assumption that in all the hostilities in the Balkans in the last several
years Serbs were aggressors or in their majority they committed military
crimes, whereas other parties waged wars in line with the norms of
international law, defending themselves against the aggressor. The trite
image of Serbian guilt was invented in 1991. Unfortunately, it is very hard
to break it today, as both the parties to the conflict and a number of
international organisations worked hard and persevered at its shaping. Owing
to the activities of the Tribunal, the stamp of a criminal will rest on the
entire Serbian nation for many years, and the international organisations
and NATO would get one more proof that to punish Serbia with sanctions,
blockade and bombings was right.

There never was a presentation of the book of the Tribunal’s principal
counsel for the prosecution never happened. The Swiss Foreign Ministry
prohibited it. Carla del Ponte was urgently dispatched to Buenos Aires,
where she had acted as Switzerland’s Ambassador to Argentina since January
of 2008. Europeans and the world at large seemed to disregard her book.
Quite naturally, Serbians were disgusted demanding the facts she published
in her book be investigated. Kosovars (Kosovo residents), too, were
indignant over the image she portrayed in her memories of the principal
accuser. Kosovo’s Parliamentary Assembly is preparing to sue her at an
international court for causing intentional harm to the image of Kosovo that
only recently declared itself independent.18 Russia’s reaction to the book
was very serious. Our Foreign Ministry tabled an inquiry at the Tribunal,
demanding that ex-Prosecutor General’s statements be verified and
information about steps taken to investigate the issue be given. «The facts
of atrocities committed by KLA militants against Kosovo’s Serbian peaceful
residents under the slogans of fighting for independence that have now
became known to broad public,” – the official statement reads, - “are
shocking. Small wonder that the revelations of Carla del Pont do not fit the
scenario of carving an image of Kosovo Albanians as martyrs, defended by a
number of states that wish to use this image as a basis for legitimising
Kosovo’s “independence”, the statement of Russia’s Foreign Ministry
underlines. By dozing off freedom of speech where crimes against peaceful
population are concerned. Apparently aims at dumping the response of
international political circles and society in general over the facts that
disclose the criminal pre-history of the illegal sovereignty of Kosovo. The
Russian delegation at the session of the EU parliamentary Assembly on April
4-18, 2008 announced its initiative to make the EU responsible for starting
investigation of Carla del Ponte’s information.

When in 1990s we spoke about the absence of objectiveness in activities of a
number of international organisations, the other side would either distrust
us, or pretended to be distrustful. Now Carla del Ponte’s book gives weighty
arguments to investigators and legal experts, even if partly removing the
cover over the backroom games some states are playing to defend their
stance. Many people think that the book arrived too late, so the process
launched by the ITFY is hard to be reversed. But the book’s significance is
its casting doubt on the activities of international organisation in the
former Yugoslavia and the efficiency of the ITFY itself, also casting a
shadow on the KFOR staff and the UN peace-keepers. It also makes sit
possible to sue Carla del Ponte for intentionally concealing from justice
the facts of atrocious military crimes, making her an accomplice of their
perpetuators.

----------------------------------------------------------

NOTES
1 Carla del Ponte. Working for many years the best we can//Politika-
Belgrade,May 3,2008 p.19

2 Kosovo Security Force

3 United Nations Mission in Kosovo

4 Carla del Ponte Working for many years the best we can //
Politika –Belgrade, May 3,2008 ,p.19

5 The Centre for the Studies of the Modern Balkans Crisis of the Institute
for Slav Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

6 Carla del Ponte. Неправда је семе будућих ратова //Politika, Belgrade, May
1-2, 2008, p.33.

7 Fokina k.Nacharov S. The Chairman of the Association of SSerbs Disappeared
in Kosovo Simo Spasic: We are Suing Carla del Ponte. She Knew about
Concentration camps for Serbs//Izvestia. –M.2008, April 4

8 Fokina K., Nacarov S.. The Chairman of the Association of the Disappeared
Kosovo Serbs Simo Spasic: We will sue Carla del Ponte. She knew about
concentration camps for Serbs.//Izvestia. – M. 2008. April 4

