Ltr in Response to Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie
News from Serbia and Balkans
| Bitterness, Irony, and Hope |
| by Nebojsa Malic |
| Bosnia, Year 11 Eleven years since the Dayton Six weeks after general A Functioning Government By Nov. 10, the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) had On the other hand, in the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there On Nov. 15, a report in Oslobodjenje about the innumerable difficulties The outgoing PM of the joint government, Adnan Terzic, did just that at the Conspiracy Theories On Nov. 20, members of the new national parliament One of the MPs is Sefer As part of a series of interviews conducted with high-ranking ARBH officers, Halilovic's tale, pitting him and a faction of the Bosnian Muslim "patriots" As a result, in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims overwhelmingly believe Consider just this quote: "There is no Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today, unfortunately. Bosniaks Givers and Takers Many soldiers that Halilovic and his successors The men of Spid have traveled to tournaments in ordinary buses they chartered; Unfortunately, Bosnia's legislation demands that they pay the import tariffs Humanity Prevails Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina, got its name The Old Bridge, destroyed by Croat artillery, was restored One resident of Mostar, a young man named Sanel Hrnic, was badly injured earlier His plight drew the attention of Nada Zovko, who owns a small business. She |
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Go big, go bold, and get it done
Globe and Mail (Canada) ^ | November 22, 2006 | Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie
Posted on 11/23/2006 2:29:31 PM PST by Doctor13
Tip-toeing won't work. We need another 30,000 NATO troops to protect Afghans while they get their country on its feet.
In 1999, I was an outspoken critic of NATO's ill-conceived bombing campaign against Serbia/Kosovo. For anyone playing close attention to the events leading up to the campaign, it was pretty obvious that the independence- seeking Kosovo Liberation Army - which, according to the CIA, was a terrorist organization - and its retained U.S.-based, public-relations support had played the West like a Stradivarius. This culminated with NATO volunteering to be the KLA's air force.
A few months after the negotiated end to the bombing, my branding as an opponent to NATO's intervention got me invited to a debate in the U.S. with General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander in charge of the campaign, regarding the wisdom of NATO's actions.
Following the debate, Gen. Clark shared a story that still resonates today regarding our mission in Afghanistan. He recalled that mid-way through the bombing campaign, he was exchanging small talk with Greece's ambassador to NATO. Gen. Clark opined to the ambassador, "This must be quite difficult for you, as I understand there is a good deal of controversy in your country regarding our bombing of Serbia." Without hesitation, the ambassador replied, "No, Gen. Clarke, there is no controversy. We are all against the bombing!" He could have gone on to say (unnecessary, considering his audience): "But we are a member of NATO and that means you can rely on us even if we don't agree with the mission."
Fast forward to today and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first operation involving combat inside or outside of Europe. No one has rewritten Article 5 of NATO's Charter since April 4, 1949. It still reads, in part: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force ..."
Article 5 was invoked by NATO's leadership following the attacks of 9/11, and as required by the same article, the decision to use armed force was reported to and endorsed by the United Nation's Security Council. NATO now finds itself fighting a major counterinsurgency campaign in three of the 34 Afghanistan provinces, one of which, Kandahar, is the responsibility of our Canadian battle group. With an area half the size of Nova Scotia, an all-too-modest number of Canadian troops are not just trying to keep the lid on the insurgency, they are trying to defeat it.
To make matters worse, they have a porous border with Pakistan staring them in the face. Replacements for Taliban killed in Afghanistan don't even need to sneak across the border through the mountain passes. They drive across in the backs of trucks with their kit in broad daylight.
General David Richards, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, expressed his dismay with the resources at his disposal shortly after taking command in August. He quite rightly indicated he had no reserve capacity to exploit or secure successes on the battlefield and requested an additional 2,500 NATO troops be provided at the earliest opportunity.
