February 26, 2006
ICTY: The Show (Trial) must go on
CANADA’S FORMER AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA TAKES THE WITNESS STAND
www.slobodan-milosevic.org
February 23, 2006
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Prof. Dr. Marko Atlagic, an MP representing Benkovac in the Croatian Sabor from 1990 until 1992, concluded his testimony at the trial of Slobodan Milosevic on Thursday.
Mr. Nice showed Atlagic Milan Babic’s testimony in which he claimed that he received military support from both Milosevic and Borislav Jovic.
Atlagic dismissed Babic’s testimony as pure nonsense. He said that Babic was an opportunist who would say anything to advance his own interests. He pointed out that Babic never said anything like that before he got to The Hague.
Mr. Nice again dredged up the BBC documentary “The Death of Yugoslavia”. Twice Mr. Nice played clips from the movie only to have it turn out that the BBC’s subtitles were wrong.
Nearly every time Mr. Nice plays a clip from that film it blows-up in his face. The subtitles are frequently do not match the words actually being spoken. Judge Bonamy branded the film “tendentious” and asked Mr. Nice if it was a good idea for the prosecution to keep relying on it.
“The Death of Yugoslavia” relies on the fact that most English-speaking people have no knowledge of the Serbo-Croatian language. By attributing false and malicious subtitles to the people interviewed in the film the BBC has created a film that is a gross manipulation of facts and reality. It is disturbing that this film is widely and uncritically shown to students in Western classrooms.
Mr. Nice spent the balance of Atlagic’s cross-examination citing Serbian war actions in Croatia. Atlagic spent an equal amount of time citing the Croatian war actions that provoked the Serbian war actions in the first place.
Atlagic reiterated his testimony that violent Croatian provocations began as early as 1989, whereas Serbian retaliation did not begin until 1991.
After Mr. Nice concluded the cross-examination Atlagic was briefly re-examined by Mr. Kay because Milosevic too ill to continue. Milosevic, who suffers from high blood pressure, complained of intense pressure behind his eyes and ears as well as a loud roaring noise in his head.
Milosevic, in spite of his ill health, spent the last hour of the hearing examining James Bisset, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia from late 1990 until mid-1992.
Bissett described the NATO bombing as an illegal and "appalling act" that precipitated the Kosovo refugee crisis.
The witness testified that the NATO charter prohibits the use of violence to settle international conflicts. "And, yet, in March of 1999, it began to bomb a country that was a sovereign country, that was no threat to its neighbors," he said.
The opening article of the NATO's founding treaty commits the allies "to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means (and) refrain ... from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
Bisset told the tribunal that Milosevic had been unfairly painted as the cause of the Yugoslav crisis when in fact he had worked to keep the country together.
Yugoslavia collapsed, Bisset testified, because Germany encouraged Slovenia and Croatia to secede and, later, American interference caused war to erupt in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Speaking of the Kosovo Liberation army, Bisset said Milosevic tried to "suppress an armed rebellion by an organization that had a year before been described by the US state department as a terrorist organization."
The witness challenged the prosecution charge that Milosevic ordered the dismissal of thousands of Kosovo-Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police officers and civil servants.
"To my knowledge they were not dismissed,” said Bisset. "They simply voluntarily withdrew from their positions (and) continued to do their work, but under a sort of underground, parallel government" in Kosovo.
His testimony was based on conversations at the time with diplomatic staff visiting Kosovo and ethnic Albanian delegations, meetings that he had with Milosevic, as well as intelligence sources within the Canadian government.
Bisset will continue his testimony when the trial continues on Friday.
# # #
TRIBUNAL DENIES MILOSEVIC MEDICAL TREATMENT AS CANADIAN AMBASSADOR CONCLUDES HIS TESTIMONY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org
February 24, 2006
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic resumed on Friday. The hearing began with Milosevic objecting to the trial chamber’s ruling denying his request for medical treatment. Milosevic says he intends appeal the decision.
Milosevic has been diagnosed with severe hypertension and is at high risk for a heart attack or stroke. Russian cardiologists from the world-renowned Bakoulev medical center in Moscow believe that they can effectively treat his condition.
The doctors retained by the tribunal have been unable to adequately treat Milosevic, and as a result the trial has been adjourned several times on account of his ill-health.
The Tribunal’s decision is a slap in the face to the Russian Government. The Russian Government guaranteed that it would return Milosevic to the tribunal’s custody after he was treated by the physicians at the Bakoulev center.
In its ruling the tribunal stated, “the Chamber notes that the Accused is currently in the latter stages of a very lengthy trial, in which he is charged with many serious crimes, and at the end of which, if convicted, he may face the possibility of life imprisonment. In these circumstances, and notwithstanding the guarantees of the Russian Federation and the personal undertaking of the Accused, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the first prong of the test has been met—that is, that it is more likely than not that the Accused, if released, would return for the continuation of his trial .”
What the tribunal is saying is that the Russian Government can not be trusted to apprehend a 64-year-old man with a heart condition if he tried to escape. For all of its empty rhetoric about human rights, what the Hague Tribunal has shown by its decision is that it is perfectly happy to imperil a man’s life just for the sake of politics.
After Judge Robinson announced that he would not hear any objections to the ruling. Milosevic continued with the examination of James Bisset, the Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992.
Bisset testified that the United States initially supported the preservation of Yugoslavia. He noted James Baker’s statement that the U.S. supported the use of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) to put down the secession of Slovenia and Croatia.
Bisset said Germany’s foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was partly to blame for the break-up of Yugoslavia. He said that the German government and Genscher in particular exerted pressure on the European Community by threatening to walk out of the EC and recognize Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally.
Contrary to the prosecution’s assertions that Milosevic provoked the Krajina-Serbs to rebellion. Bisset testified that Serbs in Croatia were provoked by the Croatian government which was dismissing them from their jobs and expelling them from their homes.
Bisset testified that Milosevic had no ambition to create “greater Serbia.” He said that the prosecution’s thesis that Milosevic engaged in a criminal conspiracy to expand Serbia’s territory was “pure fantasy”.
The witness testified that Milosevic worked for peace, and that all of the peace plans Milosevic supported for Bosnia and Croatia would have made any expansion of Serbia’s territory impossible.
Bisset, who met with Milosevic several times in his capacity as Canada’s ambassador, said that Milosevic supported the preservation of Yugoslavia, but was willing to allow others to secede as long as human rights were protected and as long as the secession was carried out in accordance with Yugoslavia’s laws and constitution.
Unfortunately Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia did not secede in accordance with the provisions of the Yugoslav constitution. In stead they opted for war carried out their secession through violence.
Speaking of the JNA, Bisset testified that they were subordinated to the federal authorities, not to Milosevic as claimed by the prosecution.
Bisset testified that Milosevic used his political influence to obtain peace. He recalled how Milosevic used his political influence to exert pressure on Milan Babic to accept the Vance Plan in Croatia.
The former Canadian ambassador testified that American interference caused war to erupt in Bosnia and Kosovo.
He testified that in March 1992 (one month before the outbreak of war in Bosnia) Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilhiero brokered a peace agreement in Lisbon between Bosnia’s Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
Bisset said that the agreement had been signed by Karadzic for the Serbs, Boban for the Croats, and Izetbegovic for the Muslims. The witness, a career diplomat, believed that the Cutilhiero plan was a good plan that would have avoided war in Bosnia if it had been implemented.
Unfortunately the Cutilhiero plan was never implemented. Bisset testified that the American ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, flew to Sarajevo and met with Izetbegovic. He testified that Zimmerman sabotaged the peace plan by encouraging Izetbegovic to remove his signature from the agreement.
Soon after his meeting with Zimmerman, Izetbegovic reneged on the agreement and civil war broke out in Bosnia.
Far from being the peace seeking humanitarians they claimed to be, Bisset testified that the Clinton Administration prolonged the Bosnian war by sabotaging the Vance-Owen plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan.
In Kosovo, Bisset testified that NATO caused the very humanitarian catastrophe that it blamed on Milosevic. He said that prior to the NATO bombing there were only a handful of Kosovo refugees. Once the NATO bombing began, the flow of refugees went from a being a trickle to a flood.
The former Canadian ambassador testified that American intransigence made war unavoidable in Kosovo. He testified that Madeline Albright attached Annex B to the Rambouillet Agreement. Annex B would have given NATO the right to occupy all of Yugoslavia, not just Kosovo. Bisset said that no government on Earth could have accepted such an agreement. He pointed out that senior level U.S. diplomats have even admitted that Rambouillet was a provocation that was intended to give NATO an excuse to attack.
It is worth noting that NATO’s original excuse for attacking Yugoslavia was Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. The bombing only became a “humanitarian mission” after it caused the humanitarian catastrophe that NATO blamed on Milosevic.
In Bisset’s opinion, Kosovo-Albanian secessionists opted for war because they had seen that violence was an effective means to achieve independence in Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia.
He testified that NATO used the Kosovo war to transform itself from a defensive organization into a renegade force that sees itself as having the power to wage aggressive war notwithstanding UN charter.
Bisset was critical of NATO’s unwillingness to implement UN Resolution 1244 in Kosovo. He said that NATO did not protect the non-Albanian population, and as a result nearly a quarter of a million non-Albanians have been expelled from Kosovo. He also said that NATO has allowed Albanian extremists to destroy more than 160 medieval Serbian churches and cultural monuments in Kosovo.
Not wishing to hear any criticism of NATO, the tribunal cut off Bisset’s examination-in-chief.
Mr. Nice then cross-examined Bisset. It is worth noting that Mr. Nice didn’t challenge most of the testimony that Bisset gave during the examination-in-chief. Nearly all of it stood unopposed.
In stead Mr. Nice challenged some magazine articles that Ambassador Bisset wrote about Racak, Srebrenica, and the Hague Tribunal.
In one of his articles Bisset claimed that Racak was a hoax. He based his conclusion on the forensic evidence found by the Finnish forensic team that examined the bodies of the so-called “massacre victims.” The forensic evidence indicated that the people had not been shot at close range and that they had been shot from various angles. In light of the forensic evidence they could not have been executed as claimed by the Tribunal.
Mr. Nice challenged Bisset by asking him if he had spoken to survivors of the alleged massacre. Bisset said that he had not interviewed survivors.
This is typical for Mr. Nice. He accused Bisset of making an irresponsible statement because he didn’t take the stories of the Albanians into account. But it doesn’t matter what the Albanians say, Bisset based his article on the scientific evidence. If the Albanians say something that is at odds with science then they’re lying. If an Albanian says the Sun revolved around the Earth it doesn't make it true.
Mr. Nice accused Bisset of being irresponsible for criticizing the Hague Tribunal, and branding the proceedings against Milosevic a “Stalinist show trial.” Bisset said that he made that remark when the tribunal denied Milosevic the right of self-representation.
Of course being accused by Bisset is the least of the tribunal’s public relations concerns. The fact that they’re denying a 64-year-old heart patient medical treatment is even worse than denying him the right of self-representation. Denying Milosevic the medical treatment he needs could kill him.
On Srebrenica Mr. Nice scolded Bisset for expressing doubt that 8,000 Muslims had really been executed there.
Bisset explained that the number 8,000 came from the Red Cross which reported that 8,000 Muslims were missing from Srebrenica after the enclave fell. 5,000 of the 8,000 were already reported missing *BEFORE* the enclave fell (i.e. before the Serbs got there), and the remaining 3,000 were reported missing when the enclave fell.
Bisset said that the media simply jumped to the absurd conclusion that all 8,000 of the missing Muslims had been executed by the Serbs. They did not take into account that there was two-way combat in the area and that many (if not most) of the supposed “massacre victims” died while attacking the Serbian lines in a failed bid to link Srebrenica up with Tuzla.
Mr. Nice said that Bisset of advocated the Serbian cause. The ambassador responded by saying that the Serbs have been wrongfully demonized by Western politicians and media organizations, and that somebody needs to defend them and set the record straight.
Following the conclusion of Mr. Nice’s cross-examination the witness was briefly re-examined by Milosevic. The trial will resume with a fresh witness next Monday.
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February 25, 2006
The Madness of General Mladic
Mladic brought to Justice?
Yesterday atleast we had the sad duty to read and post the following statement – and hope it may have been inspired more by strategic reasoning than by the actual facts. For the days must come: M-Day for Mladic and K-Day for Karadzic.
However, read this here for the time being, the statement of the Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague:
Statement by Carla Del Ponte; 22 February 2006
"Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen,
The false rumors spread yesterday from Belgrade about the arrest of Mladic have absolutely no basis whatsoever. There is no indication at all that negotiations about his surrender are currently being conducted. I was in contact with the authorities in Belgrade yesterday and I was assured that there is not truth in all this. Mladic remains at large.
Mladic and Karadzic must be brought to justice in The Hague so that the genocide of 8000 Muslims in Srebrenica is not left unpunished.
Ratko Mladic is in Serbia, there is no doubt about this. He has been there since 1998. During all this time he has been, and he remains within the reach of of Serbian authorities. He can and
must be arrested immediately, and I expect all Serbian authorities to work much more intensely towards that objective.
The conditionality imposed by the European Union in the context of the negotiations on a stabilization and association agreement is
of key importance. Serbia knows that negotiations may be suspended or may never conclude if Belgrade fails to cooperate fully with the ICTY.
I always could count on the support of the European Union. But now the role of the European Union is crucial. I need now a stronger support of the European Union to have Mladic in The Hague very soon. Clear deadlines associated with clear sanctions will produce early results."
Afterwards, Mme. Del Ponte's spokeswoman, Florence Hartmann indicated that "nothing new" has happened that the OTP (Office of the Prosecutor) is aware of that even led to these rumors.
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For further news check this source. See also the latest article in Der Tagesspiegel. And for a stunning profile of Ratko Mladic click “mehr” below.
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
Volume 42, Number 15 · October 5, 1995
The Madness of General Mladic
By Robert Block
1.
The Serbian Orthodox church in the Bosnian Serb border town of Bijeljina is a modest, dark gray building a few blocks from the central square. On Wednesday, June 28, 1995, local peasants and Bosnian Serb refugees from Tuzla and Zenica packed the church to celebrate the feast of the fourth-century martyr Saint Vitus. This is one of the holiest occasions of the Serbian Orthodox calendar: it coincides with the day in 1389 when Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic and his forces were crushed by the Ottoman Turks in the battle of Kosovo, beginning five hundred years of Muslim rule over the Serbs.
According to Serbian legend, the angel Elijah appeared to Lazar on the eve of battle offering him a choice over the outcome of the next day's events. Lazar could have a victory and win an earthly kingdom, or he could choose martyrdom and a place for his people in heaven. Thus a military failure was turned into a spiritual triumph, and a battlefield became the birthplace of the Serbian mission to recover the national homeland.
Every man, woman, and child present, whether in peasant dress or wearing smart Italian sports clothes, would have known this story. The people came hoping to catch a glimpse of their modern-day Lazar, General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serbs' military commander, who was in town for the occasion. The rest of the Bosnian Serb leadership was also there—"President" Radovan Karadzic, "Vice-President" Nikola Koljevic, and "Parliamentary Speaker" Moncilo Krajisnik—but they were a sideshow. Their comings and goings aroused mild curiosity but little enthusiasm.
When General Mladic left the church, he was mobbed by adoring fans. Old women cried and tried to hug him. Babies were held up for him to touch. Throughout all this, Mladic looked uncomfortable, as if he were genuinely surprised by the attention. His awkwardness and seeming humility only served to impress the crowd further.
"He is a god," one well-dressed middle-aged woman told me. "I would follow him anywhere, through the woods or across rivers. He is our savior and the greatest man in the world." She clasped her breast and looked up at the sky.
A delegation of Greek Cypriots came to pay their respects. "When you are finished here, you are welcome to come to Cyprus to help us throw our Turks into the sea," the leader of the delegation told the general, who smiled politely at the invitation as if such a thought embarrassed him.
Two weeks later, around July 12, General Mladic was in Potocari, a village to which more than 28,000 Muslims from Srebrenica had fled in a vain search for refuge with the Dutch UN peacekeepers there. He was on a horse, surveying the faces of the refugees, when he spied a large number of men and boys. According to the testimony of one witness,[1] Mladic could barely contain his delight. "There are so many!" he exclaimed. "It is going to be a mezze [a feast]. There will be blood up to your knees."
During the next few days, between two and four thousand captured Muslim men, including teen-age boys, were slaughtered in an orgy of methodical revenge killings.[2] Intercepted radio transmissions indicate that Mladic was present at the beginning of the executions. According to a UN source, after the first days of slaughter, Mladic told the Dutch UN commander he held captive at Potocari that Serb forces had killed "lots of people because they were trying to break out of Srebrenica."[3]
Many witnesses to the murder of Muslims from Srebrenica have said that Mladic was, in fact, present during much of the butchery. One survivor of an alleged mass execution of hundreds of Srebrenica prisoners near the eastern Bosnian village of Karakaj swears that he saw General Mladic sitting in a red Ford car, watching as Bosnian men were taken in pairs off the back of a truck and summarily shot. A few hours earlier Mladic was reported to have told the prisoners: "You will be released and you have nothing to fear."
Mladic is adept at striking an apparently benign pose while planning killings. Shortly before his soldiers began separating Muslim men from their families in Srebenica for "screening," he arrived to comfort the conquered and to hand out meat and chocolate to the children. Serbian television cameras videotaped him swaggering among the crowds, patting children on the head, saying: "Don't be afraid. No one will harm you." The Bosnian men were taken away the minute the cameras were turned off.
A few weeks later, after Mladic had crushed Zepa, another Muslim enclave, the general told a Serb reporter without a hint of cynicism: "Do you think that I like to wage war? I would be the happiest man in the world if the war were over. A soldier knows best what kind of evil war is. But when their neck is being squeezed, people must be defended."