9 HRW:istraga o trgovinin organima//BBC Serbian. Com – 2008, May 6.

10 Carla del Ponte: Working for many years the best we can...

11 Ditto

12 Ditto

13 Carla del Ponte Кажем Hинhиhу//Politika, Belgrade. 2008, April 23, p.29

14 See 7

15Quote: http://www.koreni.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1054;
Bavyrin D.The Albanian Solidarity // Vzglyad. –M.2008 –March 22.
http://www,vz.ru/politics/2008/3/22/154104.html

16 What has the Hague Tribunal Forgive the Albanian Terrorist and Promising
Kosovo politician Ramus Haradianai?//REGNUM.. - 2008. - April 6.

17 Tribunal vise razloga da postoji//Blic.- Belgrade, 2008. – April 4.

18 Klimenko Z.V. Basic Parametres of the Activities of the International
Tribunal for Investigation of Military Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia.
Presentation at the international conference “Present-day problems of the
post-Yugoslav space and Russia’s stance”. Moscow, November 13,2002. HRW:
istraga o trgovini organima // BBC SERBIAN.com. – 2008. 6 maj.

Whoever betrays Kosovo is betraying Serbia!

2008-06-22T10:48:00.001-04:00

www.glas-javnosti.co.yu

Glas Javnosti daily, Belgrade
June 20, 2008

Whoever betrays Kosovo is betraying Serbia!
by Dr. Kosta Cavoski

At this time when there are so many sycophants and lickspittles on our
political scene circling around their foreign masters, it is very difficult
to
talk about (Serbian) democracy. Because there actually is no real democracy
(in Serbia), and what we have today is a political particracy: rule by
oligarchic party leaderships that do not care for election results, the will
of the people or the country, let alone for the fate of the nation to which
they belong. Such a particracy is also an outcome of our electoral system.

You probably remember that the Dayton Agreement was signed in Dayton, and
that the foreigners were especially insistent on implementing an electoral
system using proportional representation in Republika Srpska and in all of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because proportional representation fragments parties,
and makes it possible for a large number of parties to take part in
elections. The key goal for the foreigners at that time was to reduce the
influence of Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party, to make it impossible for
it to (keep getting) an absolute majority. By the second elections, they
succeeded.

(In Serbia) proportional representation giving detrimental results is used
because it is supposedly more just, enabling parties that represent minority
interests to also appear in parliament. The majority system where, as a
rule, two, sometimes three and occasionally, exceptionally, a fourth party
manage to get into parliament is a guillotine for small parties.

The majority system is good because it makes it possible for a single party
to form a government, and for a country to have an accountable government.
In such an electoral system, there is the government on one side and the
opposition on the other, and as the English saying goes, 'The opposition
need do nothing except oppose, never propose.' That is, to catch the
government's mistakes, to criticize it publicly and, of course, to possibly
win in the next elections.

The proportional system practiced (in Serbia) has enormous deficiencies. No
party, not even the Radicals, who had a respectable relative majority, had
more than 30 percent or was able to form a government. Therefore,
governments had to be built on coalitions. We have had coalitions that have
been unprincipled and based on interests, marriages of convenience. Hence,
the government could hardly conduct consistent policies.

When the second government of Vojislav Kostunica came with the external
support of the Socialists, the Socialists' condition was that Hague
indictees not be arrested. As a result that government, if you remember,
managed to convince some to turn themselves in; and when General Lukic was
arrested in hospital and sent to The Hague against his will, the Socialists
simply - stayed silent.

Now Zupljanin has been arrested. Because of Slobodan Milosevic, the
Socialists do not recognize the Hague Tribunal. That is why they should have
said something, communicated that they will form no coalition or government
with those arresting indictees and sending them to The Hague. But look: they
are ready to enter a coalition including the Democratic Party, which is
nothing but the extended arm of the foreign occupiers in this country. We
must ask ourselves how the Socialists - who have endured such blows as
having the head of their party arrested, sent to The Hague and subjected to
juridical murder - can even think about cooperating with those who sent
Milosevic to The Hague!