As someone who has watched each and every UN mission since the end of the Cold War - in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor etc. - stumble, and in all too many cases, fail due to overly optimistic best-case scenarios and subsequent undermanning and underbudgeting of the UN force, followed by hesitant and inadequate reinforcement as the mission became mired, I am surprised Gen. Richard's request was so modest. Perhaps he hoped that once the reinforcement flow was kick started, it could be increased. Other than Poland, no NATO member raised its hand to help in any significant way. On the contrary, some nations ignored the example mentioned above that was set by Greece and treated the requirements of Article 5 as if they were multiple choice. Select what you feel like, ignore the rest.
"Sure, we will come to Afghanistan but don't ask us to leave our comfortable [and safe] firm base after the sun goes down."
Or, "Sure, our troops will be there shoulder to shoulder with the rest of you, just don't ask us to participate in any combat actions!"
Mind you, at least the countries that insist on the so-called caveats are actually in Afghanistan, which is more than you can say for the NATO leaders with at least three-quarters of a billion troops at their disposal who refuse to respond to the Alliance's pleas for help while troops from across the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel bear the brunt of a fight with inadequate resources.
In my opinion, based on a recent visit to Afghanistan and too many years operating with chronically undermanned UN forces, Gen. Richards does not need 2,500 more soldiers. He needs to double his force with 30,000 more front-line troops. Adequate headquarters are already on the ground to look after a massive infusion of combat power "outside the wire." If we want to protect the local Afghans while they reconstruct their country and create their army and local and national police forces, we can't tip-toe toward a solution.
The time has come to be bold. With NATO's future hanging in the balance, fence-sitting NATO partners have to be convinced, coerced, intimidated to live up to their end of the contract they signed when they joined during more peaceful times. Failure to do so will signal the end of a 57-year-old alliance that failed when faced with its first real test in the field.
Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.
Letters@globeandmail.com
Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool
Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool
Your Nov. 8 editorial, "Same old Serbia," lacked clarity regarding what's really going on in what used to be Yugoslavia.
Perhaps when discussing Bosnia-Herzegovina, the concern should not be as much about the political divisions there but focus more on the fact that for the past 10 years Bosnia has become fertile territory for global jihadists. One has to look no further than the machinations of the Clinton administration to know how that came to be. This information is readily available on the Internet.
The editorial mentioned that the United Nations "wants to unload Kosovo to the EU." But why does the U.N. want to unload Kosovo? Because anyone who has paid any attention can plainly see that Kosovo post-1999, and the U.S.-led "humanitarian" bombing and takeover, is a dysfunctional cesspool of organized crime, murder, and mayhem, and a fellow with a murky track record is its so-called prime minister.
Since 1999, more than 150 ancient Christian holy places have been desecrated, severely damaged, and, in most cases, completely destroyed by marauding bands of intolerant Albanian Muslims. Simultaneously, hundreds of new mosques are being built, many of them carrying plaques acknowledging funding from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.
Interestingly, this registers nary a blip on the West's radar screen. Could it be that the U.S. and its UN/NATO allies have made such a mess in Kosovo that the less said in that regard the better? And then they have the audacity to recommend Kosovo's independence.
Your editorial took the easy road by blaming Serbia for the problems in the region. The blame rests closer to home.
LIZ MILANOVICH
Edmonton, Alberta
<http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061113/OPINION03/61112003>
--------------------------------------------------------------
Article published Wednesday, November 8, 2006
Same old Serbia
RECENT developments in Serbia, the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo continue to stand as barriers to Serbia's joining the European Union and reaping for its people the economic benefits of that partnership.
Two votes last month highlighted the problem. The first, general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina Oct. 1, including the election of the Serb, Muslim, and Croat presidents who together make up the country's presidency, showed continued loyalty on the part of the three groups to nationalist, separatist representatives.
The Serb president, Nebojsa Radmanovic, and his party oppose the abolition of the political divisions incorporated in the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is generally considered that the EU would be reluctant to move toward membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina with the current divisions intact.