Such are the different faces of General Ratko Mladic: an adored soldier-hero and plausibly accused war criminal; a peace-loving killer with the common touch. To his soldiers and the Serbs of Bosnia, General Mladic is a warrior prince. To his enemies, the Muslims and Croats, he is the incarnation of the devil, a man willing to persecute and kill civilians with particular brutality. Those who know him best say that he is the most charming man who ever strangled a city or pounded a village to rubble. "You've never spent any time in private with him. He has a marvelous intelligence and a great sense of humor," said one of his friends, who also reluctantly admitted that at the same time Mladic can be uncompromisingly cruel.
Ratko Mladic was born on March 12, 1943, in Bozinovici, a village near Kalinovik in Herzegovina. His first name is a diminutive of Ratimir, meaning war or peace, or Ratislav, meaning war of the Slavs. These are names often given to boys born in wartime. Both his parents were partisans who fought the Nazi occupiers and their Croatian Ustashe allies. On his second birthday, his father, Nedja, was killed by the Croats, an event he rarely fails to mention to strangers.
After the war, Mladic went to a high school on the outskirts of Belgrade and then to Yugoslavia's military academy, graduating in 1965, the same year he joined the Communist Party. Sent to Macedonia, he commanded a platoon, then a tank battalion, then a brigade. In 1991, he became deputy commander in Kosovo, where the population is more than 90 percent ethnic Albanian.
In June 1991, he was assigned by Belgrade to go to Croatia, where fighting had broken out between Croatian militias and the Yugoslav army. In those days he did not speak about "Serbian national interests" or "Serbian military traditions." Being a Serb then had no evident importance for him. In the 1991 Yugoslav census, the last before the old Yugoslav federation collapsed, Mladic listed his nationality as Yugoslav, not Serb.[4] The reasons for his transformation into a Serb nationalist, if that is what it was, are unclear. A former colleague recalled that Mladic had an uncanny political sense. "He was sly enough to know what was to be said at any particular moment:"
Success in fighting the Croats brought him to the attention of the Bosnian Serb hard-liners who were looking for a high-ranking Yugoslav officer to be their top military leader in the war that they were planning. One of them, "Vice-President" Nikola Koljevic, a Shakespeare professor formerly at Sarajevo University, recalled recently: "We didn't know Mladic. But then we read about him in a Croatian newspaper that said 'Mladic is no social worker.' We decided that's the guy we need." In May 1992 he transferred to the newly formed Bosnian Serb army and the legend of General Mladic began to grow. It is not surprising that he was chosen for his capacity for ruthlessness. Many Serbs, particularly Bosnian Serbs, take it for granted that their soldiers will be implacable and brutal toward their enemies: "Do it to them first because if you don't, you can be certain they will do it to you."
Mladic's undoubted charisma is largely based (unexpected as this might seem to outsiders) on his reputation for "honesty" and "integrity." In a land where politicians and warlords have grown rich from the trade in war booty, Mladic is considered an ascetic. He leads a humble, some would say Spartan, existence. He has a modest house in Belgrade, and in Bosnia either sleeps on an army cot in his headquarters or out in the field with his men. His dislike of war profiteers is said to be intense. During an interview with me this summer he attacked the unscrupulous paramilitary warlords. "They went running around to jewelry stores, banks, and well-stocked super-markets. There is not a single hill that they kept or liberated. On the other hand, the soldiers and officers in the army lead modest lives."
Mladic prefers the company of soldiers in the field. He often commands in the mud of the frontlines, alongside his men, and they are committed to him. Most of the heroic myths of General Mladic have emerged on the battlefields of Bosnia, and then are repeated and elaborated endlessly in the taverns and trenches where Serbian soldiers chain-smoke cigarettes and sip thick black coffee and plum brandy.
The latest story I heard describes how one morning after the fall of Zepa, Mladic came across a small group of Serbian soldiers soaked from the cold rain the night before. "Where are you heading?" he asked them. "To find some place to dry our clothes," they replied, to which the general took off his hat, filled it with water, poured it over himself, and ordered, "Follow me."
Such stories are so common that on meeting Mladic for the first time, one is surprised to find he is not a big man. The enormous head and broad face pictured in newspapers and magazines may give the impression of a towering, barrel-chested person. But he is of average height and build, and has piercing blue eyes. When I saw him this summer, in the foyer of a theater in Bijeljina, just one week before the start of his offensive against Srebrenica, what he most wanted to talk about was the need for peace and how the "international sponsors" of the war in Bosnia had to stop backing Serbia's enemies.
"I think it is time for all peace-loving people of this world to start pondering where all this leads. I think it's high time that the weapons in this part of the world, and all over the world, were silenced.
"If humankind were to follow my advice and if it were in my power, I wouldn't allow the word 'war' to be uttered in any language, I would ban all weapons, even in the form of toys."
As he spoke, his plans were, in fact, well advanced to wipe out Srebrenica and the other Muslim enclaves. He even hinted at this in a speech just before I saw him. "The upcoming period is very important and can be decisive for the outcome of the war," he had said.
He talked so much about peace, it seemed clear, because I had written an article for the London Independent on Sunday which had ironically named Mladic as a candidate for "man of the year"—in recognition of his singular ruthlessness and his horrifying success in calling NATO's bluff over Bosnia.
But the irony was lost on the general, as it was on most of the Bosnian Serbs. They actually thought he had been given this "honor" because of his virtues. So Mladic felt the need to speak like a statesman and show me that I had made a good choice. Yet every so often he could not resist changing his tone.
"We are fully aware that war is not the only way to defend our values. But if those values are fundamentally endangered, as is the case today, then war is the only way to defend them. Everything that hinders us in our effort to defend ourselves is an injustice. We did not want this war, it was thrust upon us, like all others. Defending one's people is a holy duty," he said.
Shortly after our talk, I happened to read the testimony of Hermann Goering at the Nuremberg Tribunal: "I did not want a war, nor did I bring it about. I have done everything to prevent it through negotiations.... The only motive which guided me was my ardent love for my people; its fortunes, its freedom, and its life."[5]
Mladic, indicted by the international war-crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia this July along with Radovan Karadzic, may eventually have his chance to repeat a similar defense one day. Like Goering, Mladic often views his enemies as inferior beings, less than human. In an intercepted radio message in April 1993, during the height of the Bosnian Serbs' first siege of Srebrenica, Mladic could be heard ordering his commanders to pound with artillery force the trenches and woods where enemy soldiers were hiding. "Hit the raw meat," he barked. More recently, he brushed off allegations that Serb soldiers had raped some of the Muslim women fleeing Srebrenica. It was impossible, he said. "We [Serbs] are too picky."
Sometimes he talks of himself as god-like. During an international peace conference in 1993 in Geneva, when Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian president, expressed doubts about Serbs keeping their promises, Mladic said, "When I guarantee something to you, it is the same as when the Almighty does." After the fall of Zepa, when the UN rushed to conclude a civilian evacuation deal with the Bosnian Serbs, Mladic, before television cameras, boarded a bus carrying civilians from Zepa to Sarajevo and announced, "I am General Mladic. You have probably heard of me. Has anyone here been raped by Bosnian Serbs?" When the cameras were switched off, he told the group, "No Allah, no UN, no NATO can save you. Only me."
Mladic does not see Muslims or Croats as people fighting, however misguidedly, for self-determination, or for a multicultural society, or to avenge the injustices inflicted on them by General Mladic's own soldiers. They are for him the forces of Modred, representatives of foreign powers bent on the destruction of the Serbs. For the general there is a diabolical plan behind every action of his enemy. The Bosnian Muslims are thus not fighting to take back a rocky hill in order to control the goat path beneath; they are acting under the instructions of their powerful masters in Tehran, Washington, and Bonn, particularly Bonn.
"Germany sponsored the war," he told me. "It turned the Croats and the Muslims against the Serbs and set them in motion to achieve the German aim to Germanize the Balkans."
The German theme recurs so often in the general's statements that it has led some Serbs who know him to suggest that his brutality is inspired in part by a desire for revenge. When he says, "This war was begun and declared on us by the same people as in 1941," he may be referring to the "same people" who killed his father. Gaja Petkovic, a retired Yugoslav army colonel and a former colleague of Mladic, suggested as much last year in a critical article on Mladic in a Belgrade magazine, writing: "Some used to say that by fighting Croatia Mladic was avenging the past, his dead father, and his unhappy childhood, that he was resolving his frustrations and venting his inborn sadism."[6] Soon after the article was published, Petkovic said, Mladic threatened him with violence—a claim Mladic denies.
What is clear is that there is hardly any difference between past and present for General Mladic. He talks about both in the same breath, and different periods of history become conflated as he speaks. The Serbs today are still fighting to turn an Islamic tide away from Europe; Germany has never abandoned its expansionist aims; and the world's newest imperial power, America, also wants a slice of the Balkan pie.
"The Balkans and Europe as a whole are very much in danger of being Germanized," he told me. No less a danger is the threat of Islamization. There is also, he said, a big and "quite openly expressed wish" to have the region put under American control. All of this, he continued, runs counter to prospects for peace, and to the "real interests" of the Balkan nations.
"The time is right," he added, "for the Serbian people to get what belongs to them, the right that derives from the past and the present."
Until the recent NATO air strikes, he brushed aside the possibility of international military intervention. During the UN hostage crisis, a friend warned him that he might have caught a tiger by the tail. "Don't you worry," he replied. "To me it doesn't look much like a tiger. More like an old nag."
The only enemies that he really fears, I gathered from some of his statements, come from within his own ranks, although when we talked he was reluctant to name any of his Serb opponents or to speak openly of a rift with Karadzic. This pretense of unity would soon disappear.
2.
"Maybe we went a little bit too far with General Mladic: we have made a legend of him." When Karadzic said this on August 4, 1995, he meant to cripple his military commander, not just wound him.
For a long time Karadzic had been worried by General Mladic. He feared the general's popular appeal and his ties to Slobodan Milosevic and the other Serb leaders in Belgrade who don't like Karadzic. He was bothered by Mladic's puritanism; his loathing of gambling and womanizing and war-profiteering, all of which have become part of political life in Serb-controlled Bosnia. Above all Karadzic feared the general's strength.
Relations were cool between the two men even before Karadzic broke with Milosevic, in August 1994. The split was over Karadzic's refusal to sign a peace plan supported by Milosevic. Mladic is viewed as loyal to Milosevic, but he has played down the stories that Belgrade was encouraging him to mount a coup against Karadzic and his allies in Pale. Mladic accepted a division of labor: he would run the war while Karadzic dominated the Bosnian Serb politicians in Pale and in the Bosnian Serb towns. As long as politics did not undermine the war effort, Mladic did not interfere. The two men, however, detest each other.
Karadzic became particularly angry in mid-June when Mladic did not show up for the wedding of Karadzic's daughter, Sonja, in Pale, the ski resort outside Sarajevo that serves as the Bosnian Serbs' political headquarters. The wedding was an ostentatious affair, with a bottle of Ballantine whiskey on every table and hundreds of guests trying to relieve the boredom of Pale and ingratiate themselves with the first family.
Privately Mladic said that what made the celebration particularly obscene for him was that it was held at the height of the Muslim attempt to try to break the siege of Sarajevo. During the wedding reception, above the sound of the dance music, the wail of ambulances carrying Serb wounded to the local hospital could be heard.
Mladic formally excused himself because of "official business." But when asked by a local magazine why he had not come, he mentioned perhaps the single most important event that has marked his life, apart from his father's death: the suicide in Belgrade of his daughter, Ana, a university medical student, in March 1994. She had been in a deep depression, exacerbated, some of Mladic's associates claimed, by particularly fierce criticism in the Serbian press accusing her father of war crimes. Whatever the truth about her death, friends say that Mladic never fully recovered from the loss. Whenever he gets a chance to go to Belgrade, they say, he spends time at her graveside.
"I visit feasts and celebrations reluctantly these days," he told the Serb magazine, "regardless of whose honor they are being held in. Ever since we had a family tragedy, ever since our Ana is gone, I deem it normal not to attend parties."[7]
Nothing he said smoothed relations with Karadzic. The break came on August 1, when Milosevic sent a peace proposal to the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. The letter to the Muslims was addressed to Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The letter to the Bosnian Serbs was addressed to Mladic, an open snub of Karadzic.
On Friday, August 4, 1995, with 100,000 Croatian regular forces being mobilized for attack against Serb-held areas in the Krajina, Karadzic announced that he was removing Mladic as Bosnian Serb military commander and assuming personal command of the army himself. Karadzic blamed Mladic for the loss of Grahovo and Glamoc, two key towns in western Bosnia populated entirely by Serbs, which fell to the Croats the week before. Karadzic used the loss of the towns as the excuse to announce his unexpected changes in the high command. General Mladic was demoted to an "adviser."
It turned out to be one of the most unsuccessful military reshuffles in recent history. Mladic refused to go, calling the move "unconstitutional." "I entered the war as a soldier and that is how I want to leave," Mladic said in a statement released by the army press office. "Therefore, I shall remain at the post of commander of the main headquarters of the Bosnian Serb Army as long as our fighters and people support me...."
Karadzic tried to retaliate by enlisting the support of politicians in the "parliament" of the self-styled Republika Srpska. But most of the deputies are seen as war profiteers and their decision carried little public weight. Mladic countered with a statement that he had the backing of twenty-one of the most important Bosnian Serb generals and "the people."
Karadzic then insisted that Mladic was a psychopath. "Ratko is a madman," he told a meeting of local officials in the northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka in August. "I am telling you this as a psychiatrist with long experience. He simply could not bear the strain anymore and went insane."
Within a week, Karadzic was outmatched. In a country built on war and in the midst of war, the decision of the men in charge of the guns is likely to be final. On August 11, Karadzic announced that no changes would be made in the Bosnian Serb army after all. But the confrontation left Karadzic looking weak. Instead of shoring up his own power, he turned General Mladic into the de facto leader of the Bosnian Serbs. More worrying for Karadzic, there was talk among Serbs about a military takeover of Bosnia in which he would be ousted. In late August there were unconfirmed reports of gun battles between Mladic's and Karadzic's supporters. A Serb publication claimed that during the last week of August one of Mladic's closest associates, General Milan Gvero, "detained" Karadzic for a day and berated him for his hostility to Mladic and the army high command. By the beginning of September, Karadzic, faced with NATO air strikes, appeared at least to accept the dominance of Mladic and Milosevic.
Karadzic's mistake was to think that the propaganda machinery which had brought him, a psychiatrist of dubious reputation, to the office of "president" was also responsible for creating the "myth" of General Mladic. He forgot that Ratko Mladic's legend emerged from the killing fields of Bosnia and Croatia, not from state-controlled television.
Even more astonishing than Karadzic's miscalculation was a growing consensus among Western (particularly French and British) diplomats that General Mladic may be the leader who could deliver peace in Bosnia. They thought that Mladic, as Milosevic's man, would agree to a deal awarding the Serbs a "viable" 49 percent chunk of Bosnia.
The folly of such thinking became apparent during the first weekend in September at a meeting between General Bernard Janvier, the United Nation's top military commander in the former Yugoslavia, and General Mladic. The meeting was held after the first wave of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb military and communication installations. Janvier was dispatched by the UN and NATO to get Mladic to agree to remove his big guns from around Sarajevo and thus avoid any more air raids.
The meeting itself was set up by President Milosevic and held in Serbia, in the shabby border town of Mali Zvornik. For more than a year Milosevic had been trying without success to get his Bosnian comrades to see that peace was in their best interests. The main obstacle had always been Karadzic. But Milosevic also sent a senior military officer from the Yugoslav army to "advise" Mladic just in case he forgot Serbia's official position. Mladic, however, showed that he was no one's man but his own. He said he viewed General Janvier's demand for withdrawing guns from Sarajevo as tantamount to surrender. "All the tension and pressure for us to withdraw our weapons is senseless because the war is not over and yet they ask us to withdraw our weapons that we are defending our people with," he later said.
According to UN sources, Mladic stormed out of the fourteen-hour meeting at least four times. When he returned to negotiate, they said, he spent much of the time insulting the French general and his family and insisting that Serbs would not negotiate "at the point of a gun."
The Yugoslav officer then spent some time with Mladic explaining just what a renewed NATO air campaign would involve, urging him to agree to Janvier's demands. Mladic then reportedly made a lengthy statement complaining about how the Serbs had been unfairly treated and insisting they had a right to statehood.
Eventually at the end of the long session with Janvier, Mladic accepted the main demands, but he then hedged his letter of acceptance with conditions and qualifiers—a practice familiar from the previous behavior of Bosnian Serb leaders. Mladic agreed "in principle" to the removal of heavy weapons by "all parties," so long as "withdrawal will not confer advantages upon any party, or alter the balance of forces." NATO said Mladic's "acceptance" was unacceptable; only full compliance would avoid further bombing raids. Mladic literally stuck to his guns and in doing so almost seemed to welcome more air strikes. "The more they bombard us the stronger we are," he said.
His attitude was unlikely to endear him to Milosevic or to the Western leaders who are desperate for a political solution to the conflict. But to those people who gathered in Bijeljina on St. Vitus Day, their comparison of Mladic with Prince Lazar probably seemed more justified than ever.
"Their air power cannot harm us," Mladic told a foreign television crew in Pale just before NATO jets renewed their attacks on the Serbs on Tuesday, September 5. "They can cause destruction and violence but we are on our land and we will win."
—September 8, 1995
Notes
[1] Nedzida Sadikovic, as quoted by Roy Gutman, Newsday News Service, August 9, 1995.
[2] Robert Block, "Mass Slaughter in a Bosnian Field Knee-Deep in Blood," The Independent, July 21, 1995; and "At the Mercy of Mladic," The Independent On Sunday, July 23, 1995.
[3] Although Mladic has denied the reports of mass killings as enemy propaganda, in February 1994 he expressed his desire to get even with Srebrenica Muslims for their 1992–1993 guerrilla war against the Bosnian Serbs in which hundreds of Serb civilians were killed. Referring to the UN's efforts to stop him from overrunning Srebrenica in April 1993, he said: "Had there not been the involvement of the international community, they [the Muslims] would have paid dearly for everything they had done to the Serbian people. Srebrenica Turks committed some of the greatest crimes ever against the Serbian people." See Colonel Gaja Petkovic's article, "Guarantees of the Almighty," Nin magazine, Belgrade, March 11, 1994.