Corruption is the other face of coalitions such as these. Corruption will
never be completely eradicated. As long everyone respects people who are
rich more than people who are knowledgeable, everyone will aspire to be be
rich. Especially those close to the government or in power themselves. But
when the system is a two-party one, the opposition is constantly catching
the government's mistakes. And when a coalition is in power, then there is a
silent agreement among the coalition associates to overlook things in
matters of corruption. This is why everyone is stealing but no one is
accusing anyone of stealing; it is simply ignored.

Today those in power are trying to funnel enough money to permit them to
live to the end of their lives. Unlike today's socialists, the ones of the
past believed that the system would last and ensure their security. So they
did not take too much, figuring they would be taken care of in their old
age. Today this has changed radically and it is none other than coalitions
that are making corruption possible.

During the election campaign we heard the parties telling us how there are
two camps (in Serbia), how some are in favor of keeping Kosovo and Metohija
as a part of Serbia and against joining the EU if that meant Serbia without
Kosovo and Metohija, while others claimed that we must join the European
Union at any price because that is the only way we can get new money and new
jobs. As if the past eight years had not been enough to do this, and we
needed the next eight.

Therefore, the camps were sharply divided. Now we have a small, three-member
coalition with Palma consisting of only three deputy seats that is claiming
we can join Europe and preserve Kosovo and Metohija, too. And how is it
possible to do all these things? How, when 20 members of the EU - out of a
total of 27 - have already recognized Kosovo and Metohija as an independent
state? Because they will keep it in mind during ratification. In other
words, God forbid that a new government of Socialists and "yellows" is
formed, we can expect Brussels to tell us, 'Until you establish good
relations with your neighbors - meaning diplomatic relations with Pristina -
we will not be able to continue talks on entering the EU.'

They are not saying anything about this for now in order to form their
coalition, but when it is formed, it will be said publicly. And our people,
being like they are, will say: what can we do, the hornless are no match for
the horned (a Serbian proverb). However, those of us who know all this well
and see it happening have a duty to warn that a great deception is taking
place. Our people are being tricked. Worst of all, a betrayal of our
national interests is in progress.

All those who reject the possible coalition of the Serbian Radical Party,
the Democratic Party of Serbia, New Serbia and the Socialists are, in fact,
accepting the truncation of Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia, the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija, and entry into the EU without that
central part of our country and our national survival. They are, dear
friends, traitors and we must not allow this to happen. This must not pass!

(Translated on June 21, 2008 by sib)