The second vote was an Oct. 29 referendum on Serbia's new constitution, which includes an assertion that Kosovo is an "integral part of Serbia." The referendum was approved by 96 percent of the voters.
The problem is that the United Nations, which has governed Kosovo since 1999, wants to unload it to the EU by the end of the year. The United States currently has 1,000 troops in Kosovo.
A solution would involve granting Kosovo independence, or some form of self-government, perhaps with continued international oversight. The new arrangement would be dominated by the 90 percent of the people who are Albanian, but the rights of the Serbs, who account for less than 10 percent, will need to be guaranteed.
Serbian resistance to change in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in addition to its refusal to turn over two prominent former Bosnian Serb leaders to international authorities for trial, continues to be a barrier to Serbia's progress toward adherence to the EU as well.
Serbia can be respected for its independence, but its approach to the problems of the region does not seem to be in its people's best interests.
Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia
By Tom Burgis in Brussels
Published: November 23 2006 14:06
| Last updated: November 23 2006 14:06
Independence for Kosovo would visit a “nightmare” on Serbia’s government by bolstering supporters of the late dictator Slobadan Milosevic, the country’s foreign minister has warned.
Vuk Draskovic said the centre-right administration could be outflanked by nationalists if the final status of the province is imposed on Belgrade by the international community.
“I am very afraid of the consequences of an imposed solution,” Mr Draskovic told the Financial Times in an interview. “It will strengthen the hands of the [ultra-nationalist] Radicals. This is my nightmare.” There was already pressure to cut ties with any state that recognises an independent Kosovo, he said.
Kosovo has been a ward of the United Nations since Nato troops drove Serb forces from the Albanian-dominated province in 1999. Martti Ahtisaari, the UN’s special envoy to Kosovo, has delayed making his recommendations on the province’s future until early next year after Belgrade called snap elections for January. In October, Serbs voted to adopt a new constitution describing Kosovo as an “intergral part” of the nation.
Mr Draskovic said there remained time to find a compromise solution that would see Kosovo gain full autonomy but remain within Serbian territory without the right to join Nato or the UN.
However, the Contact Group of nations marshalling negotiations has promised a solution “acceptable to the people of Kosovo”. One Western diplomat said that “any Belgrade proposal offering autonomy is unlikely to fulfil that”.
Belgrade argues that allowing the 2m Kosovans - among them 100,000 Serbs - to secede would set a precedent. “An imposed solution will have to respect the right to self-determination of Kosovans,” Mr Draskovic said. “But what happens when the next day the Serbs in Bosnia say: ‘We also want to use that right’?” Separatists in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Taiwan might follow suit, he added.
In a meeting with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary general, in Brussels on Wednesday, Mr Draskovic will demand unconditional Serbian entry to a Partnership for Peace cooperation agreement. A pact with the treaty body could hasten the arrest of former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic by demonstrating to his supporters that “they have lost the battle for the future”, Mr Draskovic said. However, Nato has made Serbian compliance with the tribunal a precondition of partnership.
The European Union has frozen talks with Belgrade on an accession agreement, widely seen as a waystation to membership, while Mr Mladic - wanted by the UN’s war crimes tribunal for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre - remains at large.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
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Homo Balkanus
Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. - 11/22/2006
Written: August 18, 1999
Could have been written today
How does one respond to a torrent of belligerent correspondence from Balkanians arguing against the belligerence of Balkanians asserted by one in one's articles? Were it not sad, it surely would have been farcical. Only yesterday (August 17th, 1999 - five months after the Kosovo conflict) Macedonian papers argued fiercely, vehemently and threateningly against an apparently innocuous remark by Albania's Prime Minister. He said that all Albanians, wherever they are, should share the same curriculum of studies. A preparatory step on the way to a Greater Albania perhaps? In this region of opaque mirrors and "magla" (fog) it is possible. And what is possible surely IS.