[4] David Binder, "Pariah as Patriot," New York Times Magazine, September 4, 1994, p. 26.
[5] Nuremberg: A Personal Record of the Major Nazi War Criminals, Airey Neave (Coronet Books, 1980), p. 280.
[6] Colonel Gaja Petkovic, "Guarantees of the Almighty," Nin magazine, Belgrade, March 11, 1994.
[7] Interview with Ratko Mladic, Svet magazine, Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, July 21, 1995.
Letters
December 21, 1995: David Binder, 'THE MADNESS OF GENERAL MLADIC'
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February 24, 2006
Kosovo issue inflaming separatism in EU neighbours
Kosovo issue inflaming separatism in EU neighbours
24.02.2006 - 09:55 CET | By Andrew Rettman
EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - The idea of Kosovan independence as a precedent for other separatist states is catching on in South Caucasus, with damaging implications for EU energy interests.
The breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Armenian-occupied Azerbaijan region, Nagorno-Karabakh, are using the Kosovan model to legitimise their own "de facto states", UK-based analyst Oksana Antonenko said.
"The EU must develop a position on this. To say we don't recognise a linkage is not good enough," the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) expert added.
"The politicians and the elite continue to make a case to their people. The issue of Kosovo's status is changing their expectations, making them less willing to engage in the peace process."
Separatists will "scream about double standards" if the EU endorses independence in Kosovo but pushes reunification in South Caucasus, Brussels-based CEPS analyst Michael Emerson indicated.
Pristina and Belgrade are currently in talks to decide the status of Kosovo, a UN-administered province in Serbia since ethnic clashes subsided in 1999.
But senior UK diplomat John Sawers told Belgrade two weeks ago that the west has "decided" Kosovo should be independent.
Russian gambit
Russian president Vladimir Putin gave weight to the Kosovo precedent idea on Russian TV on 30 January, with Moscow diplomats discussing the notion at UN level since.
"We need universal principles to find a fair solution to these problems," Mr Putin said.
"If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" he asked. "We know that Turkey, for instance, has recognised the republic of Northern Cyprus."
Russian troops in Georgia and Armenia give Moscow leverage against the pro-EU drift of South Caucasus.
But Mr Putin's words confused some experts, with Russia historically opposed to Kosovan independence and facing a legacy of separatism at home in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.
"It's hard to know if they are serious or just trying to create pressure against Kosovan independence," former Estonian foreign minister and socialist MEP Toomas Ilves indicated.
"If Kosovo becomes a precedent and Transniestria recognises Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus recognises Nagorno-Karabakh, we could have a real mess on our hands."
Bosnian region Republika Srpska "will" also call for independence if Kosovo has its way, Serbian contacts told British conservative MEP Charles Tannock on a recent trip to Belgrade.
EU peace efforts
Brussels does not recognise Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Nagorno-Karabakh, but the EU is stepping up conflict resolution and EU integration efforts in South Caucasus under its neighbourhood policy.
The EU buys oil from Azerbaijan through the so-called BCT pipeline, with plans afoot to build a new Caspian Sea gas link via Azerbaijan and Georgia under the Nabucco project, reducing energy dependency on Russia.
"If there was a new conflict [in Nagorno-Karabakh], the first target would be the pipeline and the oil terminals," senior OSCE diplomat Bernard Fassier indicated.
"It's essential the EU uses all the tools at its disposal...to get the message across that you have to respect compromise," he added.
EU special envoy to the region, Heikki Talvitie, said Europe has promised peacekeepers and a "blessing ceremony" for Nagorno-Karabakh if Armenia and Azerbaijan can clinch a deal.
He recently went to Moscow to endorse a Georgian-Russian plan for demilitarising South Ossetia.
EU neighbours on dangerous path
International diplomacy's new interest in South Caucasus comes at a time when popular hardliners are gaining support for military solutions to the conflicts.
The region is arming for battle with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan all doubling their military spending in the past two years.
"There is a radicalisation of public opinion and a push for more hardline solutions in the future," the IISS' Antonenko said. "What we have seen in the past few years is a serious arms race in South Caucasus."
The OSCE's Bernard Fassier recalled that young soldiers die "on a monthly basis" in border skirmishes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict claimed 10,000 lives in 1994.
"Time is not on our side," he stated. "Chekhov has taught us, if you have a pistol on the table in the first act, it will be fired by someone before the curtain drops."
http://euobserver.com/9/20979
February 22, 2006
[Yugoland] International media on Kosovo
Serbs, Ethnic Albanians Don't Reach Deal
VIENNA, Austria_U.N.-mediated talks over Kosovo's disputed political status will resume in a month after a Serb and ethnic Albanian meeting on the issue Tuesday produced no agreement.
The two-day talks at Vienna's Daun-Kinssky Palace were aimed at resolving one of the toughest disputes left from the 1990s ethnic Balkan conflicts: whether Kosovo should gain full independence or remain part of Serbia-Montenegro.
Albert Rohan, the U.N.'s deputy envoy at the talks, said that the first encounter was held in a "cooperative spirit" and mediators found some common ground during discussions. He set the next meeting for March 17.
Rohan said the talks were not aimed at reaching a specific agreement but rather to finding common ground on issues not directly linked to Kosovo's status.
Ethnic Albanians, who comprise about 90 percent of Kosovo's population of 2 million, want independence. Serbia insists on retaining some control over the region, which it considers an integral part of the nation and the birthplace of its national identity centuries ago.
Leon Kojen, a Serb delegate, said the talks were "useful" but that the two sides remained opposed on Kosovo's future status.
"Solutions which contravene the territorial integrity of (Serbia-Montenegro) for us are unacceptable," Kojen said after the meeting.
Lutfi Haziri, the head of the Kosovo delegation, said the province should become independent "as soon as possible. If it is possible tomorrow, we would be happy," he said.
Rohan said U.N. mediators were tackling practical issues in the hope of reaching a final agreement by the end of 2006.
The United Nations has administered the province since 1999, after NATO launched air attacks to stop a crackdown on independence-minded ethnic Albanians by President Slobodan Milosevic's Serb forces.
Thousands of people died and hundreds of thousands were displaced during the war, and the end of hostilities did not bring the two sides any closer to a resolution.
Rohan conceded that it might take a generation for the two sides to live together in harmony after the bloodshed of the 1990s. For now the best hope for them is if they cohabit, Rohan said.
The overall process is being mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.
Diplomats from the so-called Contact Group _ the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia _ have already agreed that the province cannot return to its previous status under direct Serb rule, nor can it be partitioned along ethnic lines or join another country in the region, such as Albania. They also stipulate that any agreement should be acceptable to the province's ethnic Albanians.
The two sides have disagreed over how much power should be held locally, with the province's minority Serbs insisting they be allowed to run affairs in their communities, establish links to other Serb areas and have special ties to Belgrade. Kosovo's ethnic Albanians say such a solution is a recipe for ethnic partition.
Finally, final status Kosovo must soon secure conditional independence
The international community is finally summoning up the courage to try to settle the Kosovo question - the last big unsolved issue left by the violent collapse of Yugoslavia.
Not before time. While there are risks in pressing for a settlement, it is more dangerous for Kosovo to remain as it is - a United Nations protectorate with its future blighted by uncertainty, unemployment and rampant crime.
The Kosovo Contact Group, consisting of the US, European Union states and Russia, was right after the 1999 war to freeze talk of Kosovo's final status, given the danger of provoking renewed fighting between the ethnic Albanian majority, which wants independence, and the Serb minority which claims Kosovo remains part of Serbia.
But now conditions in the former Yugoslavia are improving. Slovenia has joined the EU, Croatia has started entry talks, Macedonia is a recognised accession candidate, and Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro have started association agreement talks. Meanwhile Slobodan Milosevic, ex-Yugoslav president, and other alleged war criminals are in custody, although Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are still free. And the economy is recovering from the wars of the 1990s.
With unemployment, crime and corruption rife, the environment is not perfect. Serbia is in a particularly hard position: as well as the prospect of losing Kosovo, it faces a likely complete break with Montenegro, the last ex-Yugoslav republic linked to Belgrade.
But there may never be a better time to act on Kosovo. And, with the US and its allies embroiled in the Middle East, western diplomats badly need a settlement in the Balkans to show intervention can end in success.
The plan is for ethnic Albanians and Serbs to negotiate a settlement. But these talks will very likely break down as Belgrade refuses to accept independence and ethnic Albanians, who compose over 90 per cent of the population, want nothing less.
The Contact Group must then be ready to impose conditional independence as anything less would perpetuate instability and risk an ethnic Albanian backlash. In return, the ethnic Albanians must be pressed to grant the local Serbs constitutional safeguards.
A settlement can be imposed only if Russia co-operates. Moscow has voiced concern about the precedent independence might set for troubled zones of the former Soviet Union. But Russia must be persuaded that UN-sanctioned conditional independence would be a less frightening precedent than an ethnic Albanian uprising.
Whatever the final deal, international troops and administrators must remain in Kosovo for years to come. The EU must continue to support the region with aid and stick by promises of future EU membership. Nothing will help the region to break with the past and focus on the future more than the prospect of EU integration.
The international community is finally summoning up the courage to try to settle the Kosovo question - the last big unsolved issue left by the violent collapse of Yugoslavia.
Not before time. While there are risks in pressing for a settlement, it is more dangerous for Kosovo to remain as it is - a United Nations protectorate with its future blighted by uncertainty, unemployment and rampant crime.
The Kosovo Contact Group, consisting of the US, European Union states and Russia, was right after the 1999 war to freeze talk of Kosovo's final status, given the danger of provoking renewed fighting between the ethnic Albanian majority, which wants independence, and the Serb minority which claims Kosovo remains part of Serbia.
But now conditions in the former Yugoslavia are improving. Slovenia has joined the EU, Croatia has started entry talks, Macedonia is a recognised accession candidate, and Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro have started association agreement talks. Meanwhile, ex-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and other alleged war criminals are in custody, although Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are still free. And the economy is recovering from the wars of the 1990s.
With unemployment, crime and corruption rife, the enviroment is not perfect. Serbia is in a particularly hard position: as well as the prospect of losing Kosovo, it faces a likely complete break with Montenegro, the last ex-Yugoslav republic linked to Belgrade.
But there may never be a better time to act on Kosovo. And, with the US and its allies embroiled in the Middle East, western diplomats badly need a settlement in the Balkans to show intervention can end in success.
The plan is for ethnic Albanians and Serbs to negotiate a settlement. But, these talks will very likely break down as Belgrade refuses to accept independence and ethnic Albanians, who compose over 90 per cent of the population, want nothing less.
The Contact Group must then be ready to impose conditional independence as anything less would perpetuate instability and risk an ethnic Albanian backlash. In return, the ethnic Albanians must be pressed to grant the local Serbs constitutional safeguards.
A settlement can be imposed only if Russia cooperates. Moscow has voiced concern about the precedent independence might set for troubled zones of the former Soviet Union. But Russia must be persuaded that UN-sanctioned conditional independence would be a less frightening precedent than an ethnic Albanian uprising.
Whatever the final deal, international troops and administrators must remain in Kosovo for years to come. The EU must continue to support the region with aid and stick by promises of future EU membership. Nothing will help the region to break with the past and focus on the future more than the prospect of EU integration.
U.S.says a settlement of Kosovo problem must protect rights of minority Serbs
WASHINGTON_The State Department said Tuesday that a Kosovo settlement should be based on protection of rights for the territory's minority Serb population and acceptance by all the people of area.
Spokesman Adam Ereli said Kosovo was discussed Monday at a meeting in Vienna between U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari and leaders from Kosovo and Serbia.
It was the first direct dialogue between the parties since the status process began in November.
"They discussed how the decentralization of the government can better protect the rights of Kosovo's minorities and improve the delivery of public services to all of Kosovo's citizens," Ereli said.
He said he expects further meetings on decentralization in the coming weeks.
Kosovo, with an ethnic Albanian majority, is a province of Serbia. It has been controlled by the United Nations with mainly NATO peacekeepers since a NATO air war in 1999 ended a Serbian crackdown on the Kosovars.
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February 21, 2006
SN543:Montenegro slams EU's referendum threshold
Montenegro slams EU's referendum threshold
21.02.2006 - 18:09 CETMontenegro says the EU threshold of 55 percent for its independence referendum is undemocratic and could provoke instability, Balkans news agency DTT-NET.COM writes.
"The formula proposed by the EU harms the basic democratic principle that each vote should have the same democratic value," Montenegran prime minister Milo Djukanovic said at the Crans Montana economic forum in Przn, Montenegro, on Monday (20 February).
"The decision belongs to the majority and not the minority. The EU's formula contains a virus which is dangerous to the stability of society when it comes to the implementation of the results," he added.
Montenegro is set to hold the vote on whether to leave the Serbia-Montenegro alliance in April or May, with pro-independence campaigners led by Mr Djukanovic saying that a majority of 25 to 40 percent should be enough for the results to stand.
Serbian-led opposition parties favour a figure of 50 percent or above, with recent opinion polls showing that 41 percent support independence while 32 percent are against.
The Montenegrin law on referendums states that the decision is to be taken by a majority of citizens eligible to vote, but doesn't fix any exact figure.
Kosovo first round inconclusive
Serbia is facing the prospect of losing two territories this year, with UN-led talks currently under way in Vienna on the future status of Kosovo.
The talks have so far focussed on creating Serb-run municipalities in the majority ethnic-Albanian province, under UN protection since 1999, when Serb forces led by Slobodan Milosevic carried out attacks on Albanian communities.
Serb negotiators have argued the quasi-autonomous units are needed to safeguard the civil liberties of ethnic Serbs, but Kosovan Albanians attacked the plan as being based on a "territorial principle, division of communities and non-functional local institutions."
The talks, currently in their first round, are not expected to produce quick results, but the international community, led by the UK, France, Germany, Italy Russia and the US, is pushing for agreement on Kosovo's status by the end of the year.
opinion articles and interviews in Kosovo Albanian press today
CHALLENGES OF STATE-MAKING
(Zeri, by Bardh Hamzaj)
Since in the process of definition of Kosovo status are involved all main world centers, they also took care to make clearer the framework, within which this solution will be found.
Based on the statements of the personalities that lead the process of definition of Kosovo status, Kosovars have reasons to be satisfied with so-far development of this process.
First, it has to do with the decisiveness of the main western states, including the US, that the status is solved this year and secondly the principles of the Contact Group made clear that Kosovo cannot return in any way to the situation before 1999 and that its status will bring stability and not open a new phase of the conflicts in the region.
In this context, the statements given to the German media by Martti Ahtisaari that at the end Kosovo people will decide how will Kosovo status look like, did not leave dilemmas about the future of Kosovo. So, the status, will be in accordance with the will of Kosovo people, which is its independence.
All this does not mean that the Albanians have already finished their job. Kosovo and its people are before the historical moment of the fulfillment of their aspirations, but also at the moment of the biggest challenge, when it should be proved that the equal status with the mechanisms of the highest standards in the world should be reserved.
This implies the capabilities’ of a society to face with challenges of a state-making and creation of free and democratic Kosovo. Kosovo should reach this, otherwise all positive trends marked so far in the recently started process of the definition of the status, could be ruined very quickly.
INDEPENDENCE OR OCCUPATION
(Express, by Tim Judah)
The moment of truth has finally arrived. More than six years after the end of the Kosovo war, talks on its future status open this morning in Vienna. They are to be chaired by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari.
For several months diplomatic sources have indicated that, not only do they expect the talks to lead Kosovo’s independence, but that they are not really even about its future status, but rather about the future of the Serbian minority within Kosovo.
Kosovo has a population of some 2 million people of whom more than 90 per cent are ethnic Albanians. They have long demanded independence from Serbia.
War began in Kosovo in 1998 and NATO intervened in 1999. Following a 78-day bombardment of Serbia, its southern province came under the jurisdiction of the UN, although technically the sovereignty of the province remained with Serbia.
An exodus of non-Albanians, primarily Serbs and Roma followed the war. Now some 100,000 Serbs live, either in the north of Kosovo, in an area that abuts Serbia, or in enclaves scattered across the province.
Over the last year, diplomats working on the Kosovo question have predicted that the talks would lead to some form of “conditional independenceâ€. This foresaw the breaking of the sovereign link with Serbia, NATO-led forces remaining and some form of international presence that would have the right, as in Bosnia, to interfere in everyday politics.
Now, however, sources close to the talks process in Vienna have told ISN Security Watch that Kosovo is likely to have far more independence than this. According to these sources, even the term “conditional independence†is now politically incorrect and is being replaced by “sovereignty with limitations†or “monitored independenceâ€.
Talks in Vienna on Monday will center on decentralization. This is diplomatic code for autonomy for Serbian areas. Among things to be discussed will be the redrawing of municipal boundaries to create more Serbian dominated municipalities.
Two questions of highly symbolic importance that are unlikely to be discussed at the Vienna talks - but rather imposed by the UN Security Council in any status decision it is likely to take later this year - are about whether Kosovo will have a seat at the UN and whether it will have an army.
Diplomatic sources have told ISN Security Watch that they expect that Kosovo will have a UN seat sooner rather than later, which means that this could be within the next two or three years rather than say, waiting to time this with Kosovo’s eventual accession to the EU, which is certainly, at the very least, a decade away.
Under any settlement, Kosovo’s security is to continue to be provided by forces from mostly NATO member states and a role in policing is likely to be played by the EU.
As to the question of Kosovo’s own future army, ideas being discussed include a re-branding of the Kosovo Protection Corps. This was set up in the wake of the 1999 war to absorb several thousand former ethnic Albanian guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK/KLA). Today, despite its military ranks, it is supposed to be an unarmed, civil emergency force. One idea is that it should be given an arsenal of light weapons and given a new role as a “gendarmerie†force.