Socialists, the Unexpected Kingmakers

2008-05-15T20:17:00.001-04:00

http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=591

Serbian Election: Socialists, the Unexpected Kingmakers
by Srdja Trifkovic

Last Sunday night, as the results of Serbia’s parliamentary elections became known, the country’s President Boris Tadiæ made a remarkable statement. “I warn the parties that have lost this election,” he declared, “not to play games with the will of the citizens and try to form a government that would take Serbia back to the 1990s. I will not allow any such government and I will prevent it by democratic means.” This was not just an ill-considered gaffe in the heat of the election night: on Wednesday he was at it again, criticizing attempts by his political opponents to form the government and pledging to “defend the will of the people with all democratic and legitimate means.”
The implications of Mr. Tadic’s statement are clear, and alarming:
1. There exists a “will of the citizens” (or “people”) that is distinct to, and in this case different from that expressed in the distribution of mandates in the National Assembly;
2. The “losers”—by which he means the outgoing Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Radicals (SRS)—would plunge Serbia into wars and isolation (“back to the 1990s”).
3. It is within Tadic’s power as head of state to prevent the emergence of a coalition government not to his liking, even if such a coalition were to be supported by the majority of parliamentary deputies.
Tadiæ’s first claim harks back to Rousseau’s volonté générale that properly guides the decisions of a civil society, rather than the sum of their individual self-interests, the volonté de tous. His assertion is in line with the postmodern USA-EU understanding of “democracy,” which judges a process democratic entirely on the basis of the “rightness” of its outcome. His European and American mentors have long used the term “democracy” as an ideological concept. It does not signify broad participation of informed citizens in the business of governance, but it denotes the desirable social and political content of ostensibly popular decisions. The process likely to produce undesirable outcomes—a sovereignist coalition government in Belgrade, say, or a “no” vote in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty—is a priori “undemocratic.” Contrary to his frankly outrageous claim, the common good is an aggregate of private interests which needs balancing and fine-tuning through the institutions of representative democracy. After such outbursts it is ridiculous to misrepresent Tadiæ as a “pro-Western democrat,” although he is certain to be thus described in a thousand MSM reports that are yet to be written.
Tadiæ’s Democratic Party (DS) did well at the election, considerably better than expected, but it did not “win.” With 102 deputies in the 250-seat assembly, the Democrats will be 24 seats short of the working majority. Even with the like-minded Liberal Democratic Party of Èedomir Jovanoviæ (14 deputies) and a couple of small ethnic minority parties (Hungarians, Sanjak Muslims), the DS cannot reach the magic number.
The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), with 20 deputies, is now the decisive factor in the equation, certain to decide the shape of the next ruling coalition. It will likely join forces with Koštunica’s DSS (30 deputies) and the Radicals (78) to create a government with a slim but workable majority. Its leader Ivica Daèiæ may yet be tempted by the DS, which is certain to make him a generous offer, but his party leadership has warned him that any such deal would split the party. It still includes numerous Miloševiæ loyalists who have not forgiven the Democrats—then led by the late prime minister Zoran Djindjiæ—the delivery of their leader to The Hague in 2001.
An agreement is already said to be in place between Daèiæ, Koštunica and the SRS to share power in the city of Belgrade, with the Radicals’ No. 3, Aleksandar Vuèiæ, becoming the new Mayor. The speed and ease with which the deal was struck on the country’s second most important government structure—with its many rich pickings—bodes ill for Tadiæ’s hopes that the SPS may yet be swayed his way.
The pro-Western camp is nevertheless trying hard. After almost a decade of relentless political and media campaign by the DS and its allies against the SPS, after years of public demonization of its late leader, the “Euro-reformist forces” have suddenly discovered that the Socialists are eminently salonfaehig. Tadiæ is now declaring that there are practically no ideological differences between the heirs to Miloševiæ and his own followers, as they are both true to the principles of the Socialist International. Yet less than two years ago, when this same Socialist Party—under the same leader and with the same program—supported Koštunica’s minority goverrnment, it was pilloried by the Euro-reformers as a dark and temporary remnant of Serbia’s unpleasant past.
Even if he manages to cobble together yet another coalition with himself at the helm, the biggest loser of the election is my old friend Vojislav Koštunica. He is a well-meaning man of principle, as we all know, and his decision on March 8 to “return the mandate to the people” may have been the honorable thing to do—but in the midst of the Kosovo crisis it was neither prudent nor conducive to the country’s best interests. Within the previous parliament, elected on January 21 2007, a “sovereignist” majority could have been created with far greater ease than today. Dr. Koštunica is now paying the price of his reluctance to part ways with the Eurofanatics and strike a solid deal with the Radicals a year ago, as many of his friends and supporters had urged him to do at the time and as it was certainly in his power to do.
Serbia is now more polarized and more evenly divided, but it is nevertheless far from having an “Euro-reformist” majority, as Mr. Tadiæ and his allies would have us believe. His DS-led coalition and the LDP, let us repeat, have 116 deputies. That is well below the score for the SRS-DSS-led emerging alliance, which is likely to stand firm on the defense of Serbia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and international legality.
After almost 8 years in the wilderness the Socialists are Belgrade’s unexpected kingmakers. It is to be hoped that by doing the right thing now they will atone for at least some of the many mistakes and misdemeanors of which they were guilty while running Serbia under Miloševiæ. It is also to be hoped that Mr. Tadiæ will respect his constitutional prerogatives and accordingly refrain from any attempt to resist the will of the people, as expressed by their democratically elected deputies.
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Balkan exceptionalism

2008-05-15T19:18:00.001-04:00

Balkan exceptionalism

May 15th 2008
From The Economist print edition

What Serbia's election says about the European Union's enlargement

Illustration by Peter Schrank

A BRITISH tabloid set a high standard for bombast when it once took
credit for the re-election of a Tory government with the headline:
“It's The Sun Wot Won It”. This week European Union leaders
were taking credit for another election upset: the unexpected success
of the pro-European coalition led by the Serbian president, Boris
Tadic, in the general election on May 11th. The Serbs had “clearly
chosen Europe,” said the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner. Jan
Marinus Wiersma, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, declared
that the election was “a form of referendum in which citizens gave
their support for the country's future membership of the EU.”