I do not believe in the future of this part of the world only because I know its history too well. every psychologist will tell you that past violent behaviour is the best predictor of future recidivism. Homo Balkanus is lifted straight off the rustling pages of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV-TR (2000) - the bible of the psychiatric profession - when it defines the Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Narcissism is a result of stunted growth and of childhood abuse. It is a reactive pattern, the indelible traces of an effort to survive against all odds, against bestial repression and all-pervasive decay. Brutally suppressed by the Turks for hundreds of years and then by communism in some countries and by cruel, capricious banana republic regimes in others - Homo Balkanus has grown to be a full fledged narcissist.
The nation state structure and ideology enthusiastically adopted by Homo Balkanus in the wake of the collapse of the rotten Ottoman edifice - has proven to be a costly mistake. Tribal village societies are not fit for the consumption of abstract models of political organization. This is as true in Africa as it is in the Balkans. The first allegiance of Homo Balkanus is to his family, his clan, his village. Local patriotism was never really supplanted by patriotism. Homo Balkanus shares an Ottoman unconscious with his co-regionists. The "authorities" were and are always perceived to be a brutal, menacing and unpredictable presence, a natural power, to be resisted by the equal employment of cunning and corruption. Turkish habits die hard. The natives find it difficult not to bribe their way through their own officialdom, to pay taxes, not to litter, to volunteer, in short: to be citizens, rather than occupants or inhabitants. Their passive-aggressive instincts are intact and on auto pilot.
The Balkanian experiment with nation states has visited only misery and carnage upon the heads of its perpetrators. Borders tracked convulsively the movements of half-nomad populations. This instability of boundaries led to ethnic cleansing, to numerous international congresses, to fitful wars. In an effort to justify a distinct existence and identity, thousands of "scholars" embarked on herculean efforts of inventing histories for their newly emergent nations. Inevitably, these histories conflicted and led to yet more bloodshed. A land fertilized by blood produces harvests of bloated corpses.
In the Balkans people fight for their very own identity. They aspire to purity, albeit racial, and to boundaries, albeit of the abstract kind. It is, perhaps, the kernel of this Greek tragedy: that real people are sacrificing real people on the altar of the abstract. It is a battle of tastes, a clash of preferences, an armageddon of opinions, judgements, lessons. Armies are still moved by ancient events, by symbols, by fiery speeches, by abstract, diffuse notions. It is a land devoid of its present, where the past and future reign supreme. No syllogism, no logic, no theory can referee that which cannot be decided but by the compelling thrust of the sword. "We versus They" - they, the aliens. Threatened by the otherness of others, Homo Balkanus succumbs to the protection of the collective. A dual track: an individualist against the authorities - a mindless robot against all others, the foreigners, the strangers, the occupiers. The violent acting out of this schizophrenia is often referred to as "the history of the Balkans".
This spastic nature was further exacerbated by the egregious behaviour of the superpowers. Unfortunately possessed of strategic import, the Balkan was ravaged by geopolitics. Turks and Bulgarians and Hungarians and Austrians and Russians and Britons and Germans and Communists and the warplanes of NATO - the apocalyptic horsemen in the mountains and rivers and valleys and sunsets of this otherworldly, tortured piece of land. Raped by its protectors, impregnated by the demon seeds of global interests and their ruthless pursuit - the Balkan was transformed into a horror chamber of amputated, zombie nations, a veritable hellish scene. Many a Pomeranian grenadier bequeathed their bones to the Balkans but Pomeranian grenadiers came and went while the people of the Balkan languished.
Thus, it was not difficult to foster a "We" against every "They" (or imagined "They"). A crossroads of faultlines, a confluence of tectonic clashes - the Balkan always obliged.
Religion came handy in this trade of hate. Orthodox Serbs fought Muslim Serbs in Bosnia (the latter were forced to convert by the Turks hundreds of years ago). Catholic Croats fought Orthodox Serbs. And Bulgarians (a Turkic tribe) expelled the Turks in 1989, having compelled them to change their Muslim names to Bulgarian sounding ones in 1984.