Although it has been clear for much of the last year that Kosovo was heading towards independence little has been done by Serbian leaders to prepare their population for this eventuality.
Tomislav Nikolic, the leader of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the largest in Serbia’s parliament, says that Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has agreed with him that if Kosovo becomes independent then it should be declared “occupied territoryâ€.
Kostunica has not denied this claim, which would end Serbia’s bids to join both the EU and NATO, as both of them would presumably be occupying powers, along with Kosovo’s native Albanian population.
Aleksandar Simic, an adviser on Kosovo to Kostunica, said recently that Serbia would “never†accept the independence of Kosovo and: “The Kosovo Albanians have to be aware that they will not receive independence from Serbia and that Serbia will retain the right to take back everything which it lost in an illegal manner.â€
Another possibility currently under discussion in Serbia is whether or not to hold a referendum on the future of Kosovo, in effect, to ask Serbian voters to reject independence.
This idea recalls the referendum held in 1998 when the then-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic asked Serbs to reject foreign mediation in the Kosovo conflict.
Indeed, the current level of discussion about the future of Kosovo has been greeted with dismay by some in Serbia. Daniel Sunter, head of the Belgrade think tank, the Euro-Atlantic Initiative, says there has been no serious debate in Serbia about what Serbs could expect if Kosovo was not given independence.
Quite apart from the demographic issues involved in trying to live in peace with a young, growing, and hostile Albanian population, he says: “What would it mean for Serbia? That it would take 500,000 soldiers to keep it under control or what?â€
Kosovo Albanian leaders are, of course, in good cheer since independence is the goal they have been working towards since the collapse of the old Yugoslavia.
They are already turning their minds to the period after independence. Veton Surroi, a prominent opposition leader, says that the election of Fatmir Sejdiu as the new president of Kosovo following the death of Ibrahim Rugova last month brings with it an opportunity to clear out a lot of the corrupt old guard of Kosovo politics and usher in new people better able to deal with some of Kosovo’s massive economic problems.
According to Surroi, the 6 February declaration by John Sawers, the political director of the British Foreign Office, that Kosovo would be independent, meant that “the Rubicon has been crossedâ€. That, he said, coupled with the political opportunities that may follow the election of Sejdiu, leads him to feel a new and positive “critical energy†among Kosovo Albanian decision makers.
SOMEONE SAID SOMETHING
(Kosova Sot, editorial)
While the Kosovo delegation started the first round of talks in Vienna as a part of the process for solution of Kosovo’s status, senior leaders in Prishtina were loudly critical towards the delays about the appointment of the two new Ministers. The weakest reaction came from the Kosovo PM, who seems to deal with serious political issues therefore, he has forgotten that according to the Constitutional Framework, he is responsible for the functioning of the Government. But it should be accepted that the decision-making process about this issue exceeds his competencies.
Kosovo should have had the Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice appointed by now. PM Kosumi should have constantly asked and make this issue his priority. It is not known if a meeting was held regarding this issue since the time when the regulation about the creation of these two ministries was approved.
But while PM Kosumi does not want to have bad relationships with the coalition partners, Assembly speaker Nexhat Daci booed his political party. The statements he made yesterday are a severe critique addressed to his party, the LDK, and a sincere concern about the huge stagnation regarding the appointment of the new Ministers. President Ftmir Sejdiu was a bit more laconic and softer, but he did not spare the governing coalition from critics regarding this issue.
The ongoing prolongation is senseless and it is empowering the idea that Kosovar politics has still many defects. The interests about power and competition within parties have been challenging the state’s interests. They have been creating a dangerous precedent just before the recognition of the Kosovar state. These negative models would not help Kosovo to keep the positive image and this may reflect on the relations with the EU and US.
INTERNATIONALS WITH THE EXPIRED MANDATES MIGHT CAUSE RIOTS
(Epoka e Re by Hamdi Miftari)
I was witness of the case when Temporary Media Commissioner Robert Gillette tried to close TV Mitrovica, by confiscating broadcasting equipment. Everyone was surprised when saw that Gillette himself came to Mitrovica, and take the stairs to the 12th floor (since the elevator was not in function) to the studio of Mitrovica TV, handover the confiscation document and return with empty hands.
What I saw there is a very important moment of Kosovo society development. Gillette has announced an inspection to TV Mitrovica and he found himself as violating law not protecting its implementation, what his post as commissioner obliges him. Seeing the case I thought why Gillette is doing this to TV Mitrovica. The reason is very simple: Gillette’s mandate has expired long time ago. The Kosovo Assembly has passed the Law on Independent Media Commission, the SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen has signed this law, but since the Assembly has not appointed the commissioner, Gillette is trying to find a job for himself by creating troubles there where the situation is sensitive, in Mitrovica.
He allowed broadcasting of TV Most and TV Mir from illegal points and now when his mandate has expired he remembered to stop the illegal broadcast. The justification was found, Gillette’s predecessor Anna De Lellio been hasn’t serious when had licensed TV Mitrovica which covered more than half of Kosovo.
By not having law on his side Gillette tried to confiscate all equipments of TV Mitrovica. The KPS police have no idea about all this. They only knew that an international who had the power wanted to destroy an institution that had many scarification on its way of build, and which had served to the society any time.
All this made me think that if UNMIK had more people like Gillette is, riots in Mitrovica and Kosovo would have been unavoidable.
ROHAN: RETURN OF THIS TERRITORY UNDER SERBIA IS NOT REALISTIC
(Most dailies)
Most dailies rerun the interview that Austrian diplomat Albert Rohan had with the ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,’ regarding the beginning of talks in Vienna. Here are some highlights of it.
FAZ: There is an estimation in Serbia that in Vienna talks on Kosovo there is onluy one status that should be clarified: the Kosovo Serb minority status. for having an independent Kosovo the decision should have been made long time ago.
Rohan: We as mediators can only follow up the atmosphere in the international community and at the Contact Group. There is a thinking there that Slobodan Milosevic has lost Kosovo in 1999 ad that the return of that territory under Serbia is not realistic. In order not to follow with the main status issue, we are following a strategy so we start concrete issues in the talks, and possibly find many joint solutions on the issues which should necessarily be solved-no matter what would be Kosovo status. our goal is to find a solution which would find the accordance of both parties. If this becomes unachievable, we will report to the UN General Secretary and he will present it to the UN SC.
FAZ: But Government in Serbia is not raising any intentions to rule Kosovo. It wants to protect Serbia’s territorial integrity and disable Kosovo win a place and a vote in the UN.
Rohan: I cannot predict result of talks and I cannot exclude the possibility that an agreement can be achieved now, what seem not to be possible. In case that no agreement will be achieved, the Security Council should decide where four countries are permanent members of the Contact Group.
FAZ: During talks in Vienna the initial issue of discussion will be decentralization. Do you see signs of compromise?
Rohan: There are four issues in the area of decentralization, which should be quickly treated one after another. Then we will have financing of local administration and connections between municipalities, respectively Serb municipalities with Belgrade. The last point is new borders lines between municipalities. In this case it is the wish of Serbs who want delineation of Serb municipalities, that we do support. But these municipalities should be big enough so they could function. We cannot create municipalities with 400 people. Parallel with the decentralization there are also other issues such as protection of Orthodox Churcyh and protection of minorities in the area of legislation and institutionally.
FAZ: Is there a timeframe for Vienna Negotiations?
Rohan: All these issues will be treated in the beginning, until we reach to the main issue. Then, sooner or later, the political leaders of both parties will have to meet. We aim at solution of Kosovo issue till the end of 2006.
February 20, 2006
The 10 Winners of a Kosovo Compromise
Please find enclosed my article "The 10 Winners of a Kosovo Compromise" published in this week's issue of the Brussels-based newsweekly "New Europe".
February 19-25, 2006. Issue Number 665
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Page 2 - Opinion
The 10 Winners of a Kosovo Compromise
By Aleksandar Mitic
Positions on the future status of the Serbian province of Kosovo differ among interested parties and international factors. Yet, as the talks get underway, there is one principle that all believe should be taken as the basis for a sustainable and long-lasting solution: compromise.
There seems to be, however, a misunderstanding of what the word “compromise†implies. Kosovo Albanian leaders claim that their maximalist demand – independence – is a compromising solution. Go figure.
Some analysts, diplomats and lobbyists argue that compromise involves granting Kosovo Albanians independence on condition they start respecting the basic human rights of the Kosovo Serbs that they had been flagrantly breaching in the last six years through murders, kidnappings, arson and destruction of centuries of historic heritage. Notwithstanding the legal fallacies, this indecent proposal is an insult to 21st century European human rights.
Indeed, a compromise for the Kosovo status can only be found within the aim of the talks on Kosovo’s future status: it is to provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region.
The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunities and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without threatening the interests of Kosovo Serbs, other non-Albanians, Serbia, as well as the security and stability of the rest of the region.
The Contact Group has excluded several options: no return to the situation from before 1999 ( a reference to “standard autonomyâ€Â), no joining to neighbouring states (a reference to a “Greater Albaniaâ€Â) and no partition (a reference to a border division between the Serb and Albanian-populated areas of Kosovo).
Within these recommendations, a compromise can only be found between the standard autonomy for the province – unacceptable for the Albanian aspirations – and the full, be it “conditional†or immediate independence of Kosovo – unacceptable for international law, for the Serbs and the Serbian state.
The proposal of a “maximum autonomy†for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia-Montenegro appears set to satisfy all these criteria. Coupled with an autonomy for the Serb areas within the highly-autonomous Kosovo, it responds to realistic demands of the Kosovo Albanians for self-governing, but it also protects the interests of non-Albanians, of Serbia itself and of the principles of non-violability of borders.
Indeed, the option of an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a “maximum autonomy†for Kosovo – all under EU supervision -- appears as the most reasonable, compromising and long-term solution.
It is a win-win situation for everyone:
1) The Kosovo Albanians will get the means to manage their future. Kosovo will get a full internal legislative, executive and judicial capacity, a limited external representation – in particular full access to the international financial institutions – a European perspective and a normalization of relations with Belgrade.
2) The Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians will be able to enjoy wide-scale decentralization, including horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities which would benefit from the education, social and health system of central Serbia, as suggested by the UN special envoy Kai Eide.
3) Serbia will not have its borders changed and its historical cradle amputated. Instead of punishing a democratic government in Belgrade and blocking its road towards Europe, it would make Serbia look towards the future rather than the past.
4) Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will receive formal and practical guarantees that the changes of borders in the Balkans are no longer tolerated. This would dissuade the division of Macedonia along the ethnic Macedonian-Albanian lines and the secession of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5) Albania will regulate and legalize its relations with Kosovo Albanians, and the Balkans will be freed from the threat of the creation of a “Greater Albania†or a second Albanian state.
6) The European Union will obtain regional stability in the Western Balkans and take fully in charge the European perspective for Kosovo. This is particularly important given that, after Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry into the EU in 2007/08, the Western Balkans will become the “missing link†for the integrity of the EU.
7) The United States would be able to finally disengage their troops from Kosovo without losing the diplomatic leverage they now possess in both Belgrade and Pristina.
8) China, Russia, Spain, India, Moldova, Georgia and many other countries in the world facing secessionist tendencies would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous precedent.
9) The UN will have the basis of international law system respected and its special envoy Marti Ahtisaari would be behind the brokering of a historic deal rather than an imposed solution.
10) Multiethnicity and the idea of Europe would finally win. The horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities would be a model of integration and survival, as these municipalities would also be fully integrated into the Kosovo system run by Albanian-dominated Pristina. Property rights and the security of Serb Orthodox cultural and religious heritage would be ensured and the return of at least a part of the 220,000 expelled non-Albanians could begin. Under the supervision of the EU and the OSCE, human rights, freedom of movement and dignified life for all would finally triumph.
Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based Correspondent of the Tanjug news agency, a Lecturer at the University of Belgrade and Analyst of the Institute 4S.
amitic5star@yahoo.com
February 16, 2006
What will be discussed in Vienna (Express, Kosovo dailynewspapers)
What will be discussed in Vienna (Express)
Along with a paper, Express carried a document that the Daily claims UN Status Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, sent out to the Kosovo Negotiations Team. The paper writes that the meeting in Vienna, within the framework of decentralization, will also deal with issues like healthcare, education, social welfare, culture, police, justice and public services.
Express says the document prepared by Ahtisaari’s team shows a quite different approach to decentralization compared to the stances coming from Pristina and Belgrade Teams who concentrate more on territorial and political aspects.
1. Health
Current situation: The PISG Ministry of Health is responsible for policy-making, development and implementation of health strategies, and provision of secondary and tertiary health services. The health directorates in municipalities are responsible for defining the budget for, and implementation of primary health care (PHC) as well as supply management in health facilities. At the end of 2004, the PISG public health system has one university hospital, five regional hospitals, three other hospitals /clinics, 10 TB dispensaries, five health institutions, six community mental centres all run by central level, and 365 PHC facilities run by municipalities.
Ministry of public services sets the staff ceilings for all health facilities while staff management on the PHC level, including hiring is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and municipality directorates. Kosovo Serbs enclaves manage their own PHC facilities and a hospital in Northern Mitrovica, with financing from Serbian Government and only very limited degree of collaboration with PISG structures.
Ground to be explored: Optional secondary health care in municipal responsibility as long as certain preconditions are fulfilled (extensive catchments are, some degree of use to capacity, profitability). Responsibility for supply management and staff reside with the municipalities (to the extent of the municipalities have functional competencies and within the context of overall policy responsibility of the Ministry of Health and existing KCB budget envelope).
With secondary health care as a voluntary municipal function (possibly by encouraging inter-municipal cooperation) potential drawbacks are to be considered, particularly financial aspects since voluntary functions are usually not reflected in the grant system.
A different approach could be to provide by law that secondary health care shall be delegated to municipalities (or inter-municipal bodies) which fulfil certain conditions. In this case the existing structures will be managed by the concerned municipalities. Delegation will guarantee the right of the Government to exert ultimate control (via a super visionary mechanism), but will also oblige it to transfer the resources necessary.
2. Education
Current situation: Kosovo currently administers an education system in which educational services are provided separately for the main ethnic groups. As a result Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs children pursue their studies in their own language according to their own curriculum, textbooks and materials. The PISG has implemented a 5+4+3/4 system of primary and secondary education.
There is only a small non-formal sector which includes eight vocational training facilities administered by the Ministry of Work and Social Welfare (MWSW). Recently, another centre (for agricultural training) has been opened in Lipjan/Lipljan through an agreement with Norwegian NGO Norges Vel.
University of Pristina is the main higher education institution in Kosovo (comprising of 22 faculties and colleges). There is also a university in Serbian language in Mitrovica as well as UP’s satellites in Peja/Pec and Prizren that work in Serbian and Bosnian languages. Education responsibilities are shared amongst central level (MEST and MWSW) and municipalities.
Responsibilities of the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST) are broad and include higher education, school inspection, setting education standards, drafting of curriculum and textbooks, licensing private education institutions, appointment of school directors etc. MEST is represented in a regional level with five field offices. Municipalities are responsible for preschool, primary and secondary education. They are responsible for training the staff, entering the data for schoolchildren, financing, maintaining and repairing of schools, recruiting, contracting and paying administrative, teaching and non-teaching staff. Many municipalities are insufficiently equipped to meet these duties because the staff at disposal has little or no experience in administration of education and many responsibilities are not exercised in full.
School principals are appointed by panels consisting of MEST and municipality representatives, but the final appointment authority rests with MEST. Principals are responsible for academic issues and general administration of schools but they have almost no authority for employing or assessing the staff and organization which has been regulated by administrative instruction of MEST implemented by municipal directors of education. Almost all MEST instructions have been drafted and signed without participation of Kosovo Serbs and without taking into consideration specific concerns of minority communities in Kosovo. This has further aggravated isolation in the field of education.
Ground to be explored: Fundamental principles of decentralization in preschool, primary and secondary education remain valid. As far as education services, they are decentralized to a certain degree.
Structural improvements seem possible by taking into account selection of school principals (with a lesser impact of MEST representatives) as well as drafting of school textbooks (issue that can be left to an independent commission comprising of MEST, minority communities and international participants so that they timely agree on a general curriculum). Some responsibilities like school transport (for students and teachers) as well as food services of the school should be competencies of municipalities. The same goes for preschool education.
All administrative instructions of MEST that have to do with organizing and school staff should be reviewed with participation of Kosovo Serbs and include special measures for minorities. A possible temporary solution should be reviewed for a four-year transitional period during which the two systems of education would become compatible or mutually recognized.
3. Social Policies
Current situation: At present, social welfare services (social service and social assistance), employment, and pension services are under central level administration. Regulation 2005/45 on Family and Social Services, that had been promulgated in September 2005, provides for transfer of responsibilities in the field of social services from central to local level (for instance, Centres for social work, provisions for social services within the territory of municipalities – kindergartens, preschool facilities, household support, personal care, counseling, housing care), provisions on financial assistance to fulfill certain social needs of individuals (in a complementary way to the social assistance scheme that is managed by central level).
Ground to be explored: Regardless of receiving pensions transferred by the Yugoslav pension scheme and pensions received by Kosovo Serbs outside Kosovo (that will not be treated in this context), positions on “decentralization” of social policies should not be very different from one another.
In principle, pensions and other programmes of social protection should be addressed in the central level, therefore the responsibility for legislation, policy making, standards, budget coordination, coordination of trainings and licensing remain in the central level. Otherwise, social services, provided by Centres for Social Work (currently placed under municipal and sub-municipal level) will be transferred to local level as specified in Regulation 2005/45. It should be assessed whether increase of municipalities’ responsibilities should include specific functions transferred to implementation of social assistance programmes (contact centres should be established in municipalities).
In general, development of concrete social services should be led by local level with the greatest possible scope.