That may be a little premature. It is true that Mr Tadic's block is
called the “Coalition for a European Serbia”. His supporters waved the EU
flag of gold stars on blue. But Mr Tadic did not win outright, and it
matters enormously which parties end up in a new coalition government.
If the wrong parties cobble together a deal, they could yet lead Serbia
into deeper isolation.

Yet it would be absurd to deny that the EU
played a role in the election. European governments agreed to offer
Serbia a couple of timely (if symbolic) concessions just days before
the vote. Serbs may feel “humiliated” that 19 EU countries have recognised the independence of Kosovo after the province broke away in February, says a diplomat. But the EU also reminded them that Europe is about good things, such as freedom to travel. If it was not exactly the EU “wot
won it”, European governments did at least send a signal that they
would rather have Serbia in the club than brooding dangerously outside.

That holds true also for Serbia's neighbours in the western
Balkans, who are being jollied along with visa concessions and the
like, and assured that they enjoy a “European perspective” (to use the
Brussels jargon for eventual membership). It all feels rather
pragmatic, even generous. And that is odd, because when it comes to
enlargement in general, older members of the club are in a foul temper.

It is not only the future that causes alarm. The mood is sulphurous
over Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007. Bulgaria has already
seen tens of millions of EU funds frozen
amid fears of fraud. The figure of suspended aid could rise to billions
when a European Commission monitoring report comes out this summer. The
new Italian government is talking menacingly about restricting Romanian
migrants. The latest Eurobarometer poll on enlargement found majority
support for the admission of only one new country: Croatia, a
relatively advanced place whose beaches heave with sizzling Italians
and Germans each summer. Croatia is on course to join in 2010 or 2011.

Even more paradoxically, some of the countries keenest on admitting
Serbia and others have voters who are the most alarmed by enlargement.
Migrant-phobic Italy led the way (together with Greece) in arguing for
the EU to be flexible over demands that
Serbia co-operate with prosecutors hunting war criminals. Austria has
lobbied tirelessly for Balkan bits of the former Austro-Hungarian
empire, starting with Croatia. Yet Austrian voters now oppose admitting
any Balkan country other than Croatia by large margins (and a whopping
81% are against Turkish membership). Similarly, French ministers may
rejoice that Serbia's voters choose Europe, but in 2006 France was
pushing the idea that future enlargement should be assessed according
to the EU's “absorption capacity”, a
dangerously vague term that includes voters' “perceptions”. The French
president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is publicly against Turkey's membership.

If enlargement is so unpopular, why do so many EU
leaders want the credit for Serbia's vote for Europe? There are two,
linked explanations. The first is that holding the door open to Balkan
countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and the rest does not
imply support for enlargement in general—it is a specific strategy for
preventing further instability in Europe's backyard. And the second is
that enlargement mostly works like that.

Consolidation, not enlargement

Arguably, enlargement as a general project does not exist. Moves to expand the EU
are more often responses to particular crises, and they trigger big
squabbles until it becomes clear that no better alternative exists (the
1995 expansion to take in Finland, Sweden and Austria being the
exception). Greece was admitted in 1981 to bind it to the West, even
though everybody feared it was not ready. It took nine years of
argument to get Spain and Portugal in, amid cries of alarm (loudest in
France) over cheap Iberian workers and farm produce. In December 1989,
as Communist regimes fell across eastern Europe, the French president,
François Mitterrand, proposed that ex-Warsaw Pact nations should be
invited to join a loose “European confederation” (the idea died, not
least because Mr Mitterrand invited Russia too). The EU hopes of Bulgaria and Romania only became plausible during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, when their airspace was needed to allow NATO jets to bomb Serbia.