Race was useful in the agitated effort to prevail. Albanians are of Illyrian origin. The Greeks regard the Macedonians as upstart Slavs. The Bulgarians regard the Macedonians as rebel Bulgarians. The Macedonian regard the Bulgarians as Tartars (that is, Barbarian and Turkish). The Slovenes and the Croats and, yes, the Hungarians claim not to belong in this cauldron of seething, venomous emotions.
And culture was used abundantly in the Balkan conflicts. Where was the Cyrillic alphabet invented (Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria) and by whom (Greeks, Macedonians, Bulgarians). Are some nations mere inventions? (the Bulgarians say this about the Macedonians). Are some languages one and the same? Minorities are either cleansed or denied out of existence. The Greek still claim that there are no minorities in Greece, only Greeks with different religions. The Bulgars in Greece used to be "Bulgarophone Greeks". The Balkan is the eternal hunting grounds of oxymorons, tautologies and logical fallacies.
It is here that intellectuals usually step in (see my article: "The Poets and the Eclipse"). But the Balkan has no intelligentsia in the Russian or even American sense. It has no one to buck the trend, to play the non conforming, to rattle, to provoke, to call upon one's conscience. It does not have this channel to (other) ideas and view called "intellectuals". It is this last point which makes me the most pessimistic. The Balkan is a body without a brain.
http://www.globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=2320&cid=3&sid=10
Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe
Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard
Saturday, November 18, 2006; Page A19
Regarding the Nov. 10 editorial "Here Comes Kosovo":
Americans don't understand or like history, which most other cultures accept and study as an invaluable source of knowledge and experience. Americans generally look at history as an unnecessary burden that can have only a negative influence on the present.
Your editorial regarding Kosovo, the very cradle of Serbia, showed such ignorance. Nowhere did it note that Kosovo has been part of Serbia since the Serbs moved to it in the sixth century, four centuries before any Albanians were heard of in the Balkans.
Moreover, the editorial said, "By incorporating Kosovo into a new constitution, Serbia's leaders staked out yet another of the reckless nationalist stands that have caused their country so much damage in the past 15 years."
Wrong. It is ignorance of historic facts displayed by The Post and other similarly inspired American publications that has caused so much damage to a small but brave nation and a loyal ally in two world wars. The Serbs do not want what belongs to others, but they will not give away what is rightfully theirs.
The United States and its citizens would react in the same way if someone suddenly decided that Southern California or New Mexico should secede just because Spanish-speaking Mexicans live there.
As for your specter of 2 million Albanians in Kosovo being enraged, they should just go back where they came from -- neighboring Albania. Most Albanians came to Kosovo during World War II or during the rule of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, which maintained an open border with Albania, its fellow communist neighbor. Since then the incoming Albanians have systematically pushed untold numbers of Kosovo Serbs out of Kosovo.
Your editorial writers should study history to ensure more meaningful and more accurate editorials.
-- Michael Mennard
Potomac Falls
INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC
Kosovo vs South Ossetia
The international community is vague about why Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared, and the answers lie in geopolitics rather than principles of self-determination and international law.
Commentary by Jen Alic for ISN Security Watch (15/11/06)
In Western media offerings on South Ossetia's recent referendum for independence from Georgia there is an unwavering tone that suggests the breakaway republic either does not deserve, or should for unexamined reasons, not be granted , independence.
The opposite is true for Western media reports concerning the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo. These reports adopt a tone that cheers for and approves of independence.
The international community has long strived for an independent Kosovo and is set to make a decision on the province's status early next year. That decision is most likely going to be independence, though conditional and gradual. At the same time, the international community opposes independence for South Ossetia, citing the unfairness of the Sunday referendum that did not include ethnic Georgians in the breakaway republic.
It has been impossible to find any arguments as to why South Ossetia should not be allowed to pursue self-determination. When questioned on this, Western officials have generally responded by saying that Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared. End of story, no further explanation needed.