4. Culture (cultural heritage, sports, stage arts, etc) and the media
Current situation: Currently the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MCYS) exercises a considerable number of responsibilities in the area of:
· Cultural heritage (general managing of cultural sites in Kosovo, the Reconstruction Committee, identification and recording of local and national heritage, archives, stage and visual arts, promotions and libraries, culture legislation, registry and inventory of premises, including protection, financing and policies through for Institutes for Protection of Monuments led by central bodies with many transferred competencies.
· Sports (federations for organizing sports, buildings and equipment. In accordance with Regulation 2000/45, the municipalities manage youth centres and Youth Network (with a financial help from Ministry of Culture, Youth and Non-Residential Affairs), local sports leagues, cultural events and some monuments (if they are not managed by the Institute for Protection of Monuments).
Out of 118 licensed broadcasters in Kosovo, 38 belong to minorities (32 of them to Kosovo Serbs, 2 to Turks, 2 to Bosniaks and 1 to Goranis). In general 30 broadcasters are to some point multiethnic, and a small number of owners broadcast one or more hours in the languages that are not the primary language of the station.
Awaiting the nomination of five local members for the Independent Media Commissioner, all broadcast media – from the municipal, regional or Kosovo wide level – get their licenses from the Temporary Media Commissioner. There are no municipality-owned broadcasters for the sake of protecting the freedom of the media and reducing the illegal local political interference, broadcasting licenses are not given to municipalities. All the radio and TV stations are as a consequence privately financed, with the exception of the RTK, which is a public broadcaster; with one television and two radio station.
Grounds to be explored: Although many responsibilities in the area of cultural heritage have been transferred, the Institute for Protection of Monuments (which in fact is led by the central level) needs to discuss further decentralization regarding maintenance, reconstruction and protection of religious sites. Protection and promotion like the inventorying and recording of the cultural heritage that has not explicitly been declared as ‘national’ should be transferred to municipalities (with some role in the hands of the MCYS in order for it to organize the work in accordance with European standards and to create a sustainable and comprehensive database of the Kosovo cultural heritage and also to organize awareness and education campaigns for respecting the cultural heritage of all the minorities).
The Reconstruction Committee should remain a direct responsibility of the MCYS, in cooperation with the international agencies (Council of Europe, UNESCO, and bilateral donors). However, a coordination/consultation mechanism/process can be recommendable to help transparency and to create the feeling of ownership and responsibility from municipalities.
Regarding the media, the position of the Temporary Media Commissioner/UNMIK is that the democratic principle of the free media rules out the media control by the state, no matter from what government level. Therefore, in no way will the municipalities be involved in managing or regulating the electronic media in Kosovo. There have been some measures taken by Kosovo institutions for a general media policy for minorities (minimal obligatory broadcasting for minority communities, reduction of custom duties and VAT in selling/importing of print media for the minority population), but not immediately linked to the decentralization schemes.
5. Police
Current situation: Gradual transfer of responsibilities in the area of policing and justice from the exclusive use by UNMIK to the local institutions is being developed trough the establishing of a Ministry for Internal Affairs late in 2005 and transfer of responsibilities to the already completed KPS.
Since the SRSG will have the last say until the end of UNMIK mandate, the responsibilities will be transferred gradually step by step and will be subject to a careful examination of the performance the ministries will show in their responsibilities at each stage; in this process the guarantees for the minority communities should be strengthened.
Ground to be explored: For KPS to fully cooperate with local authorities and Municipality Security Councils of local communities and, with other smaller areas within communities, Local Security Councils are being established in communities inhabited areas, and in respective areas where they are conveniently represented. The Commander of KPS local stations will be selected in consultation with Police Commissioner (similar to ‘Ohrid’ model),
Also, in consultation with village leaders, police sub-stations are being opened in villages of community areas with a considerable number of minorities (14 of which where already established during 2005), and main priority for employment will be given to KPS Officers from these areas. The recruitment, at all levels of KPS, should reflect the need for equal representation of all communities in Kosovo – during 2005 the percentage of minority employment doubled, from 12% to 22%.
6. Justice
Current situation: There are 25 Municipal Courts in total which operate in most existing municipalities in Kosovo (including a number of liaison offices established in smaller municipalities), 5 District Court, an Economic Court in Pristina and Kosovo Supreme Court.
All Municipal and District Courts that operated in Kosovo before March 1999 are transferred to Serbia and have built a parallel system. There are still some parallel courts in Northern Kosovo (Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavic), while parallel courts in central Kosovo (Strpce, Lipjan and Gracanica) seems to have seized the operation for ever.
The review of community guarantees in the field of justice has already started. In particular, access to Municipal Courts will be enhanced through establishing ‘courts departments’ in enclaves (like the model of Gracanica and Sterpce), and opening of ‘Court liaison offices’ in areas where a new court wouldn’t be economically sustainable. Ideas for transferring responsibilities for minor offences from courts to local administration are being discussed in the context of proposition of a new efficient and economically capable structure of courts in Kosovo. Furthermore, the plans for the transformations of court liaison offices to Offices of civic rights for the implementation of anti-discriminatory laws are sketched and could be implemented with the donors’ assistance.
Ground to be explored: In accordance with the Council of Europe applicable standards, the direct participation of municipalities for the nomination of judges is ruled out because of principles. Furthermore, it seems difficult to avoid practical obstacles for ensuring an unbiased role of judges of minorities in the Kosovo legal system, particularly Serb community, to apply for positions.
7. Public services
Current situation: So far, the management of municipal property and the settlement of public services (as: water, waste, irrigation, water surfaces, drainage, road cleaning services, etc) is done by KTA. Most of municipal properties that served social enterprises (land, materials…) were taken by KTA, although some of them (forestry, agriculture) are managed by municipalities. Water and waste management is done by 8 regional centers (extended throughout Kosovo – not always within municipal boundaries – excluding north, where a parallel waste management exists).
Under Resolution 1244, UNMIK is currently continuing the general policy of social enterprises privatization, without prejudging the status negotiations outcomes. Here consideration is given to the importance of subsidiary assistance that comes from public enterprises, financial transparency and modern business principles (private sector and public service structures).
Thus, accounting on a considerable transfer of competencies to the local level, gradual deviation from the general policy is also being considered, such as the transfer of competencies of some social enterprises (land and real property, but transport as well) to municipalities without adequate compensation and the increase of municipality representation in Supervising Boards of Public Enterprises, such as regional centres.
As for power supply, there are discussions going on regarding the need of a vertical division of energetic sector in: production and distribution, later on it could be regionalized, or even at the municipal level (with arguments favouring local property/communities of energetic network and those that believe that the industrial trend is more aggressive and that solutions should be more competitive in the energy sector.)
Ground to be explored: KTA has carried a process of incorporation of Public Enterprises in order to improve the management of companies, financial transparency and accountability procedures. Taking into account the fact that Public Enterprises can operate in individual municipalities, in several municipalities, or throughout Kosovo, discussions are underway to extend the company boards with more municipal representatives. Legal mechanisms are being reviewed for facilitating the transfer of competencies of social enterprises to municipal level without any compensation.
The vertical division of energetic system is part of Athens Agreement, where UNMIK is participatory. The vertical division is necessary in order to make the energetic market more competitive and efficient, and consumers (at least the major one) would have the possibility of choosing the supplier. Vertical division of KEK should address questions like how, when and the scale of problems that may arise when transferring KEK’s assets to new companies.
In the long-term, it is clearly visible that a number of public services should eventually be transferred to municipal institutions, or to be privatized and operate as private enterprises. This transfer should be planned clearly in order to prevent flaws of providing services. In this context, the ownership of key networks should not necessarily transfer to specific municipalities. The ownership over the network should be kept at central levels.
February 15, 2006
SN377:"Principles must be universal"
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PRAVDA
President Putin masters the art of double standards to find understanding with the West
14.02.2006 Source:
It seems that Vladimir Putin has been mastering the art of double standards lately. This art gives an opportunity to many countries – the USA first and foremost – to adjust their national interests to formal democratic and international standards. Judging upon recent statements from the Russian president, it becomes clear that Putin prefers to concentrate on the real state of affairs rather than dwell upon political fantasies.
The first double standard of the Russian president is connected with his attitude to terrorists. Pravda.Ru reported before that Russia had invited Hamas leaders to come to Moscow for talks. Such an initiative caused quite a stir in Israel . The whole world sees Hamas as a terrorist movement which does not recognize Israel. However, Putin stated at the press conference for Russian and foreign media in the Kremlin on January 31 that Russia had never considered Hamas a terrorist organization. Yet, Russia has been taking great efforts lately trying to make the international community refer to Chechen separatists as 'terrorists' not 'rebels.' European politicians have repeatedly tried to make the Russian administration negotiate with "rebels." Putin firmly stated that "Russia does not negotiate with terrorists."
Needless to say that Russia is not the only country which uses double standards in international politics. The USA would never dare to launch a military campaign against Iraq if the US administration did not rely on double standards. The Bush's administration successfully used the conflict of such values as security and international rights.
Russia studies the art of the double standards technologies too. Western politicians claim that the Russian administration supposedly has a biased attitude to Ukraine. It is not ruled out that Russia decided to punish the new Ukrainian government for its pro-Western political orientation during the recent gas conflict. Russian politicians would never say that they wanted to make Ukraine stop stealing the Russian natural gas and make the country more Russia-dependent. Instead, it was clearly said that the conflict had occurred because of the need to introduce new market prices between Russia and Ukraine. It is noteworthy that Russia continues to sell natural gas to Belarus at a very low price of $50 per cubic meter.
Ukraine has given many other reasons to Russian politicians to train their skills in the art of realpolitik. Russia harshly criticized the Western stance during the presidential election in Ukraine claiming that the West was supporting one of the Ukrainian political forces. However, Russia openly supported Viktor Yushchenko's rival at the election, Viktor Yanukovich.
Double standards help Vladimir Putin achieve at least a little bit understanding in the relations with the West. Tax evasion, for instance, is considered one of the most severe economic crimes in the Western society. As a result, this aspect became the key argument in the notorious Yukos case. When a Spanish journalist asked Putin if the use of non-transparent companies in state-run transactions had a goal to avoid tax payments, the president answered negatively to that question.
The vast majority of Russian companies use Yukos 's financial schemes in their financial activities. Nevertheless, the police do not raid their offices nor do they arrest their accounts. Here is another example. The Russian administration does not consider oligarch Roman Abramovich an economic criminal because Abramovich takes the post of the Chukotka regional governor. Putin would never try to explain that the Russian property needs to be laundered within the scope of partnership between a wealthy entrepreneur and the state. If the president released such a statement in public, Russia would be deprived of foreign investments immediately. It just so happens that honesty comes in conflict with state security at this point.
Another example of double standards in Russia can be found in the field of Russia's internal problems and their estimation. The children of Russian senior officials may not worry about their future: they will have most prestigious jobs owing to their parents' efforts. For example, the son of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov has recently taken an important position at Vnesheconombank (Foreign Economic Bank). President Putin referred to such events as an "ugly trend." "We must always try to restrict the power of state officials, put them inside the legal framework and make their work transparent and public as much as possible. At the same time, we must guarantee the rights of their family members. They are humans too. They have a right for a career. But this is a very subtle aspect," Putin stated.
Indeed, it is extremely hard to find a definitive line separating human rights and the struggle against corruption. United Russia party is currently working on a draft law about Russian deputies' right for commercial activities. This opportunity would be equated with a right to accept bribes in the Western countries.
Cogency is the most important factor in the policy of double standards. "Principles must be universal, otherwise they will not make anyone trust the policies that we are running," Vladimir Putin said at the press conference for foreign media in the Kremlin.
Albanian Terrorists
Milan V. Petkovic
Albanian Terrorists
There is only one step from fanaticism to barbarism.
Denis Diderot1998., NIGP Kalekom, Beograd
© 1998 Milan V. Petkovic
CONTENTS
CHAPTERS
- Islamic Extremism and the European Quest
- Growing Iranian influence
- The Albanian Initiative
- The US Interest for Terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija
- Turkey, Albania and the "Republic Kosova"
- Using religion
- Turkey, Albania and Kosovo and Metohija
- Planning the "Republic of Kosova"
- The "Kosovo Liberation Army"
- What is the "Kosovo Liberation Army"?
- Profile of a terrorist
- "Dogs of War" are arriving
- Profession  Terrorist
- Miscellaneous
- Others about Balcan
- Milan V. Petkovic: Albanian Terrorists [in English language]
- Milan V. Petkovic: Albanski teroristi [in Serbian language]
- Documents
- Students
- Assosiation of Serbian hystorics
- Petitions
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February 14, 2006
The EU needs a bolder Balkan strategy
The EU needs a bolder Balkan strategy
In Short:
This article, written by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt for the Centre for European Reform, argues that "the best thing the EU could do to promote Balkan stability would be to offer an indicative timetable to each state that shows an appetite for reform and a willingness to engage with the Union."
The Balkans are returning to the top of the EU's agenda. UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari has begun to negotiate Kosovo's future, while Montenegrins will probably vote in April on whether to break with Serbia. Both processes could destabilise a region that is suffering an economic crisis. Unemployment is about 30 per cent in Serbia and Montenegro, 40 per cent in Macedonia and 50 per cent in Kosovo.
The European Commission quite rightly wants to give the entire region a clear perspective of membership, as an incentive for the various governments to carry out painful reforms. The demise of the EU's constitutional treaty has turned some member-states away from the idea of further enlargement. Nevertheless, last year the EU began accession talks with Croatia, declared Macedonia a candidate, and started negotiating 'stabilisation agreements' with Serbia and Bosnia.
To read the article in full, visit the Centre for European Reform (CER) website.
February 13, 2006
Who bombed the markets in Sarajevo?
Seán Mac Mathúna
"A few days ago Mr. Boutros Ghali informed me that the projectile which hit the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo was an act of (Bosnian) Muslim provocation". President Mitterrand of France, 1995
Open military confrontation in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14th December 1995. The conflict had resulted in more than 160,000 deaths, and 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons. Not long before, the United Nations (UN) had ordered the first combat units from its rapid reaction force into Sarajevo, after after Serb rebels killed two French peacekeepers. Three Bosnian Serb shells had hit the French and Danish areas of a U.N. compound in Zetra, north of Sarajevo's centre killing a French peacekeeper and wounding another French soldier and a Dane. A half-hour later, another French peacekeeper was killed and two wounded, one seriously, when a U.N. convoy was targeted by Serbs in the suburb of Butmir. The deaths brought the number of French dead to 42 since the Bosnian war began in April 1992 - and not all of them were killed by the Bosnian Serbs, a number of them were also killed in crossfire or deliberately by the forces of the Bosnian government.
Not only did the UN get tough with the Bosnian Serbs - whose political and military leaders have now been charged with war crimes - in 1995, NATO had become directly involved when when they ordered air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. These attacks had been preceded by a series of barbaric attacks against civilians in the Markele market in Sarajevo, all of which were assumed to be the work of the Serb army laying siege to Sarajevo.
There were three attacks on the markets, all of which were blamed on them: the first on 27th May 1992, killed 16 people, the second on 5th February 1994 killed 68, and the third on 28th August 1995, killed 37. The last attack is the most significant, as it has been widely alleged, by members of the UN Mission in Bosnia, UN Commanding officers and of course, predictably, the Bosnian Serbs themselves, that this one in particular was staged by elements within the Bosnian government to provide the pretext for NATO military involvement in the war. In subsequent attacks, bombs and bullets used by the NATO jets used Depleted Uranium (DU) which is now estimated to have claimed the lives of some Serb 300 civilians who lived in the vicinity of the bases hit by NATO, according to reports that surfaced in 2001. What evidence is there for the claims that the Bosnian government carried out these attacks ?
The first attack in 1992
The first of three attacks happened on 27th May 1992 when 16 people killed in a "mortar attack" on a bread queue in Vase Miskina street in Sarajevo. As The Independent (22nd August 1992) noted, the televised scenes of civilians cut to pieces by an explosion as they queued for bread horrified international public opinion, and added growing pressure for NATO to "intervene" in the civil war against the Bosnian Serbs. Vivid footage showed dead bodies littering the street and "terrified crying people sitting on the pavement in pools of blood". The attacks came shortly before a meeting by European Union ambassadors to consider imposing sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UN officials from the start were "suspicious about the circumstances but would not go public with their thoughts without jeopardising the UN mission" in Bosnia. Classified reports given to the commander of the UN peace keepers, General Satish Nambiar, concluded that it was likely that the army of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo carried out the attack. In fact, they were reported to believe it wasn't a mortar attack at all but a "command-detonated explosion - probably in a can". The impact mark left by the "mortar" on the market square floor was nowhere "near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round lading on a paved surface". This is also supported by another UN commander in Bosnia, General Michael Rose of the British army, who according to his book Dispatch the Bosnian government in Sarajevo shelled their own people to get a military response by NATO against the Bosnian Serbs (The Observer, 28th March 1999). NATO launched air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs as a result of this attack.
According to The Independent, United Nations (UN) officials and senior Western military officers believe that the attack in 1992 was carried out by the Bosnian government, "To win world sympathy and trigger intervention". This was also expressed in confidential reports circulating at the UN headquarters in New York, and in classified briefings to US policy makers in Washington, according to the British newspaper. The attack on the bread queue in Vase Miskina Street also led to draconian sanctions against Yugoslavia imposed by the Security Council (resolution 757) on 30th May 1992 (which had been preceded by Yugoslavia's expulsion from the WHO). All supplies of raw materials to the well-developed pharmaceutical industry of Yugoslavia for production of medicines were immediately suspended. The justification for blaming Yugoslavia for attacks carried out in Bosnia was based on Western intelligence disinformation that the country was directing the war on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.
The second attack in 1994
The second attack on a market in Sarajevo happened on 5th February 1994 when a single mortar round left 68 dead and 200 wounded. Some people immediately questioned how son many civilians had been killed or wounded by one mortar bomb. Furthermore, officials from the Bosnian government did allow anyone from UNPROFOR to verify what had happened. Despite vehement denials from the Bosnian Serbs, the US news channel, CNN, immediately reported that they were responsible for the shocking carnage that the attack left, which CNN claimed was "caused by a Serb mortar bomb". The US President Bill Clinton added to this saying it was "highly likely" that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for it.