Today's Serbia and the other Balkan applicants for entry may not be
easy cases. But their admission does not pose “existential” questions
for the EU, notes one diplomat, just a lot
of hard work on building up clean, capable governments, in which scary
nationalists are marginalised. Croatian negotiators even talk smoothly
of “consolidation” rather than “enlargement” nowadays. Larger
candidates for the EU, notably Turkey and
Ukraine, cannot do that. They pose big questions, such as how to relate
to the Muslim world or how to live with Russia.

The Serbian election could have been a lot worse. A thumping win for nasty nationalists would have seriously delayed EU
expansion into the western Balkans. But supporters of admitting Turkey,
say, should avoid premature congratulation. The western Balkans remains
an exceptional case. Enlargement as a broader cause was not the winner
this week.

http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=11375822

Serbia misses the boat

2008-05-10T09:58:00.001-04:00

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/borut_grgic/2008/05/serbia_misses_the_boat.html

GUARDIAN (UK)

COMMENT IS FREE

Serbia misses the boat
Borut Grgic

May 10, 2008 10:00 AM

Serbia is again facing an election. These are now so frequent the joke is
that Serbia has a new national sport. Commentators claim this one is
crucial, but they said so of the last one, and the one before it. The
country is stuck in the past, and confused by its irrationalism.

The same faces keep appearing on the election posters - Tadic, Nikolic and
Kostunica. The three collectively in five years have done less than Djindjic
managed to do in two on his own. It is shocking that they are still around.

Europe is partly to blame for the state in which Serbia finds itself today.
The unconditional love the EU has shown for a class of political losers in
Serbia will end up costing Serbia a decade of progress and a generation. It
sounds impossible, but it is true.

For example, Serbia has regressed economically in the last decade more than
all its neighbours. Serbia attracted less foreign direct investment (FDI) in
comparative terms in the last year than all its neighbors. FDI has also been
less diverse in Serbia than in neighbouring countries. Notwithstanding
Kosovo, which is not yet recognised as a country by all the EU member
states, Belgrade was the last to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA) with the EU. And the visa restrictions are keeping young
Serbs stuck in a country that is sinking.

For Serbia to change, Brussels needs to change. First, we in Europe need to
end this obsession, which some have that Serbia should be pulled on to the
cart - Belgrade willing or unwilling - before the EU train leaves the
station. In reverse psychology we're suggesting that Europe can't do without
Serbia and is therefore willing to wait and bend the rules. It is
counterproductive. We are not succeeding in changing the political behaviour
of Serbia, but we are making the rest in the region wonder why the double
standards, and whether it pays at all to reform.

The region has new economic stars which boast competitive investment
environments and EU-interoperable political platforms. In terms of balance
of power, Serbia is not the centre of gravity it once was; and it will never
again be. The Nato umbrella and the EU component have fundamentally changed
the nature of power distribution in this region.

Obsessed with Belgrade, Europe is guilty of overlooking, or discounting, the
progress that others have been making steadily and in some cases, very
rapidly. A case in point is Montenegro. The country is barely independent,
yet its economy is growing at close to 6% for the second consecutive year.
Its FDI is above $1bn, which for a country with a population of 700,000
people is an excellent progress report. There is a buzz about Montenegro in
the business world. Some top investors - and not just the Russians - are
looking to invest. The most recent example is the Canadian-Hungarian owner
of Barrick Gold, the world's biggest gold-mining firm. He's building a
marina in Montenegro.

Albania and Macedonia are beginning to attract similar business interests.
Progress is being made in the region on all levels, and this is happening
with and without Serbia. Why is it than that Europe can't have a Balkan
enlargement policy that is not reliant on Serbia, but in which Serbia is a
partner in its own design.

On the political level, Montenegro is the only former ex-Yugoslavian
republic which has achieved its independence by peaceful means, thanks in
some part also to Europe. It's a Balkan country where Albanians and Serbs
live in peace. There is no good reason why Eurocrats shouldn't be more
excited about Montenegro. The notion that the country is not doing enough to
clean up its corruption and crime is an excuse, not a policy. Podgorica
adopted the necessary institutional reforms and Montenegro is making no less
progress in fighting crime than its regional partners. Second, rooting out
corruption is not an overnight process.