But perhaps they can be compared.
Neither South Ossetia nor Kosovo has ever been an independent nation, as far back in history as is rationally warranted to look. Both have at times enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Both have minorities whose rights may not be ensured and whose safety is anything but guaranteed. South Ossetia is home to 14,000 ethnic Georgians, while Kosovo is home to an estimated 120,000 Serbs, who live in fear in UN-guarded enclaves. There is no indication that either minority will be offered adequate protection or adequate rights. And conflict could result from a decision either way.
On Sunday, some 99 percent of South Ossetian voters backed independence from Georgia. The 14,000 ethnic Georgians living in a handful of villages in the breakaway republic were not allowed to vote, as registration required a Russian passport, which all Ossetians have been granted. This was unfair, as the international community has pointed out, but the ethnic Georgian vote would not have changed the outcome.
Furthering the comparison, neither Kosovo nor South Ossetia are necessarily prepared for independence, though Kosovo can expect help from its kin in neighboring Albania and the international community, while South Ossetia can expect some, though likely limited, aid from neighboring Russia. In economic terms, it is unclear how either could support their populations, however small. Industry is for all intents and purposes absent in both locales, while the majority of income is rumored to be made on the black market, largely through arms and drug smuggling.
What has been lacking throughout is an honest debate on these issues, which can easily be compared, despite vague statements to the contrary.
And the honest debate necessarily involves geopolitics.
South Ossetia is a buffer for Russia against the Western-leaning Georgia, while Georgia is a buffer for the US against Russia.
While Russia has played coy with the South Ossetia issue, refraining from recognizing its last declaration of independence in the 1990s and officially supporting Georgia's territorial integrity, it has clearly supported the separatists there. The US must do more than pay lip service to Georgia's territorial integrity, as the country moves toward NATO membership and continues to build its Western alliances.
And of course, there is energy to consider. The Caspian Basin is a place of intense competition, with the US, Russia and China all vying for a stronger foothold. In July, the US$4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was inaugurated. The BTC pumps Caspian Sea oil to the Turkish Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should supply 1 million barrels of oil per day by 2009. It passes through the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and also runs rather close to South Ossetia.
BP, formerly British Petroleum, has a 30.1 percent stake in the pipeline. The pipeline was commissioned by a BP-led consortium that includes energy companies from the US, Norway, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Japan, France and Italy. The BTC is a key to Western energy security. Upsetting Georgia - a major player in this energy security - by allowing South Ossetia to declare independence and be internationally recognized would be risky.
As far as Kosovo is concerned, granting independence is much easier. Serbia is of no strategic value to the West, and the international community has no bones about playing with fire there, despite some low-level concerns that granting Kosovo independence could be so unpopular in Belgrade that it would see a return to power of radical forces.
Russia, for its part, would be more than happy to see Kosovo granted independence - this, despite its support for its Serb allies and Serbia's territorial integrity - if only because it would set a precedent for similar moves in South Ossetia, Abkhazia (Georgia's other breakaway republic), and Moldova's breakaway republic of Transdneistr.
So, the question here is not really whether Kosovo or South Ossetia has a right to self-determination - which is indeed a romantic notion that is easy to digest in terms of principles - but why there has been a lack of honest debate at an official level.
Jen Alic is the editor in chief of ISN Security Watch.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
Romancing the Independence
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16920
Kosovo's identity crisis
"Why do the Serbs keep living in the past? Everyone knows where they ended up with their nationalist policies," says Agim Osmani. A year ago he and his wife, with their six children, bought and rebuilt a house in Caglavica, in the outskirts of Pristina, along the road to Macedonia. Previously it belonged to a Serb, now in Belgrade.
"We are all free to choose. There is plenty of room for everyone," adds Osmani.