Thus, US ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright and the US presidential security advisor Anthony Lake, immediately called for NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Yet there were already people claiming that even the UN itself did not suspect the Bosnian Serbs, but this appears to have been suppressed by the Western media, possibly acting under covert British and American pressure, assuming the the whole purpose of the mortar attack was to provide the pretext for NATO military involvement in the Balkans for the first time. If this is not the case, then it is certainly hinted at by the former British Foreign Secretary David Owen in his book Balkan Odyssey (Victor Gollanz, London, 1995):
"People around General Rose never tried to hide the fact that at his meeting with Bosnian Muslim leaders (President Alia Izetbegovic and General Delic) he said that he had just received some information which shows that the mortar bomb did not come from the area under Serb control but from the Muslim part of the city . . ."
However, Owen's account of the the Market square massacre in 1994 has been criticised by Noel Malcom in a review of his book in The Sunday Telegraph on 12th November 1995.
When discussing the market-place massacre in Sarajevo of February 1994, Lord Owen goes on at length about a UN investigation which concluded that the mortar shell had been fired from a Bosnian Government position. Dramatically, he confirms that General Rose put pressure on Bosnian ministers by threatening to reveal this finding, unless they did as they were told. What Lord Owen does not tell us is that a second, more thorough investigation found that the first had made mistakes in its calculations, and concluded that the shell could equally have come from the Serb side. It is surely inconceivable that Owen is unaware of this second report; yet he chooses not to mention it. Readers will have to draw their own conclusions about the overall reliability of this grotesquely vainglorious book.
But, Owen also fails to give any clear evidence as to the perpetrators of this attack - if you read his statement carefully, he is only telling us that the second investigation, although on one hand, described as "more thorough", still concluded that the shell could "equally" have come from the Serb side. This indicates to me that their is still no hard evidence that either side were responsible. Bosnian Serb and Russian claims should be treated with scepticism (as they have a vested interest, from a propaganda point-of-view, in making sure these allegations are widely circulated). But the claims of the UN and representatives of various NATO countries serving as peacekeepers should be treated as serious and worthy of investigation.
From example, On 6th June 1996, Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy for Bosnia, told a German journalist working for DPA in New York, that there was a secret UN report accusing the Bosnian government forces of this massacre. It was claimed that this secret report was passed on to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who did not publish it in the interest of "higher politics". Citing this UN report, B. Volker, a French journalist working for TV TF1 said that the mortar bomb was fired from Bosnian government positions. Volker also quotes the words of President Mitterrand: "A few days ago Mr. Boutros Ghali informed me that the projectile which hit the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo was an act of (Bosnian) Muslim provocation".
The third attack in 1995
The third attack, on 28th August 1995 also hit market and left 37 dead and 90 wounded. When UN issued a declaration blaming the Bosnian Serbs, it evidently ignored the report of the British and French experts as well as the assessment of the UN's artillery expert for the Sarajevo sector, a Russian colonel, A. Demurenko. Soon after the attack, NATO launched extensive air strikes against Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets. The strategy appeared pre-planned as it coincided with an joint Croat and Bosnian government offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. The attacks changed the course of the war in Bosnia as enabled NATO to enter the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian government and Croat forces. After this attack, President Yeltsin gave official credence to reports circulating in the Russian media that a "third party" was responsible for the mortar attack on the bread queue. Yeltsin said that Russia "insists" that the UN "look again" at the attacks as there was new evidence indicating that it was not the Bosnian Serb's who carried out the attack. Despite this, NATO went ahead and launched air strikes. One military adviser to the foreign ministry, General Boris Gromov, even claimed (with no evidence provided) that one of the NATO powers was involved in the mortar attack "as a provocation". Yeltsin also said:
"Why am l against the expansion of NATO ? This (mortar attack in Sarajevo) is the first sign of what might happen when NATO comes right up to the borders of the Russian Federation. Those who insist on the expansion of NATO are making a major political mistake. The flame of war would burst out across the whole of Europe" (The Guardian, 9th September 1995).
The Russians and Bosnian Serbs have claimed that the third attack was prepared in advance over many months by "certain" Western secret services (probably including the CIA), and that Bosnian government troops under the commander of the General R. Delic carried it out. The reason for this, they argue, was to provide NATO with an opportunity not only discredit the Bosnian Serbs, but to provide the pretext to use heavy air strikes on them so as to destroy their military potential. The Russian intelligence service (FSB) were said to had known about the preparation of the plan since February 1995. Then a detailed plan, allegedly called Cyclone 2, was related to a secret memorandum, signed on 10th August 1995 at the Pleso airport in Zagreb, Croatia. The memorandum was signed for the UN by the commander of the UNPROFOR forces based Croatia and Bosnia,General B. Janvier and by Admiral L. Smith for NATO. This secret memorandum was only passed on, as "secret", on 13th September 1995 to the UN Security Council, when the main destruction of Serb targets had already taken place. According to article 7 of the memorandum UNPROFOR agreed to provide all information necessary for the NATO strikes against Serb targets to achieve the maximum success.
According to the FSB, the mortar was fired from the roof of a building near the market and they further claimed that the device was not a standard mortar bomb. Another author, Y. Bodansky, the director of the Republican parliamentary task force studying terrorism and unconventional warfare (Target America, Terrorism in the US Today, S.P.I. Books, Shapolsky Publishers, New York, 1993), believed that the Bosnian Serb intelligence service knew that "something was being planned" in Sarajevo. On 26th August 1995 (two days before the second massacre) he spoke by telephone to a senior official of the Republika Srpska in the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, who told him anxiously that once again "something terrible is being planned against the Serbs" in Sarajevo. How much of this is true, made up or just a joint FSB-Bosnian Serb disinformation campaign is hard to assess.
Another report indicating that the Bosnian Serbs were not responsible for this market place attacks was published in The Sunday Times on October 1st 1995. It claimed that British ammunition experts serving with the UN in Sarajevo had "challenged" key evidence of the attack on the bread market which not only triggered NATO attacks against the Serbs in Bosnia, but turned the tide of the war against them. According to the newspaper, the British experts:
"found no evidence that the Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal round"
Nora Beloff, writing in her book Yugoslavia: An Avoidable War (New European Publications, London, England, 1997), also allege that "that Bosnian government arranged to kill their own people" so as to get the Bosnian Serbs blamed. She alleges the news reporter Martin Bell, now an independent MP in Britain, had known about these allegations through his contacts with British UN officers but "he ignored what they might have told him". She repeats claims, as reported in David Owen's account of the bombings, that western experts had discovered that it was the Bosnian government forces and not the Bosnian Serbs who had been behind the attack in February 1994. Allegedly, when UNPROFOR wanted the Bosnian government to participate in truce negotiations, the British commander, General Michael Rose:
"Blackmailed the Bosnian Muslim leaders into submission. He told them that unless they agreed to cooperate, he would tell the international press that he had technical expertise proving that the grenade came from the Muslim, not the Serb, side" (Beloff, p112/113).
Other attacks supposedly carried out by the Bosnian government - and blamed on the Bosnian Serbs - include:
- 29th June 1992: Rocket attack on Sarajevo's TV station kills 5 people. Bosnian government troops implicated in this attack (The Sunday Times, October 1st 1995).
- 17th July 1992: A "choreographed" mortar salvo, 30 seconds after British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd entered a building for a meeting with the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic. The attack killed or wounded 10 bystanders - but not Hurd's guard of honor, who had clearly been forewarned and ducked for cover seconds before the attack.
- 4th August 1992: Bomb attacks which were filmed by the Western film crews at a funeral of two orphans in a cemetery in Sarajevo. The attacks were blamed on the Bosnian Serbs.
- 13th August 1992: After the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic arrives in Sarajevo airport for a meeting with Izetbegovic, a Bosnian government sniper kills US TV producer David Kaplan. The attacks disrupts the schedule of Panic, and he only manages to spend 20 minutes on the phone with Izetbegovic.
Philip Corwen, a senior member of the UN in Bosnia has recently written a book about his experience there (Dubious Mandate: A memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995 [Duke, London, UK, 1999]):
"The French forces (the main UN armed force in Sarajevo) were continually harassed, shot at, blocked at, and threatened by Bosnian government forces . . . it was the French who pointed out that the Bosnian government was placing weapons systems next to UN facilities in order to draw fire from Serb artillery onto civilian and UN targets and thus provoke international outrage against the Serbs . .. (p178)
I recommend that readers interested in the background to the conflict in Bosnia read Corwen's book: His meticulous account shatters once and for all the "one victim - one enemy" myth promoted mainly by the Western media. For the record, l unequivocally condemn the war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out by the Bosnian Serb regime against the people of Sarajevo - whom they relentlessly bombed and shelled. The Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic have been rightfully indicted by the International war crimes tribunal in the Netherlands - but why has this tribunal failed to indict Alija Izectbegovic, the Bosnian President and other senior officials of his government when there is clearly enough prima-facie evidence of their complicity in war crimes carried out by the Bosnian army ? I believe that the UN probably has ample evidence to show that the Bosnian government carried out these attacks in Sarajevo, but along with NATO, decided not to pursue charges against Bosnian government leaders for political reasons, and decided to sweep the whole story under the carpet and suppress it.
Footnote: an estimated 300 civilians killed after NATO used depleted Uranium in reprisal attacks
"Up to 300 men, women and children who lived close to the site of the (NATO) bombings in 1995 have died of cancers and leukemia over the last five years". Robert Fisk, 2001
Finally the bombings of the market place unleashed a wave of NATO air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets in and around Sarajevo. In these attacks, bombs and bullets used by the NATO jets used Depleted Uranium (DU) that is now estimated to have claimed the lives of some Serb 300 civilians who lived in the vicinity of the bases hit by NATO. According to Robert Fisk, writing in The Independent of Sunday on 14th January 2001, NATO subjected the Serb military bases and surrounding civilian areas to an intense bombardment between 30th August to 15th September 1995, using jets and artillery from Mount Igman just outside Sarajevo. Civilians living in the area surrounding the bases starting to begin suffering from a variety of symptoms now linked to the use of DU by NATO in Bosnia. NATO governments have so far shown little interest in helping the civilian victims of DU in either Bosnia, Yugoslavia or during the assault on Iraq in 1990.
February 12, 2006
Mystery of the market massacre
Mystery of the market massacre
by Eve-Ann Prentice
SIXTY-EIGHT people died and more than 200 were injured when a single shell exploded in a small Sarajevo market. The ghastly scenes were filmed and a horrified world was left in no doubt that the Serbs were to blame. The slaughter brought deeper American involvement in the Balkans, with the formation of the US-led Contact Group and an American-negotiated alliance between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.
The massacre also ultimately paved the way for American airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions in late summer, 1995. Furthermore, the killing brought about a deal whereby the Serbs pulled back their heavy guns from the mountains surrounding Sarajevo and the Muslims reluctantly signed a ceasefire. The easing of the siege, and the relief for the people of Sarajevo, was a notable achievement.
To this day no one knows who fired the deadly mortar round on Markale market in February 1994. Survivors and witnesses said they heard no characteristic whistle of an approaching missile; this later led to suggestions that a bomb had been placed under a stall. A Western diplomat who was in Sarajevo at the time told me in 1999 that he was convinced the bombing was perpetrated by the Muslim-led Government. The Muslims were sure that the Serbs would be blamed and hoped that outrage at the carnage would lead to airstrikes against their foes and increase pressure for a lifting of the arms embargo that was in place against all the warring sides. Britain and France were vehemently opposed to lifting the embargo, although America had shown signs of wanting to arm the Muslims.
"On the morning of the explosion some people were told that it was not a good day to go to the market," the Western diplomat said. "There was also no shelling from the Serb positions that day, and the injuries were mainly from the waist down, as if a bomb had exploded in situ." The diplomat said that another sign that the Muslim-led Government had been responsible was that government media with cameras were on the scene "within seconds", as if poised in advance to record the full horror of the carnage to gain as much world impact as possible.
The suggestion that the Muslims shelled their own people began to be discussed by diplomats, politicians and a few journalists after the UN's investigation into the massacre concluded that no one could be sure whence the shell had come. But most people recoiled at the idea of such self-inflicted mutilation. The majority of the world's press and politicians accepted the instant suggestion that the Serbs were responsible; questions were not encouraged and the general view was that the end justified the means: the siege of Sarajevo was eased. But blaming the Serbs without proof set a precedent, and the process of demonising them took deeper root.
February 11, 2006
Nothing happens without a reason
KiM Info Newsletter 10-02-06
Serbian Orthodox Church specifies basic principles on future protection of the Serbian Orthodox religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo
Information Service of the Serbian Orthodox Church
Original document in Serbian (February 7, 2006)
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Taking into account the decisions from this yearÂ’s autumn session of the SOC Holy Assembly of Bishops (November 1-4, 2005), the Holy Synod of Bishops and the Council for Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops hereby define the following with regard to forthcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
of the SOC Holy Synod of Bishops and the Council for Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops with regard to forthcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija
1. In the process of resolving the future status of Kosovo and Metohija the Serbian Orthodox Church, her faithful and her Holy Shrines in the Province should be provided with adequate protection and a free life in accordance with basic principles of religious freedom and human rights generally accepted in the democratic world.
2. The position of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohija should be regulated by a special form of decentralization enabling the effective protection of the vital interests of the Serbian people, especially in the areas of education, culture, media, health and social policy, economic and property issues, local police and judiciary. It is especially important to ensure the return of Serb refugees, their secure living conditions and lasting survival. Toward this end, the Serbian Orthodox Church gives its wholehearted support to the Negotiation Team on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, which will represent the interests of the Serbian people and state.
3. In addition to fundamental interest in the institutional, legal and property protection of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, the Church is also vitally interested in the long-term protection of her holy shrines: monasteries, churches, property and cultural patrimony. For centuries, these Holy Shrines have been and remain the faithful guardians and witnesses of the spiritual and cultural identity of the Serbian people in the Province and as such they must be preserved for the future by being given a special position (status) within the framework of the future, comprehensive solution for Kosovo and Metohija. It is important to protect specific Holy Sites not only as cultural and religious monuments but also as living communities of a living people.
4. In cooperation with relevant experts, during the talks it is necessary to define concrete mod-els that would ensure the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose spiritual seat is the Pec Patriarchate, and its local Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija with full internal autonomy, free pastoral and missionary work with its faithful, protection of property and other rights, protection of proper names and identity, and unobstructed communication with the canonic and administrative seat of the SOC in Belgrade. In this respect, it is very important that within the future Law on Religious Freedoms in Kosovo and Metohija the SOC is provided with full rights in accordance with the UN Charter and other relevant international acts on the protection of human and religious rights and freedoms.
5. It is also necessary to ensure special, internationally guaranteed status and models for lasting protection of the living Serbian Orthodox monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija by creating appropriate protective zones around monasteries, with the presence of international military forces wherever and for as long as necessary. In addition to the protective zones, it is necessary to provide special guarantees for the free, spiritually and physically unobstructed life and work of monastic communities, unhindered access for the faithful and for pilgrims, as well as appropriate customs, tax and other benefits enabling the economic sustenance of these communities, which support themselves by their work. The form and scope of protective zones would depend on their significance and on the fact whether a monastery is located in a part of the Province inhabited by an Albanian or a Serbian majority.
6. The complete arrangement for protection of institutions, sites and patrimony of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be under the special monitoring of the International Community, in full coordination with the Government of Serbia, Kosovo provincial institutions and UNESCO, which would ensure the sustainability of protective mechanisms within the framework of the international civil presence in Kosovo. This institution would concern itself with current issues and arbitration in the event agreed-upon principles are not honored. It would maintain ties with international factors, police and municipal authorities. Participation in this process should include appropriate experts from Belgrade and Pristina and experts of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as representatives of the International Community.
7. At the same time, in accordance with Resolution 1244, Annex 2, Item 6, it is necessary to enable the unobstructed engagement of experts of the Ministry of Culture from Belgrade and the Serbian Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, who have already worked on the protection of Serbian spiritual, cultural and historical patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija in the past, and who possess complete documentation and specialized experience. The engagement of experts from Belgrade would also be realized in cooperation with representatives of local Kosovo institutions under the unique auspices of the EU. The eventual transfer of jurisdiction over the SOC cultural patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija to Kosovo institutions is unacceptable because the local Kosovo Ministry of Culture lacks the expertise for this jurisdiction and is inadequate to guarantee and ensure the protection of the identity and purpose of these Holy Shrines.
8. The resolution of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should enable the complete restoration of all Orthodox churches and monasteries that have been destroyed or damaged since 1999, their return into liturgical function, the full protection for the property of the SOC, as well as special guarantees intended to make it possible for the SOC and other religious communities to ensure the restitution of property illegally confiscated after World War II in accordance with special legislation to be passed in accordance with European standards.
9. The resolution of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should include special provisions protecting the identity, the historical and spiritual origin and the patrimony of the Serbian people. Even though our patrimony is physically located in Kosovo and Metohija, nevertheless it cannot be called the cultural patrimony of Kosovo but the Serbian cultural patrimony of Kosovo and Metohija (just as there is Albanian, Roma and Ottoman patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija). The imposition of a collective identity to this cultural patrimony represents a threat to the survival of Serbian cultural patrimony and to our people as a whole, as well as a change in the identity of Christian civilization in the Province.
10. The views of the Serbian Orthodox Church are completely complementary with the Plan of the Government of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, and with the most recent plan of President Tadic regarding the two-entity reorganization of the Province as a part of Serbia. The SOC Holy Synod of Bishops has taken the view at its most recent session in November 2005 that the issue of the future status of the Province must be resolved in accordance with international principles on the inviolability of sovereignty and integrity of democratic states, including Serbia and Montenegro. The future solution for Kosovo and Metohija must take into account the interests of all citizens which live there and must be such that it does not destabilize the situation in the region, which after years of war and suffering needs peace, reconciliation, cooperation, spiritual, moral, economic and all other forms of progress.