At stake is the political will and patience, which Europe has little of for
the Balkan countries, notwithstanding Serbia. And because this is so, Serbia
feels that Europe needs it more than it wants the others, and that European
politicians, if pushed, would still rather explain to their public why they
are supporting Serbia's irrational populism than why Albania, Kosovo and the
rest of the Balkan countries have a rightful place in the European family.

Until Europe is willing to walk away from Serbia, Cedomir Jovanovic, the
young leader of the Serbian Liberal Democratic Party will never win an
election, and Serbia won't change. Thus, this Sunday's election doesn't
matter. The same faces will be back in power with the same political spins,
but new pretences about who are and aren't their friends. Thanks to Europe's
unconditional love and the SAA, which the EU signed with Serbia just last
week, we can all go on holiday this weekend.

letters@guardian.co.uk

Kosovo, the European Union's New Colony

2008-05-08T06:52:00.001-04:00

http://www.bannerofliberty.com/BOL-2008MQC/3-6-2008.1.html

Mary's Weekly News Analysis

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Kosovo, the European Union's New Colony

By Mary Mostert, Analyst, Banner of Liberty (www.bannerofliberty.com)

March 6, 2008

My first reaction to media reports on February 16 of jubilant Albanians in Kosovo gleefully celebrating their "independence" from Serbia was simple bewilderment. In the first place, I noted from pictures of their jubilation that they are not waving a Kosovo flag. What they wave is the flag of Albania.
Secondly, according to the Kosovo Plan developed by Marti Athtisaari,former president of Finland and the United Nations special envoy to Kosovo,their independence requires that "Kosovo must uphold, promote and protect internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. All persons in Kosovo are entitled to these rights and freedoms without discrimination of any kind."
History proves that Albanians simply don't recognize the rights and freedoms of others. In fact, when Albania declared itself an "atheist state" in 1967, all churches and other buildings owned by religious groups were closed down. In an article published April 1, 1999 I reported that over 166,000 Greeks were driven out of Albania between 1993 and 1997 From 1991 to 2000 the percentage of Greeks in Albania dropped from 8% of the population to 3% of the population. In Kosovo the Serb population dropped from almost 15% of the population in 1981 to 5% of the population in 2007.
The Kosovo Albanians waving an Albania flag is exactly comparable to illegal alien high school students in California ripping down the US flag and raising the flag of Mexico at their school. They justify their behavior by claiming that California is really a part of Mexico. In Kosovo, Albanians that have flooded across the open borders between Kosovo and Albania are now claiming that Kosovo is really part of Albania. Actually, Kosovo has never been part of Albania, except during World War II when it was overrun by then fascist Italy that had also occupied Albania. California was part of Mexico until the treaty of Guadalupe of 1847 when it ceded California, Texas and New Mexico (including all the present-day states of the Southwest) to the United States in exchange for the US withdrawing its troops from Mexico City.
Kosovo, on the other hand, has been the home of Serbs for more than a thousand years and part of the nation of Serbia for for 700 years although it has been occupied by other nations a number of times. The latest occupation has been the 9 year occupation by NATO troops.
And, like every other state or province within nations, Kosovo had its own budget and its own debt. During these nine years of occupation by a foreign power, Serbia has continued to service that debt, although it has received no taxes from Kosovo during the NATO occupation. Belgrade has been paying $150 million a YEAR to service Kosovo's debt. That compares with less than $20 million a year the World Bank has given to Kosovo from 1999-2006. (A week ago Serbia's Economy Minister Mladjan Dinkic wisely urged his government to stop paying Kosovo's debts as long as it is occupied by NATO and the European Union.) The World Bank reports that since June of 1999 over $2.57 BILLION dollars has been spent trying to rebuild Kosovo and make a modern, viable state out of it.
In spite of all that money, the World Bank reports that growth in Kosovo "has weakened from 21.2% in 2000 to 4.2% in 2006 in line with declining donor resources." As the Serbs and other minorities have been ethnically cleansed from Kosovo due to crime and violence that KFOR seemed to be unable or unwilling to control, unemployment has skyrocketed to a reported 50-70% of the workforce.
The English word independent, in my dictionary is defined as: (1) Not influenced or controlled by others in matters of opinion, conduct, etc; (2) Not subject to another's authority or jurisdiction (3) Not relying on another or others for aid or support (4) declining others' aid or support; refusing to be under obligation to others.