In fact, along the 5km stretch between Caglavica and Pristina there is increasingly less room. In just a few years the fields have filled with Albanian-owned warehouses, filling stations and shops. Most of Osmani's neighbours are Serbs, but for how much longer? The average age of Kosovo's 130,000 Serbs is 54, compared with 28 for their 2 million Albanian neighbours.
Stamenko Kovacevic, 82, lives just behind Osmani's house, scraping by on his miserable Elektro Kosova pension. He hopes to end his days in this village of 1,500 people, all Serbs until recently. His children have left the province, which always been one of the poorest parts of the former Yugoslavia.
"Agim takes care of me, he brings me food and takes me to the doctor's," says Kovacevic. But he nevertheless voted "yes" in the referendum, "because it has always been that way".
In the distance the antiquated power station at Obilic belches poisonous smoke. Kovacevic has few illusions about the benefits of the new constitution, hurriedly drafted in Belgrade to replace the 1990 text.
Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Serbia, was determined to end Kosovo's relative autonomy in a Yugoslav union that was already disintegrating. Fighting in Kosovo only flared up at the end of the 1990s, after Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. But unlike the former republics which have gained independence - joined by Montenegro a few months ago - the fate of the former autonomous region of Kosovo is still undecided.
Kosovo has its own president, elected parliament and government, which raises taxes in euros. It also has a civil defence corps, more akin to an army than a pioneer group. Not many young Albanians speak Serbo-Croat any longer, as was the case for the previous generation brought up in Tito's Yugoslavia. The number plates on their German saloons and Yugo bangers are all marked KS and none of them are in any doubt about their imminent independence. "Only the Serbs shut their eyes so as not to see the elephant in their sitting room," says Veton Surroi, a Kosovar writer.
Milan Ivanovic, on the other hand, is among those who reject the idea of independence. Seated on the terrace of the Dolce Vita café, in the northern quarter of the divided town of Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo, he persists in maintaining that the province "was, is and always will be Serb. Nor will any Serb leader wreck his political career by abandoning Kosovo". "What is happening at present is temporary. In the medium term Serbia will regain control of Kosovo," he adds. He does not explain how, but then the democratic process is not his cup of tea.
Dr Ivanovic runs the local hospital and chairs the Serb National Council. A radical, with closely cropped hair and a steely gaze, he forecasts more violence: "It's inevitable. The only unknown quantity is its scale. As Serbs we could never accept Kosovo's independence. We will block the roads in the north and stop the Albanians coming here. If need be we'll organise our own referendum to ratify our independence, inside Kosovo. On the other hand, if Kosovo is not granted its independence, the Albanians will be angry because the international community promised it six year ago."
He recalls the rioting in March 2004 and the violence that claimed a dozen lives. Albanian extremists attacked isolated Serb homes and burned Orthodox churches, prompting villagers from around Mitrovica to take refuge in the town. The international community is terrified a similar uprising might engulf the whole of Kosovo - either spontaneously or stirred up by one of the opposing forces.
"We will defend ourselves against any attacks," warns Ivanovic, who has rejected any moves since 1999 that might bridge the gap between the two communities. Here in Mitrovica the health service, schools and university are all an integral part of the Serb system and completely dependent on Belgrade.
"Our politicians are heading for disaster," says Milos, a Serb studying philosophy at the local university. "They adopt an extremist line because they are paid by Belgrade. If things go wrong, they have a fallback solution, but I don't. My future is here," he adds, lowering his voice to express views shared by a silent minority.
Most of the customers at the Dolce Vita are bulky skinheads who claim to be the "guardians of the bridge", a reference to the bridge across the Ibar river that separates the Albanian districts, to the south, from their Serb counterparts, to the north. There has been no communication between the two sides since Nato forces arrived in June 1999.
Milos does not much like the idea of an independent Kosovo. He says: "We have lost touch with our Albanian neighbours, but if we can have reasonable security and autonomy, then perhaps we can live together. I certainly do not fancy the sort of security the 'guardians of the bridge' are offering."