February 09, 2006
Kosovo Serb leaders against withdrawing from negotiations (Tanjug)
Kosovo Serb leaders against withdrawing from negotiations (Tanjug)
Kosovo Serb leaders have assessed that the Belgrade authorities should not give up negotiations on the future status of Kosovo regardless of western officials statements that anticipate the status of the province. SLKM head Oliver Ivanovic has pointed out that the withdrawal from negotiations before they have even begun would represent a big and fatal mistake. Our opponents expect that we give up the negotiations so that they would go on without us, like in Rambouillet, but with consequences for the entire Serb people, said Ivanovic. He added that such an action would prevent the Serb side from arguing with the results of those negotiations. SNC official Rada Trajkovic has assessed that as long as there is a chance for negotiations, there is the chance for Serbs to achieve the fulfillment of their requests. She warned that giving up the negotiations would result in the expelling of Serbs from Kosovo.
Interview with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade (Blic)
Interview with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade (Blic)
The Contact Group, in whose work Russia is taking part, has not passed any decision on the possible status of Kosovo, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade Aleksandr Alexeyev told Blic on the occasion of the statement by British diplomat John Sawers that Kosovo independence had already been agreed.
What kind of solution Russia advocates?
“The solution for Kosovo’s status must be the result of a direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina along with significant support of the international community. It is a dangerous attempt to impose any kind of solution on anyone. Imposed solutions by rule aren’t long lasting.â€
Only Russia considers that it isn’t possible to achieve a solution this year.
“In the Contact Group statement from London, on which all member-states agreed, it is not mentioned anywhere that the negotiations must end in 2006, but it is stressed that all efforts will be undertaken so talks would be completed by the end of the year. If additional time is needed for working out a compromise and safe solution, that will not be a problem.â€
What does President Putin think when he says that a universal solution must be found for Kosovo?
“The Kosovo problem is not the only problem Europe is facing. If we want to resolve similar problems, and for this to strengthen and not to destroy European security, we must strongly adhere to the existing principles. If we approach individually, and often with political ideas, each individual conflict, then the results could be very serious and negative.â€
What kind of consequences could Kosovo’s independence have on the Balkans, the Russian Federation and Europe?
“If someone is allowed to violate the principles of the inviolability of borders, then why couldn’t other do this as well.â€
Do you also have in mind B&H, Spain, Cyprus…
“President Putin has turned the attention to the frozen conflicts that exist in the former USSR. This issue especially concerns us, because we are deeply involved in the resolution of these conflicts and we are very interested in finding an unambiguous legal solution. I imagine that similar problems are appearing in other parts of Europe as well.â€
February 07, 2006
Too Much Yugoslavia or too Little EU?
Nobody wanted to create a new Yugoslavia
BRUSSELS, Belgium | The European Commission on 27 January put forward a series of measures aimed at boosting economic cooperation and development in the western Balkans, but the plan has been met with little enthusiasm in the region itself.
From Croatian apprehension that the plan smacks of the former federation of Yugoslavia to Serbia’s criticism that it does too little to address the key question of investment, the Commission’s proposal is likely to be amended before it is presented to an informal meeting of foreign ministers from the EU and the western Balkans on 10 March in Salzburg.
THE PROPOSALS
In a strategy paper titled “The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity,” the Commission proposed to foster trade and economic development, movement of persons, education and research, regional cooperation, and civil society in the western Balkans.
“While the Kosovo status process is moving ahead, we need to encourage the people of the western Balkans to look forward to their European future, not back to the nationalism of the past,” EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said at the presentation of the paper, standing alongside the UN special envoy for the Kosovo status talks, Martti Ahtisaari. “The best way to do that is to focus on practical measures which will integrate their economies and societies into the European mainstream,” Rehn said.
The enlargement commissioner warned that the western Balkans “should not be allowed to remain a black hole or a ghetto in Europe.”
The proposals include the easing of visa requirements, increasing scholarships, a new regional school for public administration, a civil-society dialogue with the EU, contributions to the recently established European Fund for Southeast Europe (a public/private investment fund financed by international and national donors), and the creation of a diagonal-cumulation-of-origin formula, which would make it easier for a producer in one country to process raw materials from another.
But the key proposal is the creation of a regional free-trade agreement among the countries of the region: Serbia-Montenegro (including Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia.
The rationale behind the free-trade measure is the relative inefficiency of the current web of bilateral trade agreements in the region – 31 in total – which have failed to produce a sufficient level of intra-regional trade or were not properly implemented.
This idea is not new: it has been on the table since mid-2005, when trade ministers from the region agreed to turn bilateral free-trade agreements into a single regional agreement. Rehn himself had cited the idea on several occasions.
THE OBSTACLES
But the proposal infuriated public opinion in Croatia, which saw the idea as evidence of a Brussels plan to resurrect the old Yugoslavia, which went up in flames in the early 1990s.
Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader tried to calm the outcry by saying there was no chance of anyone in the EU “trying to create something like Yugoslavia.” He suggested that, instead of creating a new regional zone, the existing Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) should be extended to the western Balkans.
After the last wave of EU enlargement, in 2004, only Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia remain members of the CEFTA. Bulgaria and Romania are slated to enter the EU in 2007 or 2008, and Croatia hopes to follow in 2008 or 2009.
The Croatian Chamber of Commerce harshly criticized the Commission’s proposal, saying it had more to do with politics than trade. It said the idea was “dangerous” because it demonstrated that the EU did not have a clear concept for resolving the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, which could split this spring, or the status of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Serbian officials, by contrast, welcomed the proposal, but said it did not go far enough in attempting to boost trade and investment in the region.
In an interview with TOL, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus described what he saw as the proposal’s shortcomings.
“The free-trade reasoning is good, but we are still in a deep depression, in a post-conflict situation, and we need to boost development,” he said. “Free trade is a must, but it is not sufficient. We need investment, but there is not much investment policy in the paper.”
Labus said Serbia was firmly in favor of forming a single market in the region instead of the many bilateral free-trade agreements. “But until this single market is formed, we ask for these bilateral agreements to be fully implemented.”
He argued that the diagonal cumulation of origin should not be restricted to countries that have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, that is, Croatia and Macedonia, but also to those which have asymmetrical preferential regimes with the EU, thus including the entire region. This rule would allow a producer in, say, Croatia, to treat raw materials or components from another country that is also party to the agreement (such as Serbia) as domestic when the final product is exported to the EU.
Tanja Miscevic, the head of the Serbian government’s EU integration office, agreed with Labus that the Commission’s free-trade proposal had its limitations.
“A single free-trade agreement without an institutional infrastructure but only a secretariat cannot really be efficient,” Miscevic said. She warned that under such circumstances the proposal might not be “realistic or sustainable.”
AMENDING THE PLAN
Another potentially difficult area is the relaxation of the visa regime of the Schengen agreement, which emerged outside the EU framework but has 15 European signatories, for citizens of western Balkans countries.
EU Justice and Internal Affairs Commissioner Franco Frattini said after meeting Labus in Brussels that some groups, notably students and business people, would benefit from such measures and travel more easily in the EU.
“Our opinion is that there is no free trade unless at least businessmen can travel freely. If this obstacle is not lifted, we will not see the full effects of free trade,” Labus said.
“My proposal is to make this plan much more effective than it is right now. This is not a criticism, but a suggestion that we should be truly looking for practical measures,” he added, suggesting there was sufficient time before the Salzburg meeting to revise certain aspects of the plan.
He says the Commission’s plan “perfectly” fulfilled all political promises the EU made at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit.
“They are really repeating that the Balkans will be a part of Europe in the future and we no longer have to worry about the dilemma of whether we will be in Europe tomorrow or not,” Labus said. “But there is a need to switch from the level of political promises to the level of practical measures in order to accelerate our way into the EU,” he said.
Miscevic said another problem was that most of the proposals set out in the Commission’s proposal, such as a single free-trade area or visa facilitation, would be implemented only in 2007. “This leaves us with an empty 2006,” she said.
At the same time, Miscevic said the Commission’s proposal was the maximum that the EU could propose “at this specific moment of time” given political constraints.
“Due to enlargement fatigue, the outcomes of last year’s referenda on the European constitution, and problems with the EU budget, ordinary citizens and politicians in the EU are not willing to commit more to enlargement than they already have,” Miscevic said.
Aleksandar Mitic is a TOL contributor from Brussels and Belgrade.
"We are appalled"
| Signed: NIKOLIC, Tomislav, Serbia and Montenegro, NR BOJOVIC, Bozidar, Serbia and Montenegro, EPP/CD CHERNYSHENKO, Igor, Russian Federation, EDG EXNER, Vaclav, Czech Republic, UEL GLIGORIC, Tihomir, Bosnia and Herzegovina, SOC GOJKOVIC, Maja, Serbia and Montenegro, NR HOOPER, Gloria, United Kingdom, EDG JOVASEVIC, Ljubisa, Serbia and Montenegro, EPP/CD KOLESNIKOV, Victor, Russian Federation, EDG KOVALEV, Nikolay, Russian Federation, EDG MELNIKOV, Ivan, Russian Federation, UEL MILICEVIC, Ljiljana, Bosnia and Herzegovina, EPP/CD MILOJEVIC, Goran, Bosnia and Herzegovina, EPP/CD MOKRY, Vladimir, Russian Federation, EDG NAGHDALYAN, Hermine, Armenia, ALDE NAROCHNITSKAYA, Natalia, Russian Federation, UEL | OSKINA, Vera, Russian Federation, EDG OSTROVSKY, Alexey, Russian Federation, NR RUSTAMYAN, Armen, Armenia, SOC SLUTSKY, Leonid, Russian Federation, SOC Sobko, Sergey, Russian Federation, UEL/GUE TODOROVIC, Dragan, Serbia and Montenegro TOROSIYAN, Tigran, Armenia, EDG ZHIRINOVSKY, Vladimir, Russian Federation, NR ZIUGANOV, Guennady, Rusian Federation, UEL ZIZIC, Zoran, Serbia and Montenegro, SOC
Total: 28 - SOC: socialist Group - EPP/CD: Group of the European People’s Party - ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe - EDG: European Democratic Group - UEL: Group of the Unified European Left - NR: not registered in a group |
Tomislav Marcinko, former editor of the HTV News Department and currently director of the HTV-owned Orfej music recording company, said in an interview with Vecernji List on Saturday that he was in possession of a document containing the names of HTV employees who had worked for the Yugoslav Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) and State Security Service (SDB) up until 1990 and that he was prepared to make it public in order to stop accusations against him that he persecuted ethnic Serb journalists at HTV in 1991.
"We are appalled by lies, half-truths and insults from Tomislav Marcinko," the Executive Board of HTV Reporters at the HND said in a statement, adding that the interview had set off "an avalanche of comments and new interviews" challenging the credibility of the national broadcaster.
The HTV reporters said they were angered by renewed discrimination against their colleagues on ethnic grounds, and that they were confident that it was "a continuation of a well-planned and coordinated attack" on HTV.
The statement urged the HTV Board of Governors to take action against Marcinko and called on the HND to condemn the editorial policy of Vecernji List as unprofessional and unethical.
Later in the day, the HTV Board announced an investigation into the case and said that charges would be brought against Vecernji List for incorrect and offensive reporting on HTV and causing damage to its image.
(Hina) vm
Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaw those Serbians
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/2C5F41A9-B175-45E5-B12D-A03FDD4D68EC.html
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
Monday, 06 February 2006
Kosovo: U.S. Official Expresses Hope For Final-Status Progress
RFE/RL: The Contact Group issued a statement last night [31 January] calling for all possible efforts to be made to reach a settlement in the course of 2006. Do you think this is possible and what would be the risks that can jeopardize this phase?
Philip Goldberg: Clearly the United States has said that we are interested in the process moving as fast as possible, trying to reach a conclusion in the final-status discussions. That will require hard work by all sides, especially here in Prishtina. The death of [Kosovo] President [Ibrahim] Rugova of course has understandably caused a short period, we believe, in respect of his memory, from working in the negotiating team. But that will start again and it will require hard work, hard decisions, and compromise by Prishtina, Belgrade, and the active involvement of the international community. So I do believe that in 2006, as the Contact Group said, that this is possible.
RFE/RL: The statement issued by the Contact Group has been evaluated as of very high importance for Kosova. How would you comment the context of the statement?
Goldberg: I believe that any statement by the Contact Group by definition, especially at the ministerial level, is of great importance. And yet I think it again restates that we are very active in trying to reach a resolution of the final-status decision; it expresses great support for former [Finnish] President [Martti] Ahtisaari, as the [special] UN envoy [on the status talks] and his efforts. I know that Ambassador [Frank] Wisner, the US envoy who was in London, will be arriving in Prishtina later this afternoon and will make his initial consultations with the negotiating team and the political players here, both from the Albanian side and the Serb side and the non-Serb minorities. So I think the process is well under way, and the Contact Group statement supported that process. I think that is good.
RFE/RL: The official talks on status are due to begin at the end of February, with a meeting on decentralization. International negotiators have said they are ready, but according to you, how ready are Prishtina and Belgrade?
Goldberg: I can't speak about Belgrade. I'll allow my colleague [U.S.] Ambassador [to Serbia and Montenegro Michael] Polt to do that, if you are interested in the American perspective on it. What I can tell you about the Prishtina side is that there was a lot of good work that went on in the political and strategic group. A paper was developed that appears to be a very good one and a good starting point from this side. And I believe that the team will be ready to discuss those issues in late February, after the selection of a new president, after the meeting of the negotiating team that is necessary to help put them on that course to Vienna. As I mentioned, this is a mourning period now for President Rugova and that has delayed the process a couple of weeks.
RFE/RL: Do you think that the death of President Rugova can impact the political scene and the negotiating process itself as a whole?
Goldgberg: I believe that President Rugova would want this process to go forward, and his life's project was to reach a decision on Kosovo's status. We all know what he believed that status should be. But that will require hard work and compromise and will require people here to respect each other in reaching decisions. I do believe that this can be done and has to be done now, keeping in mind President Rugova's legacy, but obviously without President Rugova.
RFE/RL: After the late president passed away, many have said that Kosovo may face political crises. What do you think, is there really such an anxiety in this regard?
Goldberg: I don't believe that's the case. I think, actually what we saw over the last week, 10 days, is enormous respect, an enormous outpouring of grief over the president's loss. But I think that the political world has remained stable and now the president's political party is in the process of choosing someone for the post of president to offer at the Kosovo Assembly. So that is the normal course of events. Of course this is not an easy situation either for the LDK the Democratic League of Kosovo], the president's political party, or for Kosovo as a whole. They have only known one president. So it will be a difficult period. But I think it is an important period for Kosovo to show its maturity both politically and as a society that this is a collective effort and an issue in terms of a status decision that will effect everybody, not just one person.
RFE/RL: You have raised the issue of a consensual president. Fatmir Sejdiu from the LDK is most likely to be nominated as a candidate for Kosova's president. Does he fit the description you were referring to when you mentioned the consensual president?
Goldberg: What I meant when I used the term "consensual president" was somebody who would gain wide respect, not just within the LDK, but also in the Kosovar society, among the opposition parties. Somebody who would be able to unite people at this time. And I think that the reaction to Mr. Sejdiu, at least what I have seen in the press and among the political figures here, indicates that that is the case with him. So I believe that yes, he is among those who would fit the description of the consensual president.
RFE/RL: Mr. Goldberg, the talks on status are expected to be more concentrated on minorities issues, especially on the Serb minority. How much have the Kosovars done and what do they need to do further in this regard?
Goldberg: The decentralization paper that I mentioned is one of the key issues that relates to the minorities and their ability to live safely, securely and with confidence in Kosovo. That is an important step. The key issue really is what does the majority, really the vast majority, probably 90 percent of the population, feel about having the minority living with them and enjoying not just full rights, but also the ability to maintain their culture, their language, their educational facilities, and the rest. These are important issues that they need to think about a lot. I think you can also see that what Kosovo and the negotiating team will have to deal with in considering all these issues, is that the international community, which has actually been in charge through the UN over the last 6 1/2 years until the final-status decision, is going to make sure that these are issues that are front in center. So it is both a part of getting the situation internally correct, because it says a lot about Kosovo's democracy that minorities will have that ability to live comfortably and securely, but also in a way Kosovo's policy toward the world, what kind of place is going to be.
RFE/RL: Many experts say the development of the economy is a precondition for a stable situation. Many are expecting that after the status definition, the issue of economy is going to be resolved. Is it realistic to expect that, and is it realistic to expect that international aid is going to be more approachable after the status is defined?
Goldberg: It is not a question of aid; it is a question of development. The question is if the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] are able to come in and help with international funding for productive projects, such as a new electric plant for example, which as we have seen the last couple of weeks is badly needed here. If companies see certainty in the final-status outcome and decide that there is something to invest in here, whether it will be the mines or the agriculture areas that have been identified as places in the economy that can be developed, then that's what is in Kosovo's future. Aid has never developed a place alone. It can help and may be is needed here. But this isn't a question of aid. It is a question of what can Kosovo do to develop economically.
- The Legacy Of Ibrahim Rugova
- Rugova's Death Complicates Final-Status Process
- Premier Says Independence Shouldn't Be 'Bargained For'
- U.S. Says Ethnic Albanians Must Demonstrate Good Governance
- UN Envoy Backs Launch Of Final Status Talks
- RFE/RL Speaks With UN Special Envoy Kai Eide
Who Wants a Greater Albania?
by Michael Radu
July 10, 1998
Michael Radu, a Senior Fellow at FPRI, is author of Collapse or Decay? Cuba and the East European Transitions from Communism.