That does not define Kosovo. It is clearly dependent on outside money and even outside policing to keep it reasonably in line. How is it that the Albanians in Kosovo with such non-productive background even SURVIVE - much less be granted such favor by the international community that it is being recognized as an "independent nation?"
Actually, the answer to that is in Albanian past and present history. Piracy and illegal trading has been part of Albania's economy for hundreds of years. According to an article by Peter Klebnikov in the February 2000 edition of Mother Jones Magazine, which strongly favors legalizing currently illegal drugs, most of the illegal drugs consumed in Europe are supplied by Albanian crime "families."Klebnikov wrote: "in the six months since Washington enthroned the Kosovo Liberation Army in that Yugoslav province, KLA-associated drug traffickers have cemented their influence and used their new status to increase heroin trafficking and forge links with other nationalist rebel groups and drug cartels.
"The ascent of the Kosovar families to the top of the trafficking hierarchy coincided with the sudden appearance of the KLA as a fighting force in 1997. As Serbia unleashed its campaign of persecution against ethnic Albanians, the diaspora mobilized. Hundreds of thousands of expatriate Kosovars around the world funneled money to the insurrection. Nobody sent more than the Kosovar drug traffickers -- some of the wealthiest people of Kosovar extraction in Europe. According to news reports, Kosovar Albanian traffickers launder $1.5 billion in profits from drug and arms smuggling each year through a shadowy network of some 200 private banks and currency exchange offices."
That was more than eight years ago. The "Serbia persecution" mentioned by Klebnikov was a effort by Belgrade to stop the killing of Serb policemen. Time marches on. Today the man who headed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 2000, Hashim Thaci, is the prime minister of Kosovo. Until President Bill Clinton removed it in 1999, the KLA was on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist organizations.
In February 1999 I also wrote about what I could see was a puzzling situation then developing in Kosovo. Frankly, at the time I knew nothing about the area but did know that the Albanians were the poorest, most backward and most devotedly communist nation in all of Europe. They thought the Russians were not proper "communists." I wondered how they could afford to create an army and finance expensive modern weapons to challenge the Yugoslavian army.
This was more than 2 years before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but even then in that article I had tracked down connections between the KLA and Osama bin Laden. I observed: "The KLA actually is the successor to the Ustashi regime of World War II which slaughtered over 700,000 Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies living in Croat-controlled territory in the forgotten part of the Holocaust. They have hated the Serbs for several hundred years - the Serbs supported the Allies in World War II and the Ustashi supported Mussolini and Adolph Hitler."
According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime the global drug trade generated an estimated $321.6 billion in 2003. That compares with the $358.2 billion that was spent in the 2003 US Defense Department budget. The size of the world's illicit drug trade, which fuels much of world terrorism and crime, is equivalent to .9% of the world's entire GDP and higher than the GDP of 88 percent of the countries in the world.
When the Albanians declared Kosovo "independent" the Serbs also gathered. In fact, their leaders - traditional, elected and spiritual, gathered to pray for the survival and the well being of the Serbs in Kosovo, most of whom have already been either driven out of Kosovo or killed in recent years. Crown Prince Alexander II addressed the gathered Serbs at Saint Dmitri Church in Mitrovica, Kosovo as follows: "Peace, determination, decisiveness, faith, and goodwill - these are our only 'weapons'. And, of course, law and justice, which are on our side. I appeal for the respect of human rights.
"Once again, I repeat my appeal for unity, for wisdom, for the unity of all politicians leading Serbia at this grave hour, so that we can live up to our ancestors who created this country with great effort, and our successors, to whom we must leave this country in legacy."
On one hand we are told that all the problems in the Balkans will simply go away when a "new" nation created by and for terrorists, drug dealers and criminals is recognized by other nations as legitimate and can join the United Nations. On the other hand we have the old nation of Serbia that is praying for the survival of the small group of Serbs still remaining in Kosovo.
I can hardly wait to see what happens next.
________________________________________