"Fortunately there is little fighting between the two communities now," says Romuald Pilchard, a political adviser to the commander of the KFOR international force deployed since 1999. The presence of 16,000 foreign troops and the setting up of a local police force have helped keep the peace. But other factors are also at work. "Now that they have almost achieved their goal of independence, the Kosovar Albanians are playing it safe. They have nothing to gain from upsetting negotiations on final status," says a European diplomat. "But there is a limit to their patience, and the politicians say it is increasingly hard to keep control of the more unruly elements," he adds. Many think the outburst of violence in 2004 was in fact salutary because it reminded the international community that Kosovo still existed.
During a visit to Paris last month the Kosovar prime minister, Agim Ceku, underlined his people's "concern" at the delay to negotiations. "People are fed up. They get the impression nothing is happening, whereas the situation is dramatic," says Nehad Islami, a moderate Albanian writer. "Almost half the population is unemployed and the others are living below the poverty line. They may blow their top at any time," warns Avni Zogani, of the Cohu! (Wake up!) organisation, which is trying to raise civic awareness among Kosovars.
Albanian politicians are keen to keep things calm but they lack the necessary credibility. "Most of them are corrupt and the political parties all have links of some sort with organised crime, which has infiltrated most official bodies," says Zogani.
He adds: "The public sector is more of a welfare operation, doing favours for specific groups, with 70,000 officials. That is three times more than in Slovenia for a comparable population. Added to which the UN Mission in Kosovo [known as Unmik] people turn a blind eye. They have already packed their bags and do not want any problems. We are increasingly fed up with our politicians but also with the international agencies."
"The only solution is independence, but it is like a lover you've been waiting for too long: part of the charm has gone," says Linda Gusia, a professor of sociology at Pristina University. "Daily life absorbs all our energy. We have no time to think of anything else. We realise that not having an international status is part of the problem, but we also know it will not solve all our woes, as if by magic, particularly the power cuts in the winter."
With a salary of only €150 a month, she has to do several jobs to feed her family. She says: "I feel humiliated at not being able to provide for my children, at not having a passport or being able to buy books on the net, because Kosovo is not a state. It isn't even Kosovo here, it's Unmikistan, and we're trapped."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1948467,00.html
[ From Antiwar.com ]
Ltr in response to "Kosovo cannot wait." Financial Times
The following is from todays Financial Times.
Kosovo cannot wait http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3ba4939a-72bb-11db-a5f5-0000779e2340.html
Published: November 13 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 13 2006 02:00
The international deadline set for the settlement of the Kosovo question - the last big territorial issue left by the collapse of
While a few weeks' delay is tolerable, any longer postponement could undermine hopes of a peaceful settlement and of a brighter future for one of
Kosovo's majority ethnic Albanians want independence for a province that has been UN-ruled since 1999, when Nato troops forced out Slobodan Milosevic, former Serb leader. But Kosovo remains legally a part of
Mr Ahtisaari is expected to propose conditional independence in which Kosovo wins limited de facto sovereignty minus the full trappings of statehood. But even this will be too much for most Serbs. So he has delayed his announcement until after Serbian elections on January 21 - for fear that his plans would fuel extremist support.
Moderate Serb leaders are playing for time. Their tactics are not utterly hopeless.
There are risks in imposing an early settlement.
However, the dangers of international inaction are greater. Delay poisons Kosovo by preventing ethnic Albanians taking responsibility for their future and hampers economic development, as few companies will invest in a stateless zone. And, worst of all, it risks provoking renewed violence from frustrated ethnic Albanians.
An early settlement would give maximum political benefit to moderate ethnic Albanian leaders, creating the best environment for them to deal in future with Kosovo's Serbs and with
The likely settlement would also, rightly, impose tough conditions on Kosovo, including the presence of foreign troops and of a European Union supervisory mission. Local Serbs would have a lot of autonomy under decentralisation plans. Kosovo would be forbidden from merging with next-door
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006