CNN’s heart-wrenching images and the New York Times' strident editorials on the suffering of allegedly innocent Albanian civilians in Kosovo at the hands of the ruthless Serbs have the Clinton Administration on the same kind of meaningless rhetorical and diplomatic offensive as it was in Bosnia and Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti. And the results, as in those cases, are predictable: misguided sentimentalism, outrage, and protest; increased but covert costs for Americans; and complete disregard of the implications of bellicose statements and a diminishing foreign policy stick. The most disturbing of those implications, the Administration’s protestations to the contrary, is the inadvertent encouragement by Washington of the creation of a Greater Albania, including Kosovo and areas of Macedonia.
Kosovo, annexed by Serbia in 1912, became a highly autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia— a status it lost in 1989 as a result of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s machinations. Although the more developed Slovenia and Croatia had subsidized Kosovo for decades, the region remained the most backward in the former Yugoslavia. Barely larger than Delaware, Kosovo, even more than Albania itself, largely lacks natural resources. Its young, fast growing, poorly educated, and unskilled population of 2.8 million— 80% of which is ethnic Albanian, 10% Serbian/Montenegrin and the rest of various origins, mostly Gypsy— has no economy to speak of, beyond smuggling, remittances from (mostly illegal) emigrants to Western Europe and the United States, and most recently foreign aid. Simply put, Kosovo is, like Albania, the archetypal social, political and economic basket case— a Haiti in Europe.
Although Kosovo is now largely Albanian, it did not have such a large majority prior to 1912. The high Albanian Muslim fertility rate, in addition to Serbian emigration, helped create the present situation. Nonetheless, Serbian and Montenegrin history, sentiments and geopolitical considerations are all strong reasons as to why Kosovo should remain part of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the religious and cultural roots of medieval Serbian nationhood are to be found in today’s Kosovo: the first Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate at Pec, the great monasteries of Decani and Gracanica, and most importantly, the location of the 1389 lost battle of Kosovo, the source of Serbia’s national mythology.
It is easy to dismiss such emotional attachments as irrelevant or obsolete, just because they come from the Balkans, that motherlode of historic delusions; but it is also dangerous to dismiss Serbian motivations, which are truly nationalistic and involve Serbia’s most revered institution— the Orthodox Church. Not surprisingly, the Belgrade Patriarchate is at the forefront of Serbian and Montenegrin sentiments on Kosovo. Nor are Serbian and Montenegrin fears of the implications of Kosovo irredentism all emotion — an independent Muslim Albanian Kosovo, or a Greater Albania, would probably provoke secessionist pressures in the Sandjak of Novi Pazaar, the largely Muslim area linking Bosnia and Kosovo— enough to bring relatively liberal Montenegro back into the arms of conservative and nationalist Serbia. Then there is the little matter of international law, which recognizes Kosovo as an integral part of Yugoslavia, as do all world governments, including the United States.
On the other side of the ledger are the Albanians, whether the “moderate” followers of Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo or those of the increasingly active and violent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)— and they all share the same objective— independence as a first step toward joining Albania. The Rugova forces use an increasingly sophisticated public relations campaign, including ubiquitous English language banners during their made-for-TV marches in the capital of Prishtina. The KLA is more direct: it threatens the moderates and, more ominously, it uses civilians as propaganda tools. Its money, arms and ideas come from (mostly illegal) Albanian emigres in Western Europe and the United States, its leaders seem to be former Stalinist followers of the Enver Hoxha regime, and its ideology is a hodgepodge of totalitarianism, ultranationalism, and contempt for the West and its values.
Indeed, from the murky images coming from Kosovo through the double screens of Serbian censorship and Western media emotionalism, it appears that the KLA has selected a risky but so far successful strategy. On the one hand it engages in a hopeless static “defense” of villages against superior Serbian forces, resulting in heavy civilian casualties, and on the other it counts on the usual Serbian brutality to make sure that those casualties are widely known (and exaggerated) abroad — in other words creating victims today for the glory of tomorrow— and for provoking a NATO military intervention. And the glory of tomorrow, for the KLA and Rugova alike, is a Greater Albania, which would include large parts of Macedonia (another fragile and largely fictitious Balkan state with its 600,000 irredentist Albanians) as well. Indeed, the U.S. position only encourages the Kosovo Albanians as well as the violent operators of the KLA to pursue their maximalist goal.
Albania proper can best be described as a Balkan Somalia. Its Western-installed regime, led by the barely reformed ex- Stalinist Fatos Nano, hangs on to the capital by a thread. Smugglers, criminals and local clans, in effect, control most of the country. In fact, foreign aid and smuggling— of drugs, emigrants, weapons and anything else — are Albania’s economy. An Albania almost double the size of today’s would not only intensify the clan conflicts and corruption that have already destroyed the state, but also magnify mass emigration to Italy, provoke further "humanitarian crises,” and require more and more foreign aid. Who needs it? Who needs a Greater Albania? And who will pick up the inevitable bill to keep it afloat?
Officially, the Clinton Administration recognizes that Kosovo is, and should remain part of Serbia/Yugoslavia, and has even declared the KLA a terrorist organization. On the other hand, it makes no secret of its sympathy for Rugova, and for the Albanian government whose weakness and duplicity allow the KLA to exist. More seriously, it threatens the Serbs with dire consequences if they defend their territorial integrity, as they have every right to do. Washington demands the withdrawal of Serbian police from Kosovo, protests the mining of the border with Albania, and forces Belgrade into negotiations with Rugova. Symbolically, during his recent trip to the area, Richard C. Holbrooke, the Administration’s factotum in the Balkans, did not even see fit to meet with Serbian religious leaders in Kosovo— as if they are not a party to the conflict.
How do these attitudes combine with the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, forbidding territorial changes by force? Seeking a “peaceful solution” in Kosovo may sound good, but the Administration cannot have it both ways— professing respect for recognized borders while at the same time supporting committed irredentists and condemning the state that tries to protect its borders. If Washington has decided that Kosovo should be independent, then it should explain that decision; if not, it should act accordingly.
By manifesting sympathy for the Albanians and threatening Serbia/Yugoslavia with military intervention for using force in Kosovo, the Clinton Administration (like the Bush administration before it) is making impossible negotiations that might lead to the only solution, if there is one, to the Kosovo problem: the region’s autonomy within Serbia/Yugoslavia— i.e., a return to the 1974 old Yugoslav status quo. That would mean forcing Rugova, before KLA completely destroys his political support, to accept a return to the pre-1989 situation. The same should be required from Belgrade. The alternative is more bloody, useless insurgency by Afghan Muslim ideological veterans, Islamic mercenaries, and fanatical volunteers seeking the creation of a Greater Albania, opposed by a brutal, well- armed, and zealous Serbian and Montenegrin state supported by the masses.
The Congress of the United States has the responsibility to ask questions and to compel the Clinton Administration to answer for its decision to push the Serbians into an unacceptable concession of territory to an ethnic group totally incapable of ruling itself, either alone or with its even less prepared brethren across the mountains in Albania and Macedonia. Meanwhile, Americans should be prepared for a protracted diet of selective CNN images of Serbian atrocities against Albanian “innocents” with no corresponding images of Albanian terrorism, no analysis of the implications of a possible KLA victory, and no analysis of the Serbian motivation for resistance.
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VIEWPOINTS
By Iliya Pavlovich
In view of today's conflicts in Kosovo, where Albanian (drug trafficking, prostitution, white slavery funded operations) violence against a Serbian minority is tantamount of danger of being an extinct nation, we make more fuss about the endangered whales, seals, flowers and minerals, and much less about a rarely valuable contributor to our own humanity.
My son was born at St. Vincent's hospital in downtown NYC, Manhattan, Greenwich Village - so by all standards he's an American.
I am not. I was born is Belgrade, Serbia, but being a self-appointed American (by choice) I gave myself many of the "American rights"- (probably various delusions, that I am still trying to decipher).
In my early views on America as a country and a culture (word culture used in a most generous sense), I saw it fit to endow my son with his European heritage, as I was strongly convinced that the greatness of America is derived from the "frontier spirit" that can be found even among more recent immigrants (like myself). It was that "frontier spirit" that always gave you more power, more resilience, more impetus to try new things - and that is why America has produced the most Nobel Prize winners on Earth (probably another one of my partially accurate delusions - but maybe it's not).
Let me try to translate the following into English. This a quote from M. Danojlic's book "Personal things" published 2001:
"Kada se samo setim u sta sam sve verovao, koga sam sve uzimao ozbiljno, sta mi se sve cinilo jasno kao sunce ... Ne, ne odricem se svojih zabluda, naprotiv, samo ih idioti nemaju, i jedino ih podlaci ne priznaju. One su sustastvena iskustva naseg postojanja. Do konacnih i nepomerljivih istina ionako se nikad necemo probiti. Ostaje nam dostojanstveno i posteno suocavanje sa nasim ogranicenjima, posrtanjima i protivrecnostima." (Milovan Danojlic)
translation: "When I only think of all the things I believed in, all the people I took seriously, and it all appeared very clear to me No, no, I'm not reversing my delusions, to the contrary, only idiots can have no delusions, and only the crooked ones will not admit to ever having them. Our delusions are integral parts of our existence. To ever arrive at permanent and final accuracy/truth is most impossible so all we have left is our own weaknesses, our own limitations, our own existence and contradictions with daily stuttering in pursuit of [wider truths]."
We are all entitled to all sorts of delusions and they should be guarded and dear to us. Without those delusions we'd be paralyzed in some small Balkan war laden country with God-only-knows what type of tyrant for president. It is our permanent and mature views that have grown out of uncovering those delusions so it's quite good to have them and work with them, never to entirely suppress them. In the following few paragraphs (and images), I shall offer you two widely opposed views on the same people (Serbians), you can choose which delusion to keep, and which to reject.
Here is a rather simplistic (and possibly partially delusional) view on some Serbians that is vastly unknown (even in Serbia).
Let me give you a visual presentation what my son view when he watches me. Here is the image that my son described to me. My nickname often being "buzdovan" - the large wooden bat with nails as pictured below. Now in all truth, I am 6'4" and one of the shortest guys among my Serbian friends (strangely enough most are 6'5", 6'6" and over) - so we do look like giants and his vision is understood (he is now about 6'4" himself).
Within this colossal image it is hard to see what I determined is a very deeply embedded feeling of justice, democracy, charity and kindness - and they all seem totally incompatible with the images I offered here. Let me give you three small chapters (literature, based on eyewitness accounts, published as fiction):
1. During the Winter of 1915 as the Austro-Hungarian forces (mainly composed of Bosnians, Croats, Checks, Slovaks and other Slavic people in light blue uniforms) were advancing through the North Eastern Serbia (Valjevo, Sabac, Macva region), the peasants came out of their homes and gave the passing occupiers prunes, bread, apples, milk or whatever the little food they had. They spoke a common language and it was later established that the conquering army didn't look like the victorious army of the mighty empire, but rather a the scared common-folk grouped by force of conscription and threatened by the Austrian and German officer staff to go to battle. Serbian villagers had this rarest of human qualities (mercy, charity, forgiveness) called MILOSRDJE, for which there isn't even an adequate word in most languages with a few exceptions (Greek: ELEOS, Hebrew: Gemuilt Chasidim)
2. During the retreat of the Serbian Army (Summer of 1916), a Serbian sentinel surprised a Bulgarian (opponent-enemy) soldier who was taking a rare bath in the nearby river. It turned out that the Bulgarian was a sergeant, while the sentinel was only a private. The two languages are somewhat close and it is very easy for them to understand one another (especially in those times when there were no such new words as: cell-phone, TV-set; download, upload, Internet, etc.). The Bulgarian tells the captor: Batko (brother in Bulgarian) I am wounded and I was trying to wash my wound, how far are you taking me? I may not be able to walk any long distance. The Serbian sentinel puts his captive on the back of his horse and walks him a good 11km (7.5 miles) to Serbian headquarters. As the strange party is arriving the young sentinel sees one of the lead commanders of the Serbian Army, General Stepa Stepanovic (later duke - Vojvoda), pacing in front of his log cabin that served as the staff quarters. A day later the young sentinel is summoned to the General's quarters. He is terrified that he will be reprimanded for having given the captured enemy his horse while he walked on foot. To his amazement the General listened patiently while the private was explaining that the Bulgarian sergeant was wounded and could not walk, so in his view there was no need to further torture the one who is already suffering. The General congratulated the soldier and blessed him with words: "may you and yours be prolific and populous so that the face of our nation is always saved by people like yourself, it is an honor for anybody to be your prisoner, as it is an honor to be your commander"
It took the private a few days to fully understand how did he ever earn such praise as in his view he did the only decent thing he could do and barely had any choice in the matter.
3. From the book "Personal things" from Milovan Danojlic published 2001 same type of events that he recalls in his youth (1944 and 1945) chapter "Nasi i njihovi" (translated as Ours and theirs) page 14 in loose translation:
"Before the communist partisans were consolidating their power in the aftermath of WW2, the Chetniks ruled some villages in Serbia proper and their rule was obeyed. As the most villages had members in both armies that were often opposed to one another as well as to German occupiers, the villagers never knew which side to turn to. At an earlier point in the war the village mayor was close to the author's (Danojlic's) father, who was pro-Chetnik and often had advance notices when the chetnik-troikas would be coming to town, usually in pursuit of their prime enemy (the other Serbians who joined the communist lead partisans). Danojlic states that he was often sent on a clandestine mission by his father with words: "Go to so-and-so, and tell them to hide tonight and tomorrow, while "ours" are here. To the common villager "ours" were closer but "theirs" were not immediately discarded and belittled. Danojlic continues:
"A warning to the non-compliants or "theirs", of the impending doom, to be perpetrated by "ours" was, to me, one of the highest forms of tolerance and a deeply rooted democratic principles. Opposing views were tolerated, even understood and guarded, so that even utopian communism was (as bad as it was) watched after and protected in spite of the prevalent opposing beliefs. The communists in those days were thought of as pro-Russians, hotheads, idealists who keep preaching topics of the impossible justice and unattainable freedoms with non-balanced equality. There are stories that should be told, regardless of veracity and fact-finding."
IN CONCLUSION: The present day Serbia (in spite of my son's imagery) is not some God-forsaken country of mountain goats and giants with medieval torture systems, but a simple group of good-natured people who are probably the closest to the American view on democracy in countless ways. So much was the Clinton implemented NATO bombing of Serbia received as a shock by these peaceful people (true even in the most peaceful people there will be criminals, tyrants and similar bad apples) - but if the society overall is endowed with such strong Christian values and endless generosity, Clinton should have thought twice about his legacy which will stay forever besmirched by those thoughtless acts.
Iliya Pavlovich,
Deerfield Beach, FL - USA
About: Iliya Pavlovich, PhD, sociology, culture, Europe, international relations and a frequent commentator at Baltimore Independent Media Center.
February 01, 2006
SN16:Christian Schwarz-Schilling: How to move Bosnia forward
The office I have just inherited was created by the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee implementation of the accord ending the Bosnian War in 1995. In response to massive obstructionism in the first two years of Dayton implementation, the powers of the high representative were augmented at a meeting in December 1997 in Bonn, enabling him to dismiss officials and to impose laws if this was deemed necessary.
In the intervening years, my three immediate predecessors - Carlos Westendorp of Spain, Wolfgang Petritsch of Austria, and Paddy Ashdown of Britain - all made use of these so-called "Bonn powers" to establish the institutions necessary for a viable, modern democracy. In this way, they succeeded in taking the peace process forward.
There are, however, limits to what can be achieved by imposition and these limits have almost certainly been reached.
It is not possible to decree reconciliation, opportunity and prosperity. Institutions that have been created by imposition will never function effectively unless Bosnians of all ethnicities buy in to them and until Bosnian citizens expect them, and not in to international organizations, to deliver reform.
This requires a shift in mind-set both among Bosnians, who have grown accustomed to an intrusive international presence in their country, and within the international community, which has grown accustomed to intervening in all levels of decision making.
One consequence of seeking to avoid using the Bonn powers could be a slowdown in the perceived pace of progress in the coming year. But neither stagnation nor a return to the zero-sum attitudes that once characterized Bosnian politics are inevitable. Indeed, I believe it is possible that Bosnians surprise us and prove to the world that the caricature of their country as a "failed state in Europe" is no longer accurate.
I have traveled through Bosnia for more than a decade, brokering more than 60 mediation agreements on highly sensitive issues, and I have seen impressive changes as a result of the efforts of local people and institutions.
There are huge incentives for success. This year, Bosnia could both sign a stabilization and association agreement with the European Union and join NATO's Partnership-for-Peace program. These are key milestones on the road to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. My office will do what we can to help Bosnia reach these objectives. But to take these processes forward, Bosnia must be a fully sovereign country. That means that I must step back.
Elections in October should provide Bosnians with an opportunity to debate the way forward and to choose leaders who are best equipped to secure their country's European future. For they - not I - will be responsible for negotiating the terms and speed of their country's entry into Europe.
Termination of the office of the high representative - and with it, the Bonn powers - does not signal the end of international engagement in Bosnia. Rather it will herald the beginning of a new chapter in the country's relationship with the wider world and in particular with the rest of Europe. Moreover, I will not leave the country when I cease to be high representative. Instead, I will remain here as a special representative of the European Union to help steer these processes.
Europe has not always done the right thing for Bosnia. I have been acutely aware of this since I resigned from the German government in 1992 in protest of our collective failure in Bosnia. But today tried-and-tested mechanisms, in particular in the form of the European Union's pre-accession negotiations but also NATO's Membership Action Plan, exist to focus the minds of Bosnian leaders on required reforms.
The process of European integration has been remarkable for all countries that today make up the European Union and has helped create unparalleled peace, prosperity and opportunity. It has also helped heal the wounds of the most devastating war the world has known.
Those of us who experienced Europe's darkest days and have lived long enough to see the European Union and NATO grow to include countries that used to be part of the Eastern bloc realize how far and fast it is possible to move when countries are on the right track. While clearly Bosnia still has a long way to go, the goal of eventual membership in these institutions should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.
(Christian Schwarz-Schilling is High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/01/opinion/edschill.php?rss
The goal of eventual membership in the EU and NATO should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.Subscribe to Posts [Atom]

